PAUL  PERIGORD 


TOWARDS    INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 


/ 


Towards  International 
Government 


BY 

J.    A.    HOBSON 

AUTHOR  OF  "  TVORK  AND  WEALTH  :  A    HUMAN  VALUATION, 
"  IMPERIALISM,"  ETC. 


NEW    YORK  :    THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 
LONDON:   GEORGE   ALLEN   &  UNWIN   LTD. 


First  published  1975 


(All  rights  reserved) 


i  rt  —  ^-  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

\"    i  «— >  SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

54&03 


PREFACE 


AFTER  this  war  is  over,  will  the  nations  fall  back 
again  into  the  armed  peace,  the  rival  alliances, 
the  Balance  of  Power  with  competing  armaments, 
the  preparations  for  another  war  thus  made  "  in- 
evitable," or  will  they  go  forward  to  the  realization 
of  the  idea  of  "  public  right,"  as  expounded  by 
Mr.  Asquith,  "  the  substitution  for  force,  for  the 
clash  of  competing  ambitions,  for  groupings  and 
alliances  and  a  precarious  equipoise,  of  a  real 
European  partnership,  based  on  the  recognition  of 
equal  rights  and  established  and  enforced  by  the 
common  will  "?  l  The  preservation  and  progress 
of  civilization  demand  that  the  peoples  go  forward. 
But  how  shall  "  public  right  "  be  realized? 

The  issue  is,  perhaps,  best  approached  by  putting 
a  narrower,  more  concrete  question  :  How  can 
nations  be  got  to  reduce  their  armaments?  For 
this  action  will  be  the  best  test  and  pledge  of  the 
establishment  of  "  public  right  "  and  the  reliance 
on  a  pacific  future.  Could  a  conference  of  Powers 
bring  about  a  reduction  of  armaments  by  agree- 
ment? Surely  not  unless  the  motives  which  have 
led  them  in  the  past  to  arm  are  reversed.  These 
motives  are  either  a  desire  to  be  stronger  than 

1  Dublin,  September  25th,  1914. 

5 


6  PREFACE 

some  other  Power,  in  order  to  take  something 
from  him  by  force — the  aggressive  motive  ;  or  a 
desire  to  be  strong  enough  to  prevent  some  other 
Power  from  acting  in  this  way  to  us — the  defensive 
motive.  Now  how  can  these  motives  be  reversed? 
Nations  may  enter  into  a  solemn  undertaking  to 
refer  all  differences  or  disputes  that  may  arise  to 
arbitration  or  to  other  peaceful  settlement.  If 
they  can  be  got  to  adhere  to  such  a  general  agree- 
ment, international  law  and  public  right  will  take 
the  place  of  private  force,  and  wars  of  aggression 
and  defence  will  no  longer  happen.  But  what  will 
ensure  the  fulfilment  of  their  undertaking  by  all 
the  signatory  Powers?  Public  opinion  and  a 
common  sense  of  justice  are  found  inadequate  safe- 
guards. There  must  be  an  executive  power 
enabled  to  apply  an  economic  boycott,  or  in  the 
last  resort  an  international  force.  If  this  power 
is  adequate,  it  will  secure  the  desired  reversal 
of  the  offensive  and  the  defensive  motives  to  arma- 
ments, and  will  by  a  natural  process  lead  to  a 
reduction  of  national  forces. 

But  it  is  not  safe  for  the  League  of  Nations  to 
wait  until  difficulties  ripen  into  quarrels.  There 
must  be  some  wider  power  of  inquiry  and  settle- 
ment vested  in  a  representative  Council  of  the 
Nations.  This  will  in  substance  mean  a  legisla- 
tive power.  For  peace  cannot  be  secured  by  adopt- 
ing a  purely  statical  view  of  the  needs  and  rights 
of  nations  in  relation  to  one  another.  New 
applications  of  the  principles  of  political 
"  autonomy  "  and  of  "  the  open  door  "  will  become 
necessary,  and  some  international  method  of  deal- 
ing with  them  is  essential.  So  there  emerges  the 


PREFACE  7 

necessity  of  extending  the  idea  of  a  League  of 
Peace  into  that  of  an  International  Government. 

Such  is  the  general  argument  of  these  chapters, 
highly  speculative  in  parts,  but  directed  to  the 
needs  of  the  situation.  Many  difficulties  come  up 
for  consideration.  What  nations  would  enter  into 
such  an  international  arrangement,  and  upon  what 
terms  of  representation?  Should  it  be  a  European 
Confederation,  or  is  a  wider  basis  wanted? 
Finally,  the  reader  is  confronted  with  the  objec- 
tions of  political  theorists  and  historians,  to  the 
effect  that  all  these  ambitious  designs  are  Utopian. 
But  these  objections  do  not  take  account  of  the 
new  factors  in  the  modern  situation,  and  in  par- 
ticular of  the  rising  consciousness  of  power  in  the 
Peoples.  The  new  era  of  internationalism  requires 
the  replacement  of  the  secret  diplomacy  of  Powers 
by  the  public  intercourse  of  Peoples  through  their 
chosen  representatives.  If  the  Peace  which  ends 
this  war  is  to  be  durable,  it  must  be  of  a  kind  to 
facilitate  the  setting-up  of  these  new  international 
arrangements.  No  timid,  tentative  quarter 
measures  will  suffice.  Courage  and  faith  are 
needed  for  a  great  new  extension  of  the  art  of 
government. 

The  writer  is  well  aware  that  his  proposals  and 
the  argument  by  which  he  recommends  them  form 
an  outlined  sketch  rather  than  a  scheme  of  inter- 
nationalism. Countless  practical  difficulties  are  no 
doubt  thus  evaded  which  will  need  close  discussion 
before  any  substantial  progress  along  these  lines 
can  be  realized.  But  it  seemed  desirable  that 
some  such  rapid  and  hazardous  advance  of  specula- 
tive thought  should  be  made,  even  though  it  might 


8  PREFACE 

be  found  that  some  of  the  positions  could  not 
be  "  held  "  while  others  had  to  be  "  reconstituted." 
Even  had  he  felt  qualified  to  set  forth  his  proposals 
in  closer-worked  designs,  he  would  have  refrained 
from  doing  so.  For  at  the  present  stage  it  is  of 
paramount  importance  to  try  to  get  the  largest 
number  of  thoughtful  people  to  form  clear, 
general  ideas  of  better  international  relations,  and 
to  desire  their  attainment.  To  bury  these  new- 
formed  ideas  beneath  mountains  of  detail,  however 
relevant,  is  for  the  time  a  bad  intellectual  and 
moral  economy.  It  may,  indeed,  be  the  case  that 
this  mode  of  appeal  ignores  or  extenuates  some 
difficulties  and  dangers  that  are  deep-rooted  in 
the  nature  of  man  or  of  national  life,  and  are  not 
of  mere  detail.  The  writer  has  had  an  interesting 
experience  of  these  deeper  differences  of  opinion 
and  judgment  as  a  member  of  a  Committee 
which,  under  the  guidance  of  Lord  Bryce,  has 
met  constantly  during  the  course  of  the  war 
for  the  consideration  of  a  constructive  policy  in 
international  relations.  To  his  fellow-members  on 
this  Committee  he  owes  much  in  the  way  of  in- 
formation and  of  suggestion,  and  to  two  in  par- 
ticular, Mr.  G.  Lowes  Dickinson  and  Mr.  E.  R. 
Cross,  he  wishes  to  express  a  special  sense  of 
obligation  for  the  service  they  have  rendered  him 
in  reading  the  manuscript  of  this  work  and  in 
offering  valued  criticism  of  its  contents. 

HAMPSTEAD, 
July  1915. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

PREFACE  .....        5 

CHAPTER 

I.    A  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE    .  .  .  .11 

II.     A  BASIS  OF  CONFEDERATION     .  .  .24 

III.  INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  :  ITS  SCOPE  AND 

METHOD       .  .  .  .  .28 

IV.  SETTLEMENT  BY  CONCILIATION  .  .      44 

V.     COURT    AND    COUNCIL  :    THEIR  APPOINTMENT 

AND  PERSONNEL       .  .  .  -59 

VI.     INTERNATIONAL  FORCE  .  .  72 

VII.     THE  ECONOMIC  BOYCOTT           .  .  .90 

VIII.     THE  INTERNATIONAL  EXECUTIVE          .  .     101 

IX.  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT  IN  RELATION  TO 
(i)  PROBLEMS  OF  NATIONALITY  (ii)  PROB- 
LEMS OF  ECONOMIC  OPPORTUNITY  .  .112 

X.     THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF  NATIONS  .  .     149 

XL     THE  INTERNATIONAL  MIND      .  .  •     J73 

XII.     DEMOCRACY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM  .  .198 

INDEX    ....  .  213 


TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER  I 
A  LEAGUE  OF  PEACE 

ALMOST  everybody  hopes  that,  when  this  war  is 
over,  it  will  be  possible  to  secure  the  conditions  of 
a  lasting  peace  by  reducing  the  power  of  militarism 
and  by  setting  the  relations  between  nations  on  a 
better  footing.  To  watchers  of  the  present  conflict 
it  seems  an  intolerable  thought  that,  after  the  fight- 
ing is  done,  we  should  once  more  return  to  a 
condition  of  "  armed  peace,"  with  jealous,  dis- 
trustful, and  revengeful  Powers  piling  up  arma- 
ments and  plotting  singly  or  in  groups  against  their 
neighbours  until  Europe  is  plunged  into  another 
war  more  terrible,  more  bloody,  and  more  costly 
than  this.  Yet  nothing  is  more  certain  than  that 
this  will  happen  unless  the  Peoples  which  are  so 
vitally  concerned  are  able  to  mobilize  their  powers 
of  clear  thought,  sane  feeling,  and  goodwill  in 
carefully  considered  plans  for  a  co-operative  policy 
of  nations. 

The  first  great  obstacle  to  the  performance  of 


12     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

this  task  is  the  state  of  mind  of  those  who  seem 
to  think  that  all  that  is  required  is  "to  crush 
German  militarism,"  and  that,  this  incubus  once 
removed,  the  naturally  pacific  disposition  of  all 
other  nations  will  dispose  them  to  live  together 
in  amity.  It  is  not  easy  to  induce  such  persons  to 
consider  closely  what  they  mean  by  "  crushing 
German  militarism,"  or  how  its  destruction,  what- 
ever it  does  mean,  would  secure  the  peace  of 
Europe,  we  will  not  say  in  perpetuity,  but  for  a 
single  generation.  But  let  us  suppose  the  most 
complete  success  for  the  arms  of  the  Allies,  the 
slaughter  or  the  capture  of  great  German  forces, 
the  invasion  of  Germany,  and  the  dictation  of  terms 
of  peace  by  the  Allies  at  Berlin.  Such  terms  as 
were  imposed  might  cripple  her  military  power 
of  aggression  or  revenge  for  some  years.  But 
would  it  kill  what  we  know  as  German  militarism? 
If  our  accepted  political  analysis  be  right,  the 
German  militarism  that  must  be  crushed  is  not 
an  army  and  a  navy,  but  a  spirit  of  national 
aggression,  proud,  brutal,  and  unscrupulous,  the 
outcome  of  certain  intellectual  and  moral  tendencies 
embodied  in  the  "  real  "  politics  and  the  "  real  " 
culture  of  the  nation.  Can  we  seriously  suppose 
that  this  evil  spirit  will  be  exorcised  by  a  crushing 
defeat  on  land  and  sea,  followed  by  a  humiliating 
peace?  If  Germany  could  be  permanently  dis- 
abled from  entertaining  any  hopes  of  recovering 
her  military  strength,  or  from  exercising  any  con- 
siderable influence  in  the  high  policy  of  Europe, 
her  feelings  of  resentment  and  humiliation  might 
perhaps  be  left  to  rankle  in  impotence,  or  to  die 
out  by  lapse  of  time.  But  nothing  which  the  Allies 


A   LEAGUE    OF   PEACE  13 

can  do  to  Germany  will  leave  her  in  such  long- 
lasting  impotence.  Even  if  stripped  of  her  non- 
Teutonic  lands  and  populations,  she  will  remain 
a  great  Power — great  in  area,  population,  industry, 
and  organizing  power — and  no  temporary  restric- 
tions or  guarantees  can  long  prevent  her  from 
once  more  developing  a  military  strength  that  will 
give  dangerous  meaning  to  her  thirst  for  vengeance. 
Whether  the  hegemony  of  Prussia  over  a  con- 
federation of  German  States  (possibly  including 
Austria)  be  retained  or  not,  Europe  can  have  no 
security  that  the  same  passions  which  stirred 
France  to  the  most  strenuous  efforts  to  recover 
her  military  strength  after  1870  will  not  be 
similarly  operative  throughout  Germany.  We 
cannot  feel  sure  that  the  experience  of  the 
most  disastrous  war  will  effectively  destroy  the 
hold  of  Prussianism,  and  that  the  efficiency  of 
intellect  and  will  which  constitute  that  power 
will  not  be  able  to  re-assert  their  sway  over  a 
broken  Germany. 

The  fear  of  such  a  revival  of  German  strength 
will  remain  ever-present  in  her  neighbours,  and 
will  compel  them  to  maintain  great  military  pre- 
parations. A  beaten  Germany,  with  a  ring  of 
military  Powers  round  her,  watching  every  phase 
of  her  recovery  with  suspicion,  and  always  liable 
to  quarrel  among  themselves,  will  not  give  peace 
to  Europe.  Even,  therefore,  if  we  assign  to  Ger- 
many a  monopoly  of  the  spirit  of  aggressive 
militarism,  European  peace  is  not  secured  by 
crushing  Germany.  A  saner  review  of  the  situa- 
tion, however,  will  recognize  that  Germany  has 
no  such  monopoly  of  the  spirit  of  aggression, 


14     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

though  that  spirit  has  in  her  recent  policy  found 
its  most  formidable  and  most  conscious  expression. 
If  the  craving  for  a  colonial  Empire  with  "  places 
in  the  sun  "  was,  as  seems  likely,  the  principal 
factor  in  the  aggressive  designs  of  Germany,  can 
we  confidently  assert  that  no  other  State  has  in  the 
past  harboured  such  designs,  or  may  not  harbour 
them  again?  The  expansive  Imperialism  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  even  more  recently  of 
Japan,  gives  the  lie  to  any  such  assertion.  Pan- 
Slavism  is  in  spirit  identical  with  the  Pan- 
Teutonism  which  has  contributed  to  this  dtbdcle, 
and  Great  Britain  and  France  are  already  sated 
with  the  overseas  Empire  which  Germany  was 
craving.  History  shows  that,  in  every  militarist 
State,  aggressive  and  defensive  motives  and  pur- 
poses are  present  together  in  different  degrees  at 
all  times.  While,  therefore,  we  may  reasonably 
think  that  the  aggressive  militarism  of  Germany 
held  increasing  sway  in  the  political  direction  of 
that  Empire  during  recent  years,  and  was  the 
direct  efficient  cause  of  the  present  conflict,  we 
cannot  hold  that,  with  the  defeat  or  even  the  de- 
struction of  the  military  and  naval  power  of  Ger- 
many, militarism  would  tend  to  disappear  from  the 
European  system,  and  that  the  relations  between 
nations  would  henceforth  undergo  so  radical  a 
change  as  to  secure  the  world  against  all  likelihood 
of  forcible  outbreaks  in  the  future. 

Clearly,  it  is  not  German  militarism  alone,  but 
militarism  in  general  that  must  be  broken.  The 
real  question  is  how  to  change  the  inner  attitude 
of  nations,  their  beliefs  and  feelings  towards  one 
another,  so  as  to  make  each  nation  and  its  rulers 


A   LEAGUE   OF   PEACE  15 

recognize  that  it  is  no  longer  either  desirable 
or  feasible  to  seek  peculiar  advantages  for  itself 
by  bringing  force  to  bear  upon  another  nation. 

But  it  may  be  urged,  granted  that  disarmament 
may  not  be  set  afoot  spontaneously  and  separately 
by  the  different  nations,  mutual  disarmament  can 
occur  by  arrangement  between  the  Powers,  which, 
after  the  menace  of  German  aggression  is  re- 
moved, will  be  disposed  to  take  this  step  in  concert. 
Such  disarmament,  it  is  usually  conceived,  will 
not  stand  alone,  but  will  form  an  important  feature 
of  a  larger  international  policy,  by  which  the 
Powers  will  agree  among  themselves  to  settle  any 
differences  that  may  arise  by  reference  to  courts 
of  conciliation  or  of  arbitration,  and  perhaps  also 
to  concert  measures  of  common  action  in  dealing 
with  States  and  territories  not  within  their  juris- 
diction. Such  a  concert  of  European  Powers  has 
hitherto  appeared  to  many  to  yield  an  adequate 
basis  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  if  it  could  be  brought 
about.  It  has  also  seemed  to  most  men  the  utmost 
limit  of  the  actually  attainable.  The  idea  of  the 
possibility  of  any  closer  relation  between  sovereign 
independent  States  has  been  dismissed  as 
chimerical. 

Now  in  any  discussion  of  the  feasibility  of  such 
a  concert  of  European  or  world  Powers  as  will 
by  mutual  agreement  secure  disarmament  and  a 
settlement  of  differences  by  judicial  methods,  it 
must  be  recognized  at  the  outset  that  this  war 
may  make  the  successful  pursuance  of  such  a 
policy  more  difficult  than  it  would  have  been 
before.  A  Balance  of  Power,  whatever  may  have 
been  its  other  disadvantages,  seemed  in  itself 


1 6     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

favourable  to  the  possibilities  of  an  agreement 
in  which  each  nation,  or  group  of  nations,  might 
be  an  equal  gainer.  But  a  decisive  victory  in 
war,  which  leaves  the  Allied  nations  with  a  strong 
preponderance  of  power,  is  less  likely  to  yield 
a  satisfactory  basis  of  agreement  for  a  mutual 
disarmament.  Is  it  likely  that  they  will  readily 
consent  to  a  reduction  in  their  several  military 
and  naval  forces  equivalent  to  the  reduction  they 
will  demand  in  the  forces  of  the  nations  that  have 
been  their  enemies?  To  put  the  difficulty  in  con- 
crete terms  :  Would  France  consent  to  an  early 
reduction  of  her  army  upon  terms  which  would 
leave  her  fighting-strength  as  compared  with  that 
of  Germany  relatively  the  same  as  before  the 
war?  Would  Great  Britain  consent  to  reduce 
her  navy  in  the  same  proportion  as  the  reduction 
she  required  of  Germany?  Even  if  the  Allies 
believed  that  the  proportionate  reduction  would 
be  duly  carried  out  by  Germany,  would  they  regard 
such  an  arrangement  as  affording  the  desired 
security?  Obviously  not.  It  may,  of  course,  be 
urged  that  an  agreed  basis  of  reduction  might 
be  reached,  according  to  which  the  relative  strength 
of  army  and  navy  assigned  to  Germany  would 
be  smaller  than  before.  But  the  more  closely 
the  proposition  is  examined  the  less  feasible  does 
it  appear.  What  basis  for  the  size  of  armies  could 
reasonably,  or  even  plausibly,  be  suggested  which 
would  not  assign  to  Germany  a  larger  preponder- 
ance over  France  in  number  of  soldiers  than  she 
possesses  at  present?  Size  of  population,  or  of 
frontiers,  the  two  most  reasonable  considerations 
for  apportioning  defensive  needs,  would  tell  in 


A   LEAGUE   OF   PEACE  17 

favour  of  Germany  against  France.  True  it  would 
tell  even  more  strongly  in  favour  of  Russia,  assign- 
ing her,  in  fact,  a  relatively  larger  military  pre- 
dominance in  Europe  than  she  has  ever  claimed. 
But  would  either  France  or  Germany  regard  the 
new  military  situation  as  safe  or  desirable?  Nor 
would  there  be  any  permanence  in  an  arrange- 
ment based  on  such  a  mutable  factor  as  population, 
according  to  which  the  German  preponderance 
over  France  and  of  Russia  over  Germany  would 
be  continually  increasing.  If  area  of  territory,  as 
well  as  population  and  frontiers,  were  taken  into 
consideration  in  fixing  a  basis,  France  would  come 
off  a  little  better  in  relation  to  Germany,  but  the 
size  of  Russia,  even  if  her  European  lands  were 
alone  included,  would  give  her  an  overwhelming 
advantage.  If,  as  might  not  unreasonably  be 
claimed,  the  extra-European  possessions  of  Russia, 
Great  Britain,  and  France  must  be  reckoned  in, 
either  on  a  basis  of  territory  or  of  population,  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  would  possess  a  superiority  of 
military  strength  which  would  give  them,  acting 
together,  a  complete  control  over  the  politics  of 
Europe  and  Asia.  Or,  were  the  United  States 
to  come  into  the  arrangement,  the  military 
strength  of  Anglo -Saxondom  might  too  obviously 
surpass  that  of  any  likely  combination  of  other 
Powers. 

Again,  what  basis  of  naval  strength  would  be 
satisfactory?  Great  Britain  would  not  think  of 
accepting  the  area,  population,  or  frontier  factors 
unless  the  Empire  as  well  as  the  British  Isles 
were  counted  in.  On  the  other  hand,  her  pro- 
posal, that  volume  of  shipping  and  of  foreign 


i8     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

trade  should  count  heavily  in  the  basis,  might 
give  her  for  the  time  being  an  even  greater  pre- 
ponderance over  other  navies  than  she  has  hitherto 
possessed. 

If  the  comparison  of  the  military  and  riaval 
strength  of  nations  were  conducted,  as  in  the 
past,  by  direct  consideration  of  the  numerical 
strength  and  the  fighting  value  of  the  several 
items  of  an  army  and  a  navy,  agreement  upon  a 
basis  of  reduction  would  be  manifestly  impossible. 
The  discovery  and  acceptance  of  any  standard 
unit  of  naval  or  military  value  applicable  to 
changing  conditions  of  modern  warfare  are  found 
to  be  impracticable.  For  though  every  military 
budget  implies  the  acceptance  of  some  scale  of 
values  by  which  the  worth  of  a  battery  of  artillery 
is  compared  with  that  of  a  battalion  of  infantry, 
while  every  naval  budget  involves  a  calculation 
of  the  worth  of  a  submarine  or  a  seaplane  as  com- 
pared with  an  armoured  cruiser  and  a  super- 
Dreadnought,  no  two  budgets  would  be  found  to 
support  the  same  scale  of  values.  It  is  quite 
manifest  that  no  agreement  for  reducing  arma- 
ments could  be  attained  by  stipulations  as  to  the 
number,  size,  or  quality  of  the  several  forces  and 
arms  employed.  This  difficulty  in  itself,  however, 
is  not  fatal  to  the  proposal.  For  a  far  simpler 
and  more  satisfactory  method  of  agreement  might 
be  found  by  disregarding  the  concrete  armaments 
and  accepting  a  financial  basis  of  expenditure 
which  would  leave  each  nation  complete  liberty 
to  apply  the  money  prescribed  to  it  as  a  maximum 
expenditure  on  armaments  in  whatever  way  it 
chose.  Though  each  nation,  considering  its  de- 


A  LEAGUE   OF  PEACE  19 

fence,  would  doubtless  have  to  take  into  account 
the  sort  of  preparations  for  possible  attack  its 
neighbours  might  be  making,  it  would  be  entitled 
to  spend  as  large  a  proportion  of  its  authorize^, 
expenditure  upon  guns,  torpedo-boats,  aircraft, 
Dreadnoughts,  as  it  chose. 

The  real  difficulty,  therefore,  turns  upon  the 
agreement  upon  a  basis  of  comparative  expendi- 
ture. Now  this  difficulty  appears  insuperable,  if 
reduction  of  armaments  be  regarded  as  the  sole, 
or  the  chief,  mainstay  of  a  durable  peace.  For 
so  long  as  the  motives  which  have  hitherto  impelled 
nations  to  increase  their  armaments  still  retain 
the  appearance  of  validity  in  any  nation  or  group 
of  nations,  no  agreed  basis  for  reduction  will  be 
reached,  or,  were  it  reached,  no  reliable  adherence 
to  its  terms  could  be  expected.  For  the  reduction 
of  armaments  involves  the  acceptance  of  and  the 
adherence  to  a  principle  of  reduction  by  all  the 
Great  Powers.  If  any  single  Great  Power  refused 
to  come  into  the  agreement,  or,  coming  in,  was 
suspected  of  evading  the  fulfilment  of  its  pledge 
by  concealing  some  of  its  expenditure  on  arma- 
ments, this  method  would  have  failed  pro  tanto, 
both  as  an  economy  and  a  security.  For  each  of 
the  would-be  pacific  nations  would  have  to  make 
adequate  provision  against  the  warlike  outsider  or 
suspect.  Now,  that  a  mere  agreement  for  mutual 
disarmament  would  thus  be  baffled  is  almost  certain. 
So  long  as  a  Power,  by  simply  refusing  to  come 
in,  could  retain  full  liberty  to  pile  up  arms  with  a 
view  to  a  future  policy  of  menace  or  aggression, 
would  there  not  be  Governments  which  would  find 
some  more  or  less  plausible  excuses  for  declining 


20  TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

the  invitation  to  come  in?  Or  could  we  feel  com- 
plete assurance  that  a  Power  with  an  aggressive 
past,  after  entering  into  such  an  agreement,  would 
faithfully  fulfil  it  when  so  many  facilities  of  evasion 
present  themselves?  Nay,  there  would  be  a  posi- 
tive incentive  to  an  aggressive  or  revengeful  Power 
either  to  stay  outside,  or,  entering  in,  to  violate 
secretly  its  obligations.  For,  by  either  course,  it 
would  be  enabled  to  steal  a  march  in  military 
strength  over  its  intended  enemy,  if  the  latter  were 
a  faithful  adherent  to  such  a  treaty.  The  slightest 
reflection  suffices  to  show  that  a  mere  agreement 
for  disarmament  or  reduction  of  armament  must 
be  futile. 

But,  it  will  be  contended,  these  difficulties  may 
be  overcome  by  extending  the  agreement  so  as  to 
bind  the  signatory  Powers  to  bring  their  united 
force  to  bear  upon  any  member  convicted  of  a 
wilful  evasion  or  infraction  of  the  agreement.  That 
is  to  say,  they  must  engage  to  secure  the  agree- 
ment by  an  ultimate  sanction  of  physical  force. 
The  administration  of  such  an  agreement  would, 
of  course,  involve  the  setting  up  of  some  standing 
Court  or  Committee  of  Inquiry,  vested  with  full 
rights  of  inspection  and  judgment,  and  endowed 
with  a  power  of  armed  executive. 

But  if  a  treaty  of  reduction  of  armaments  could 
be  secured  by  such  a  guarantee  of  collective  force, 
it  would  still  find  itself  confronted  by  the  problem 
of  the  lawless  outsider.  So  long1  as  an  aggressive 
outsider  were  at  liberty  to  threaten  or  coerce  a 
member  of  the  League  without  involving  the 
hostility  of  the  other  members,  this  danger  would 
compel  members  of  the  League  to  maintain  large 


A   LEAGUE   OF   PEACE  21 

armaments,  though  they  were  secure  against  in- 
ternal hostility.  A  single  Power,  such  as  Germany, 
Russia,  or  Japan,  standing  out  for  its  absolute 
right  to  determine  its  own  expenditure  and  policy, 
would  cancel  nearly  all  the  economy  of  the  agree- 
ment. It  would  become  self-evident  that  the 
Powers  entering  such  an  agreement  must  bind 
themselves  to  a  common  defence  against  such  an 
outsider.  They  would  be  impelled  to  this  course 
by  a  double  motive.  In  no  other  way  could  each 
member  gain  that  security  which  would  win  his 
consent  to  a  basis  of  reduction  that  would  lower 
his  separate  defensive  power.  Again,  by  pledging 
themselves  to  united  action  against  an  aggressive 
outside  Power,  they  would  diminish,  perhaps  destroy, 
the  aggressive  design  or  policy  of  such  a  Power. 
For  such  aggressive  policy  and  the  armed  force 
which  supports  it  are  only  plausible  upon  the 
assumption  that  they  can  be  successfully  applied  to 
gain  a  selfish  national  end.  If  the  united  strength 
of  the  Treaty  Powers  remained  so  great  as  to 
render  the  pursuance  of  its  aggressive  designs 
impossible  or  too  dangerous,  the  lawless  Power 
might  learn  the  lesson  of  the  law,  and,  abandoning 
its  hopes  of  aggression,  come  into  the  League. 

In  a  word,  the  proposal  for  reduction  of  arma- 
ments only  becomes  really  feasible  when  it  is  linked 
with  a  provision  for  reversing1  the  motives  which 
lead  nations  to  increase  their  armed  forces.  Once 
bring  to  bear  upon  the  Governments  of  States  a 
clear  recognition  of  the  two  related  facts  :  first,  that 
by  no  increase  of  their  armed  force  will  they  be 
reasonably  likely  to  succeed  in  any  aggressive 
design  upon  a  neighbour  ;  second,  that  by  the 


22  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

pledged  co-operation  of  their  cosignatories  they  are 
not  dependent  for  defence  upon  their  own  force 
alone,  then  obvious  motives  of  economy  and  self- 
interest  will  lead  them  to  reduce  their  armaments. 
Though  the  military  caste  may  still  plead  the  in- 
stability of  pacific  agreements  and  the  disciplinary 
advantages  of  National  Service,  while  contractors 
for  armaments  do  their  best  to  sow  dissension 
among  the  leagued  Powers  and  to  arouse  the  mili- 
tary ambitions  of  new  nations,  these  war  interests 
would  no  longer  be  able  to  play  as  heretofore  upon 
the  fears  and  passions  of  the  peoples.  For  what- 
ever the  secret  political  and  business  policy  behind 
the  race  for  armaments,  its  engineers  could  only 
make  that  policy  effective  by  periodic  appeals  to 
the  menace  of  invasion.  Once  make  it  manifest 
that  no  evil-minded  foreigner  can  threaten  aggres- 
sion against  one  country  without  meeting  an  over- 
whelming strength  of  leagued  forces,  to  which  one 
particular  contribution  is  not  of  determinant  im- 
portance, and  the  balance  of  national  motives  leans 
heavily  and  constantly  towards  smaller  and  less 
expensive  forces. 

The  absolute  strength  of  the  rational  and  moral 
case  against  war  and  militarism  has  in  some  degree 
obscured  the  fact  that,  so  long  as  pushful  statesmen 
and  diplomatists,  ambitious  soldiers,  covetous 
financiers,  and  war-traders  were  able  to  stimulate 
and  carry  out  aggressive  policies  of  conquest  and 
aggrandizement  on  the  part  of  stronger  against 
weaker  States,  the  apprehensions  upon  which  these 
same  interests  played  in  urging  the  necessity  of 
large  expenditure  upon  defence  were  not  unreason- 
able. It  is  only  by  making  it  too  obviously  diffi- 


A   LEAGUE   OF   PEACE  23 

cult  and  dangerous  for  any  one  Power  to  attack 
any  other  Power  that  the  balance  of  reasonable 
motives  is  firmly  weighted  against  armaments. 
This  can  only  be  achieved  by  substituting  for  a 
world  of  isolated  independent  States,  or  of  Balances 
of  Power,  a  world  in  which  the  united  strength 
of  a  sufficient  number  of  States  is  brought  to  bear 
immediately  and  certainly  against  any  disturber 
of  the  public  peace. 

"  Splendid  isolation  "  is  no  longer  practicable  in 
the  modern  world  of  international  relations.  Group 
alliances  in  pursuit  of  the  Balance  of  Power  are 
seen  to  be  nothing  else  than  an  idle  feint.  For 
the  sole  and  constant  aim  of  each  such  group 
and  Power  is  not  to  achieve  or  to  maintain  the 
balance,  but  to  weight  it  on  one  side.  Such  an 
alternating  and  oscillating  balance  gives  the  maxi- 
mum of  insecurity,  and  thus  plays  most  effectively 
the  game  of  war  and  armaments.  The  only 
possible  alternative  is  the  creation  of  such  a  con- 
cert or  confederation  of  Powers  as  shall  afford  to 
each  the  best  available  security  against  the  aggres- 
sion of  another  within  the  concert  and  the  best 
defence  of  all  against  aggression  from  outside. 


CHAPTER    II 
A    BASIS    OF    CONFEDERATION 

THE  general  form  in  which  a  co-operation  of 
nations  for  these  objects  presents  itself  is  that 
of  a  League  or  Confederation.  The  primary  object 
of  such  a  League  is  to  bind  all  its  members  to 
submit  all  their  serious  differences  to  arbitration 
or  some  other  mode  of  peaceful  settlement,  and 
to  accept  the  judgment  or  award  thus  obtained. 
Some  advocates  of  a  League  of  Peace  think  that 
the  sense  of  moral  obligation  in  each  State,  fortified 
by  the  public  opinion  of  the  civilized  world,  would 
form  a  valid  sanction  for  the  fulfilment  of  such 
undertakings,  and  would  afford  a  satisfactory 
measure  of  security.  But  most  hold  that  it  is 
advisable  or  essential  that  the  members  of  such 
a  League  should  bind  themselves  to  take  joint 
action  against  any  member  who  breaks  the  peace. 
Assuming  that  a  considerable  body  of  nations 
entered  such  a  League  with  good  and  reliable 
intentions,  how  far  would  it  be  likely  to  secure 
the  peace  of  the  world  and  a  reduction  of  armed 
preparations?  The  answer  to  this  question  would 
depend  mainly  upon  the  number  and  status  of 
the  Powers  constituting  the  League  and  their 
relation  to  outside  nations.  If,  as  is  not  unlikely, 

24 


A   BASIS   OF  CONFEDERATION  25 

at  first  only  a  small  number  of  nations  were  willing 
to  enter  such  a  League,  the  extent  of  the  pacific 
achievement  would  be  proportionately  circum- 
scribed. If,  say,  Britain,  France,  and  the  United 
States  entered  the  League,  undertaking  to  settle 
all  their  differences  by  peaceful  methods,  such  a 
step,  however  desirable  in  itself,  would  not  go 
far  towards  securing  world-peace  or  enabling  these 
leagued  Powers  to  reduce  their  national  arma- 
ments. This  is  so  obvious  that  most  advocates  of 
the  League  of  Peace  urge  that  the  leagued  Powers 
should  not  confine  their  undertaking  to  the  peace- 
ful settlement  of  differences  among  themselves,  but 
should  afford  a  united  defence  to  any  of  their 
members  attacked  by  any  outside  Power  which 
was  unwilling  to  arbitrate  its  quarrel.  A  defensive 
alliance  of  three  such  Great  Powers  (for  that  is 
what  the  League  of  Peace  would  amount  to  at  this 
stage  of  development)  would  no  doubt  form  a 
force  which  it  would  be  dangerous  for  any  nation, 
or  combination  of  nations,  to  attack.  But  it  would 
secure  neither  peace  nor  disarmament.  Nor  would 
it,  as  an  earnest  advocate  of  this  procedure  argues,1 
necessarily,  or  even  probably,  form  a  nucleus  of  a 
larger  League  drawing  in  other  nations.  A  few 
nations  forming  such  a  League  would  not  differ 
substantially  from  the  other  nominally  defensive 
alliances  with  which  the  pages  of  history  are  filled. 
Their  purely  defensive  character  would  be  sus- 
pected by  outside  Powers,  who  would  tend  to  draw 
together  into  an  opposing  alliance,  thus  recon- 
stituting once  more  the  Balance  of  Power  with 

1  "  Proposals  for  a  League  of  Peace,"  by  Aneurin  Williams, 
M.P.,  p.  S. 


26  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

all  its  perils  and  its  competing  armaments.  Nay, 
if  such  a  League  of  Peace  were  constituted  in  the 
spirit  of  the  Holy  Alliance  of  a  century  ago,  or  of 
the  resurrection  of  that  spirit  which  Mr.  Roose- 
velt represents  in  order  "  to  back  righteousness 
by  force  "  in  all  quarters  of  the  earth,  such  an 
opposition  of  organized  outside  Powers  would  be 
inevitable.  The  League  of  Peace  idea,  in  order 
to  have  any  prima  facie  prospect  of  success,  must 
at  the  outset  be  so  planned  as  to  win  the  adherence 
of  the  majority  of  the  Great  Powers,  including 
some  of  those  recently  engaged  in  war  with  one 
another.  For  until  there  was  an  absolute  pre- 
ponderance of  military  and  naval  strength  inside 
the  League,  the  relief  from  internal  strife  would 
do  very  little,  if  anything,  to  abate  the  total  danger 
of  war,  or  to  enable  any  country  to  reduce  its 
armed  preparations.  Further,  it  would  seem 
essential  that  such  a  League  should  in  its  relations 
to  outside  Powers  assume  a  rigorously  defensive 
attitude,  abstaining  from  all  interference  in  ex- 
ternal politics  until  they  encroached  directly  upon 
the  vital  interests  of  one  or  more  of  its  members. 
Such  an  encroachment  it  would  presumably  treat 
as  an  attack  upon  the  League,  and  would  afford 
the  injured  member  such  power  of  redress  as  was 
deemed  desirable  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers  forming  the  League. 

Before  entering  upon  the  fuller  consideration 
of  the  practicability  of  a  League  of  Nations  formed 
upon  these  lines,  it  may  be  well  to  set  forth  in  a 
brief,  formal  manner  the  nature  of  the  chief  im- 
plications which  appear  to  be  contained  in  the 
proposal.  We  shall  then  be  in  a  position  to 


A  BASIS  OF  CONFEDERATION  27 

examine  seriatim  the  various  steps  which  the 
advocates  of  this  method  of  securing  world-peace 
and  disarmament  desire  to  take,  and  the  many 
difficulties  which  are  involved. 

The  signatory  Powers  to  the  Treaty  or  Agree- 
ment establishing  such  a  League  of  Peace  would 
undertake  : — 

(1)  To  submit  to  arbitration  or  conciliation 
all  disputes  or  differences  between  them  not 
capable  of  settlement   by  ordinary   processes 
of  diplomacy,   and   to    accept   and   carry  out 
any    award     or    terms     of     settlement     thus 
attained. 

(2)  To    bring    joint    pressure,    diplomatic, 
economic,  or  forcible,  to  bear  upon  any  mem- 
ber refusing  to  submit  a  disputed  matter  to 
such   modes   of   peaceable   settlement,    or  to 
accept  and  carry  out  the  award,  or  otherwise 
threatening  or  opening  hostilities  against  any 
other  member.1 

"(3)  To  take  joint  action  in  repelling  any 
attack  made  by  an  outside  Power,  or  group 
of  Powers,  upon  any  of  the  members  of  the 
League. 

(4)  To  take  joint  action  in  securing  the 
redress  of  any  injury  which,  by  the  general 
assent  of  the  signatory  Powers,  had  been 
wrongfully  inflicted  upon  any  member  of  the 
League. 

1  Many,  perhaps  most,  supporters  of  a  League  of  Peace  would, 
however,  be  disposed  to  apply  this  police  power  of  the  League 
only  in  cases  where  members  in  contravention  of  the  Treaty 
actually  opened  hostilities  against  another  member. 


CHAPTER    III 

INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION:    ITS 
SCOPE   AND    METHOD 

THE  .efficacy  of  a  League  of  Peace,  or  of  any 
similar  arrangement  between  nations  for  the  pre- 
vention ,of  wars  and  the  reduction  of  armaments, 
depends,  of  course,  upon  the  establishment  of 
reliable  methods  of  pacific  settlement  for  all  sorts 
of  international  differences.  The  recognition  that 
diplomacy  is  not  always  an  adequate  method  of 
peaceful  settlement  was  the  premise  from  which 
the  Czar's  proposal  at  the  International  Peace 
Conference  in  1899  proceeded. 

"  Diplomacy,"  said  M.  Staal,  "  long  ago 
admitted,  among  the  means  of  preserving  peace, 
a  resort  to  arbitration  and  mediation  ;  but  it  has 
not  defined  the  conditions  of  their  employment, 
nor  determined  the  cases  to  which  they  are  applic- 
able. It  'is  to  this  high  task  that  we  are  about  to 
devote  our  efforts,  sustained  by  the  conviction 
that  we  are  labouring  for  the  welfare  of  all  man- 
kind and  in  the  path  marked  out  for  us  by 
preceding  generations." 

In  pursuance  of  this  purpose  a  Permanent  Court 
of  Arbitration  has  been  established  at  The  Hague, 
to  which  a  number  of  disputes  have  been  referred 

38 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  29 

for  settlement,  while  an  International  Prize  Court 
has  been  set  up  as  a  court  of  appeal  from  national 
courts  in  cases  of  merchant  ships  captured  in 
naval  warfare.  Why  should  not  a  group  of  nations 
agree  to  submit  either  to  a  court  of  arbitration  or 
to  another  judicial  tribunal  l  all  disputes  likely  to 
endanger  peace?  Arbitration  has  sometimes  been 
assumed  to  be  a  process  competent  to  the  pacific 
settlement  of  every  sort  of  difference.  Treaties 
have  actually  been  made  by  which  nations  have 
bound  themselves  to  submit  all  issues  without  ex- 
ception to  this  mode  of  settlement.  In  1898 
(before  the  first  Hague  Conference)  Argentina 
and  Italy  had  taken  this  step,  and  they  were 
followed  in  1904  by  Denmark's  three  treaties  with) 
Holland,  Italy,  and  Portugal.  Theoretically, 
indeed,  no  clear  distinction  can  be  drawn  which 
should  exclude  from  arbitral  settlement  any  sort 
of  differences  arising  between  nations.  "  There 
is  no  doubt,"  holds  Professor  Oppenheim,  '"'  that, 
the  consent  of  the  parties  once  given,  every 
possible  difference  might  be  settled  through 
arbitration,  whether  the  verdict  is  based  on  the 
rules  of  International  Law,  or  rules  of  national 
equity,  or  the  opposing  claims  are  compromised."  2 
But  it  does  not  follow  that  arbitration  is  equally 
suitable  or  convenient  for  the  settlement  of  all 
cases,  and  at  the  Hague  Conferences  and  else- 
where .a  practically  useful  and  generally  accepted 
distinction  has  been  drawn  between  issues  that 
can  best  be  dealt  with  by  arbitration  and  issues 

1  Such  as  the  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  proposed  by  the  United 
States  in  the  Conference  of  1907. 

2  "  International  Law,"  vol.  ii.  p.  18. 


30    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

for  which  some  other  method  of  pacific  settlement 
is  better  fitted. 

It  is  agreed  that  differences  of  a  "  judicial  " 
or  "  legal  "  nature  are,  in  default  of  any  Court 
of  International  Justice,  especially  fitted  for 
arbitral  settlement.  The  Hague  Convention  em- 
bodies this  view  in  Article  16  :  "  The  signatory 
Powers,  therein  recognizing  arbitration  as  the 
most  efficacious  and  at  the  same  time  most  equit- 
able means  of  determining  differences  of  a  judicial 
character  in  general,  and  in  especial  differences 
regarding  the  interpretation  or  application  of 
international  treaties,"  etc.  The  phrase  used  to 
describe  the  subjects  submitted  to  arbitration  in 
the  Arbitration  Treaty  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  which  lapsed  in  1914,  was 
"  differences  of  a  legal  nature."  A  distinctly 
broader  sense,  however,  is  assigned  to  arbitration 
in  the  treaties  which  President  Taft  endeavoured 
to  negotiate  between  the  United  States  and  various 
European  nations.  The  term  then  adopted  by  Mr. 
Knox  in  defining  the  issues  suitable  for  arbitra- 
tion was  "  justiciable,"  and  the  form  of  the  treaties 
ran  as  follows  :  "  The  differences  .  .  .  relating 
to  international  matters  in  which  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  are  concerned  by  virtue  of  a  claim 
of  right  made  by  one  against  the  other  under 
treaty  or  otherwise,  and  which  are  justiciable  in 
their  nature  by  reason  of  being  susceptible  of 
decision  by  the  application  of  the  principles  of  law 
or  equity,"  etc. 

Ex- President  Taft's  interpretation  of  this 
language  deserves  citation.  "  First,  the  differ- 
ences must  relate  to  international  affairs  ;  second, 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  31 

they  arise  upon  a  claim  of  right — i.e.  a  right  under 
a  treaty  or  under  principles  of  international  law 
of  one  against  the  other  ;  third,  they  must  be 
justiciable — i.e.  capable  of  judicial  solution  by 
application  of  the  principles  of  law  or  equity."  l 

Now  this  definition  evidently  excludes  certain 
causes  of  dissension  and  dispute  between  nations 
as  unsuitable  for  this  mode  of  settlement.  Strained 
relations  between  nations  sometimes  occur  when 
no  international  injury  is  alleged  and  no  "  claim 
of  right  "  arises,  as,  for  example,  where  the  mem- 
bers of  one  nation  are  resentful  at  the  persecu- 
tion of  their  co-religionists  or  co-racials  by  the 
Government  of  another  nation.  More  numerous 
are  the  quarrels  when  the  commercial  policy  of 
one  nation  inflicts  grave  injury  upon  the  commerce 
of  another,  though,  as  in  the  case  of  Tariffs,  there 
is  no  question  as  to  the  "  right  "  of  the  offender 
to  pursue  this  policy.  Mr.  Taft's  definition  would 
also  exclude  political  issues  of  a  "  general  "  order 
such  as  could  not  be  brought  down  to  any  definite 
point  of  law  or  fact,  such  issues  as  are  involved  in 
the  rival  claims  for  spheres  of  influence,  the  com- 
petition in  armaments,  the  acquisition  of  railroad 
concessions  in  territory  where  the  acquiring  Power 
obtains  an  important  strategical  advantage  over 
a  neighbour,  etc. 

Finally,  the  confinement  to  "  the  application  of 
the  principles  of  law  or  equity  "  excludes  disputes 
turning  wholly  upon  questions  of  fact. 

Now  if  we  are  seeking  means  for  composing 
every  sort  of  dispute  or  ill-feeling  between  nations, 
we  shall  evidently  require  several  different  methods 
1  "The  United  States  and  Peace,"  p.  107. 


32  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

of  procedure  accommodated  to  the  nature  of  the 
trouble. 

It  is  pretty  evident  that  the  various  disputes  can 
be  brought  under  three  categories  :  disputes  of 
law  and  its  application,  disputes  of  fact  not  in- 
volving law,  and  disputes  of  policy.  Dr.  Marburg 
deduces  from  this  distinction  three  modes  of  treat- 
ment. "  Diplomacy,  including  good  offices  and 
mediation,  may,  of  course,  deal  with  all  of  them. 
But  the  finding  of  facts  is  naturally  the  function 
of  a  commission  of  inquiry  or  jury,  while  the 
determination  of  law  and  its  application  falls 
properly  within  the  province  of  a  court  of  law. 
Disputes  as  to  policy  are  the  only  ones  which, 
after  the  failure  of  diplomacy  to  compose  them, 
lean  naturally  for  final  settlement  on  arbitration, 
the  inherent  principle  of  which  is  compromise."  ' 
Of  the  logical  validity  and  the  practical  utility 
of  this  distinction  there  can  be  no  question.  There 
will  be,  of  course,  some  overlapping  or  mingling 
of  these  issues.  There  will  be  mixed  questions  of 
fact  and  law,  and  questions  of  policy  which  can  in 
part  at  any  rate  be  resolved  into  questions  of  fact. 
But  if  we  were  building  with  a  free  hand  our 
structure  of  international  agreement,  we  should 
certainly  establish  a  separate  International  Judi- 
cature for  the  determination  of  points  of  law,  a 
Commission  of  Inquiry  to  discover  facts,  and  a 
Conciliation  or  Arbitration  Court  to  compose  dis- 
putes of  a  political  or  general  character. 

But  the  separation  of  the  distinctively  judicial 
from  the  arbitration  process  is  not  easy  to  com- 

1  "  Law  and  Judicial  Settlement,"  Dr.  Marburg,  No.  18. 
"Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes." 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  33 

pass.  Two  difficulties  may  render  it  impossible 
in  the  beginnings  of  international  architecture. 
The  formal  establishment  of  an  International 
Judicature  would  seem  to,  and  would,  in  fact,  involve 
an  acknowledgment  on  the  part  of  sovereign  States 
of  a  more  definite  cession  of  sovereignty  than  they 
may  be  willing  to  consent  to.  Moreover,  the  sharp 
distinction  between  judicial  procedure  and  arbitra- 
tion has  not  been  maintained  even  by  its  advocates 
at  The  Hague  or  elsewhere.  This  is  conclusively 
shown  by  reference  to  the  title  Court  of  Arbitral 
Justice,  which  the  American  delegates  at  the 
Second  Hague  Conference  proposed  to  substitute 
for  the  existing  Court  of  Arbitration.  In  urging 
the  establishment  of  this  Court,  neither  the 
American  nor  the  other  supporters  sought  to  dis- 
tinguish the  judicial  from  the  arbitrable  disputes, 
but  confined  their  advocacy  to  emphasizing  the 
greater  continuity  and  other  advantages  attendant 
upon  the  reform. 

Moreover,  though  Mr.  Taft  in  the  passage  above 
quoted  drew  a  sharp  distinction  between  justiciable 
and  non-justiciable  cases,  elsewhere  he  seems  will- 
ing to  bring  all  definitely  "  international  "  issues 
under  the  arbitral  process.1 

In  view  of  these  facts  and  of  the  further  fact 
that  in  the  existing  international  treaties  for  settle- 

1  "  My  whole  ideal  is  that  of  an  arbitral  court  for  the  settle- 
ment of  international  controversies,  and  I  favoured  the  arbitra- 
tion treaties  as  a  long  step  towards  an  arbitral  court  whose 
jurisdiction  should  be  increased  ultimately  to  include  all  possible 
disputes  of  an  international  character." — Letter  to  Conference 
of  American  Society  for  Judicial  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes,  1914. 

3 


34    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

ment  of  disputes  no  distinction  between  judicial 
and  arbitrable  is  known,  the  cases  of  interpretation 
and  application  of  international  law  being  recog- 
nized as  suitable  for  arbitration,  it  may  be  well 
for  our  present  discussion  to  ignore  this  dis- 
tinction of  Dr.  Marburg,  and  to  adhere  to  our 
preliminary  division  into  arbitrable  and  non- 
arbitrable  issues. 

Now,  this  division  involves  a  withdrawal  of  the 
strict  division  between  issues  of  law  and  issues  of 
fact.  Even  in  national  judicial  procedure  the  dis- 
tinction cannot  always  be  preserved,  and  in  many 
instances  the  judge  determines  the  latter  as  well  as 
the  former.  In  the  actual  history  of  arbitration 
the  ascertainment  of  definite  crucial  facts  has 
always  formed  an  acknowledged  part  of  the  arbi- 
trator's work. 

The  most  serviceable  distinction  between  arbi- 
trable and  non-arbitrable  cases  is  made  by  another 
American  lawyer,  who  says  :  "  There  cannot  be 
an  arbitrable  question  unless  there  is  a  dispute 
between  nations  as  to  some  questions  of  fact  or 
some  question  of  international  law.  Purely 
political  or  dogmatic  questions  cannot  in  their 
nature  be  arbitrated."  l  Without  entering  further 
into  the  subtleties  of  the  question,  we  can,  I  think, 
form  a  pretty  clear  idea  of  the  kinds  of  issue  that 
are  conveniently  arbitrable. 

First,  all  disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  or 
application  of  treaties  or  other  formal  agreements 
between  nations. 

Secondly,  disputes  capable  of  settlement  by  the 

1  Mr.  Hornblower,  "  Report  of  a  Conference  on  Judicial  Settle- 
ment of  International  Disputes,  1913,"  p.  213. 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  35 

application  of  the  principles  of  international 
law.1 

Thirdly,  disputes  on  questions  of  fact  that  are 
capable  of  submission  to  ordinary  processes  of 
legal  evidence. 

It  is  the  third  class  that  raises  the  most  diffi- 
culty. All  differences  are  in  a  sense  dependent  on 
questions  of  fact.  The  question  how  far  Germany 
intended  to  bring  about  this  war,  and  what  her 
motives  were,  the  question  whether  France  made 
her  Russian  alliance  in  order  some  day  to  carry 
out  a  war  of  revanche,  whether  Russia's  stiffening 
on  the  Servian  grievance  was  due  to  her  recogni- 
tion that  the  time  was  ripe — these  are  questions  of 
fact.  But  such  inner  facts  of  feeling  and  intention 
cannot  be  ascertained  by  arbitration  with  any 
measure  of  certainty. 

Disputes  of  fact  for  purposes  of  arbitration  must 
relate  to  concrete  facts,  or  motives  which  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  are  clearly  ascertainable  by 
evidence  of  facts.  Whether  a  vessel  struck  a  rock 
or  was  destroyed  by  a  mine,  whether  a  Government 
authorized  a  punitive  expedition  across  a  distant 
frontier,  what  amount  of  damages  would  cover 
the  injuries  sustained  by  the  illegal  launching  of 
the  Alabama — such  ascertainments  of  fact  and 
measurable  valuations  upon  evidence  are  eminently 
fit  for  arbitration.  This,  however,  does  not  ex- 
clude all  cases  of  subjective  fact  or  intention.  The 
fixation  of  responsibility,  as  well  as  the  extent  of 
injury,  may  be  determined  by  arbitration.  The 

1  International  law  differs  from  municipal  law  in^that  it  is  not 
the  creation  of  any  Legislature  or  of  any  judicial  process.  It  is 
nothing  other  than  recognized  international  usage. 


36     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

Report  of  the  Dogger  Bank  Commission  was  in 
effect,  and  might  have  been  in  form,  an  arbitral 
award,  though  it  was  the  result  of  what  was 
described  as  an  "  Inquiry." 

But  adopting  provisionally  the  distinction  which 
confines  arbitration  disputes  to  the  questions  of 
interpretation,  law,  and  fact,  just  enumerated,  we 
find  among  statesmen  a  great  reluctance  to  con- 
sent to  submit  to  arbitration  all  issues  that  are  in 
these  senses  arbitrable.  No  arbitration  treaty  has 
been  made  between  two  Great  Powers  in  which  all 
differences  of  a  legal  nature  are  submitted.  Differ- 
ences affecting  "  vital  interests,"  "  honour,"  and 
"  independence  "  are  excepted.  These  were  the 
exceptions  in  the  series  of  treaties  made  by  Great 
Britain  in  1903  and  1904  with  France,  Spain, 
Italy,  Germany,  Sweden,  Norway,  Portugal,  and 
Austria-Hungary.  To  these  exceptions  "  territorial 
integrity  "  is  sometimes  added.  The  reservations 
made  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  in  the 
treaties  of  general  arbitration  proposed  by  Mr. 
Knox,  specified  in  addition  to  "  territorial  in- 
tegrity "  questions  relating  to  the  admission  and 
treatment  of  "  aliens,"  and  the  indebtedness  of  a 
State,  and  all  issues  relating  to  the  Monroe  doctrine 
of  foreign  policy.1 

1  The  American  proposal  for  an  obligatory  world  treaty  of 
arbitration  in  a  general  form,  submitted  to  the  Hague  Con- 
ference of  1907,  took  the  following  shape  :  "  Differences  of  a 
judicial  kind,  and  before  all  those  relating  to  the  interpretation 
of  treaties  existing  between  two  or  more  of  the  contracting 
States,  which  may  arise  between  the  said  States  in  the  future, 
and  which  shall  not  have  been  settled  by  diplomatic  means,  shall 
be  submitted  to  arbitration,  on  the  condition  that  they  affect 
neither  the  vital  interests  nor  the  independence  or  honour  of 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  37 

It  is,  of  course,  apparent  that  "  honour  "  and 
"  vital  interests  "  can  be  made  to  cover  almost 
any  issue  of  sufficient  importance  to  endanger  the 
peace  between  nations,  and  that  the  formal  ex- 
clusion of  such  issues  renders  arbitration  treaties 
of  comparatively  little  worth  as  a  provision  against 
war.  The  retention  of  such  reservations  virtually 
cancels  the  so-called  obligation  to  submit  to  arbi- 
tration any  class  of  issues  named  in  the  treaty. 

It  is,  however,  needless  to  labour  so  obvious  a 
point.  If  arbitration  is  to  be  made  an  effective 
method  for  securing  peace,  all  issues  in  their  nature 
arbitrable  must  be  brought  within  its  scope,  irre- 
spective of  their  importance  or  the  feeling  that 
attaches  to  them.  The  question,  for  example,  of 
the  alleged  complicity  of  the  Servian  Government 
in  the  Serajevo  assassination,  affecting,  as  it  un- 
doubtedly did,  both  honour  and  vital  interests, 
was  eminently  suitable  for  arbitral  decision. 

But  if  arbitration  is  to  be  made  a  really  effective 
international  instrument  for  peace,  it  is  not  enough 
that  individual  nations  should  bind  themselves  to 
refer  to  arbitration  all  issues  that  are  arbitrable, 
including  those  affecting  honour  and  vital  interests. 
Such  a  network  of  separate  treaties  ought  to  be 
replaced  by  a  general  treaty  to  which  all  the 
Powers  should  set  their  signature.  The  efforts  of 
several  Powers  to  induce  the  representatives  at 
the  1907  Hague  Conference  to  enter  a  general 
treaty  were  defeated  by  the  fact  that  no  prior 

either  of  the  said  States,  and  that  they  do  not  affect  the  interests 
of  other  States  not  parties  to  the  controversy."  The  decision 
as  to  the  relation  of  any  case  to  honour,  vital  interests,  or  inde- 
pendence is  left  to  the  several  signatory  Powers. 


38    TOWARDS    INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

agreement  had  yet  been  reached  among  the  Powers 
to  submit  to  arbitration  all  justiciable  issues.  All 
sorts  of  divergences  were  disclosed  as  to  the  kinds 
of  issues  which  .particular  States  were  or  were 
not  willing  to  arbitrate.  So  long  as  the  several 
States  insisted  on  considering  the  proposal  of  com- 
pulsory arbitration  in  the  particular  light  of  their 
own  national  interests  and  history,  disregarding 
or  insufficiently  regarding  their  larger  interest  in 
maintaining  the  peace  of  the  world,  the  conditions 
of  a  general  treaty,  as  distinct  from  separate 
treaties,  were  not  attainable.  This  objection  was 
promptly  and  persistently  maintained  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Germany.  Baron  Marschall  von 
Bieberstein  put  the  matter  in  the  following  way  : — 
"  It  would  be  an  error  to  believe  that  a  general 
arbitrational  agreement  concluded  between  two 
States  can  serve  purely  and  simply  as  a  model,  or, 
so  to  speak,  a  formulary  for  a  world-treaty.  The 
matter  is  very  different  in  the  two  cases.  Between 
two  States  which  conclude  a  treaty  of  general 
obligatory  arbitration,  the  field  of  possible  differ- 
ences is  more  or  less  under  the  eyes  of  the  treaty 
members  ;  it  is  circumscribed  by  a  series  of  con- 
crete and  familiar  factors,  such  as  the  geographical 
situation  of  the  two  countries,  their  financial  and 
economic  relations,  and  the  historic  traditions 
which  have  grown  up  between  them.  In  a  treaty 
including  all  the  countries  of  the  world,  these 
concrete  factors  are  wanting,  and  hence,  even  in 
the  restricted  list  of  juristic  questions,  the  possi- 
bility of  differences  of  every  kind  is  illimitable. 
It  follows  from  this  that  a  general  arbitrational 
agreement  which,  between  two  States,  defines  with 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION  39 

sufficient  clearness  the  rights  and  duties  which  flow 
from  it,  might  be  in  a  world-treaty  too  vague  and 
elastic,  and  therefore  inapplicable."  l 

The  discussions  of  the  Conference,  which,  after 
abandoning  the  attempt  to  define  the  subjects  of 
arbitration  by  exclusion,  endeavoured  to  secure 
agreement  upon  a  specified  list  of  subjects  for 
inclusion,  supported  this  criticism  of  von  Bieber- 
stein.  The  attempt  to  secure  general  acceptance 
for  an  agreed  list  of  subjects  proper  for  arbitra- 
tion by  a  general  treaty  completely  failed.  A 
careful  list  of  subjects,  founded  upon  actual  treaties 
recently  negotiated,  was  most  harshly  treated  by 
the  Conference.  "  Of  the  twenty-four  clauses 
voted  on,  only  the  first  eight  received  a  majority 
of  the  votes  of  the  Committee  ;  of  the  eighteen 
countries  represented  on  the  Committee,  from  four 
to  nine  cast  adverse  votes  in  each  case.  Two  dele- 
gates (Germany  and  Austria)  voted  against  every 
one  of  the  clauses  ;  and  two  others  (Belgium  and 
Greece)  either  voted  against  every  one  or  abstained 
from  voting  at  all  ;  while  only  five  (France, 
Norway,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  and  Servia) 
voted  for  all  of  them."  2 

It   seems    evident   that    no  such   general   treaty 
of  arbitration  as  seems  essential  to  the  formation 
of  an  effective  League  of  Nations  will  be  possible 
unless  the  signatory  Powers  are  willing  to  submit 
all    arbitrable    issues,    inclusive    of    those    affect- 
ing    honour      and      vital      interests.       So      long 
as   the   spirit   of    reserve   prevails,   inducing   each 
nation  to   seek  to   exclude  some   set  of  issues  of 
1  Quoted,  Hull,  The  Two  Hague  Conferences,  p.  313. 
2  Hull,  p.  334. 


40  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

special  interest  to  itself,  a  general  treaty  must 
prove  impracticable.  It  is  perhaps  possible  that 
a  new  spirit  may  prevail  among  those  who  are  sent 
to  represent  the  nations  at  the  settlement  of  this 
war.  Might  it  not  be  felt  that  the  honour  and 
the  vital  interests  of  a  nation  are  better  conserved 
by  accepting  an  award  impartially  decided  on  the 
merits  of  the  case  than  by  insisting  on  the  ordeal 
of  battle? 

It  may  seem  to  some  a  matter  of  light  import- 
ance whether  nations  seeking  peaceable  relations 
with  their  neighbours  bind  themselves  by  separate 
treaties  in  each  instance,  or  participate  in  a  general 
arbitration  treaty.  But  sound  internationalism 
demands  the  latter  process.  So  long  as  the  policy 
of  special  treaties  holds,  the  tendency  to  negotiate 
them  only  with  certain  favoured  or  favourable 
nations,  and  to  pay  regard  to  particular  objects 
in  the  way  of  inclusion  or  exclusion,  will  con- 
tinue to  prevail.  Only  by  assent  to  a  general 
treaty  can  the  standardization  of  arbitral  justice 
be  secured.  Nor  does  this  apply  only  to  the 
agreements  ;  it  applies  also  to  the  process  of 
arbitration.  It  is  a  prime  requisite  for  equitable 
arbitration  that  the  best  conditions  for  complete 
impartiality,  as  regards  the  constitution  of  the 
Court  and  its  methods  of  procedure,  shall  prevail. 
These  conditions  are  better  fulfilled  where  every 
case  that  arises  proceeds  automatically  to  a  stand- 
ing tribunal,  with  a  skilled  personnel  of  experi- 
enced judges  following  a  recognized  procedure, 
than  where  special  arrangements  may  be  made 
by  the  two  parties  for  a  tribunal  of  their  own 
selection.  The  damage  done  to  the  reputation  of 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  41 

arbitration  by  the  appointment  of  arbitrators  who 
are,  in  fact,  ex.  parte  advocates,  and  whose  ulti- 
mate awards  carry  a  recognizable  bias,  has  been 
considerable.  Compromise  is  essential  to  arbitra- 
tion. But  there  is  every  difference  between  a 
compromise  which  embodies  the  spirit  of  give  and 
take,  or  mutual  concession,  and  that  which  is  the 
mechanical  register  or  resultant  of  a  number  of 
opposing  pulls. 

Such  an  extension  of  the  existing  scope  of 
arbitration,  and  such  a  tightening  of  the  arbitral 
apparatus  at  The  Hague,  would  virtually  accom- 
plish the  work  to  which  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States  especially  addressed  themselves  in 
the  Hague  Conference  of  1907,  viz  :  the  substitu- 
tion of  a  permanent  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  for 
the  loosely  composed  Arbitration  Court  already  in 
being.  The  chief  defects  of  the  existing  structure 
were  thus  designated  by  Mr.  Choate  : — 

"  The  fact  that  there  was  nothing  permanent  or 
continuous  or  connected  in  the  sessions  of  the 
Court,  or  in  the  adjudication  of  the  cases  sub- 
mitted to  it,  has  been  an  obvious  source  of  weak- 
ness and  want  of  prestige  in  the  tribunal.  Each 
trial  it  had  before  it  has  been  wholly  independent 
of  every  other,  and  its  occasional  utterances,  widely 
distant  in  time  and  disconnected  in  subject-matter, 
have  not  gone  far  towards  constituting  a  consistent 
body  of  international  law  or  of  valuable  contribu- 
tions to  international  law,  which  ought  to  emanate 
from  an  international  tribunal  representing  the 
power  and  might  of  all  the  nations.  In  fact,  it 
has  thus  far  been  a  Court  only  in  name,  a  frame- 
work for  the  selection  of  referees  for  each  par- 


ticular  case,  never  consisting  of  the  same  judges. 
It  has  done  great  good  so  far  as  it  has  been  per- 
mitted to  work  at  all,  but  our  effort  should  be  to 
try  to  make  it  the  medium  of  vastly  greater  and 
constantly  increasing  benefit  to  the  nations  and 
mankind  at  large.  Let  us,  then,  seek  to  develop 
out  of  it  a  Permanent  Court  which  shall  hold 
regular  and  continuous  sessions,  which  shall  con- 
sist of  the  same  judges,  which  shall  pay  due  heed 
to  its  own  decisions,  which  shall  speak  with  the 
authority  of  the  united  voice  of  the  nations  and 
gradually  build  up  a  system  of  international  law, 
definite  and  precise,  which  shall  command  the 
approval  and  regulate  the  conduct  of  the  nations." 
The  proposal  received  powerful  support,  not  only 
from  the  Russian  representatives,  who  had  them- 
selves drafted  a  similar  proposal,  but  from  Baron 
von  Bieberstein  on  behalf  of  Germany.  Such  opposi- 
tion as  was  invoked  to  overthrow  the  acceptance 
of  the  scheme  arose  almost  entirely  from  the  small 
nations,  and  was  directed,  not  to  the  essential  merits 
of  the  proposal  but  to  the  structure  of  the  Court 
that  was  proposed.  The  demand  of  the  smaller 
nations  for  absolute  international  equality  in  the 
appointment  of  the  judges  was  the  rock  on  which 
the  proposal  split.  This  fear  of  the  small  nations 
lest  a  Tribunal,  virtually  endowed  with  a  legis- 
lative power,  should  operate  to  secure  the  practical 
domination  of  a  few  Great  Powers  cannot  be 
ignored  in  any  practical  discussion  of  arbitration 
in  the  more  extended  form  which  is  required.  This 
risk  might,  no  doubt,  be  obviated,  in  part  at  any 
rate,  by  strictly  circumscribing  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Court  so  as  to  confine  its  powers  within  the 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION  43 

limits  set  by  the  original  agreement.  It  is,  how- 
ever, right  to  recognize  that  the  acceptance  of  the 
claim  to  equality  made  by  the  small  Powers  would 
be  likely  to  prove  a  stout  obstacle  to  the  adhesion 
of  certain  Great  Powers,  especially  if  the  scope 
of  arbitral  justice  were  extended  to  include,  not 
merely  the  minor  concrete  issues  hitherto  submitted, 
but  all  arbitrable  issues  involving  honour  and  vital 
interests. 

But  leaving  on  one  side  for  the  present  these 
grave  political  difficulties  relating  to  the  composi- 
tion of  the  tribunal,  the  proposed  enlargement 
of  the  powers  and  consolidation  of  the  structure 
of  the  Hague  Court  would  seem  essential  to  the 
full  and  effective  work  of  arbitration.  It  is 
desirable,  then,  that  in  the  settlement  of  this  war 
every  effort  should  be  made  to  induce  the  Powers 
to  bind  themselves  to  submit  to  that  process  all 
issues  of  an  arbitrable  nature,  and  to  enter  into  a 
general  treaty  for  the  establishment  of  a  permanent 
Tribunal  of  Arbitral  Justice  before  which  all 
such  cases  should  be  tried. 


CHAPTER   IV 
SETTLEMENT    BY    CONCILIATION 

WHAT  is  to  be  done  for  the  pacific  settlement  of 
such  differences  as  are  in  their  nature  not  suited 
for  arbitration?  Purely  political  or  dynastic  ques- 
tions, we  have  already  recognized,  cannot  be  arbi- 
trated. Many,  if  not  most,  of  the  issues  fraught 
with  greatest  peril  to  peace  are  of  this  order. 
They  sometimes  consist  in  a  general  attitude  of 
policy  or  in  inflammation  of  feeling  which  cannot 
be  reduced  to  definite  claims  or  complaints,  and 
is  not  compassed  in  any  clearly  specified  acts. 
The  danger  always  simmering  in  the  Balkans  has 
largely  been  of  this  general  character,  though 
taking  concrete  local  shape  at  various  moments. 
The  intrigues  of  Austria  and  of  Russia  among 
these  East  European  States  could  scarcely  ever 
be  formulated  in  a  manner  suitable  for  arbitration. 
The  resentment  and  suspicion  of  the  growing  mili- 
tary power  of  Germany  or  Russia  by  other  nations, 
and  fears  relating  to  a  disturbance  of  the  Balance 
of  Power,  the  ill-feeling  evoked  in  one  nation 
by  the  sudden  adoption  by  another  nation  of  a 
tariff,  apparently  designed  to  damage  the  trade 
of  the  former  nation,  the  question  of  competition 
for  spheres  of  influence  in  China  or  in  other  parts 

44 


SETTLEMENT   BY   CONCILIATION  45 

of  Asia,  the  whole  grave  issue  of  competition  in 
armaments,  belong  to  a  class  of  differences  which 
cannot  in  their  main  aspect  be  brought  to 
arbitration. 

Again,  there  are  matters  of  difference  not 
directly  contained  in  any  political  act  or  attitude, 
and  to  the  settlement  of  which  no  existing  inter- 
national law  is  applicable.  Many  points  in  the 
working  of  the  postal,  telegraphic,  monetary 
systems  which  are  essential  to  international  inter- 
course, rules  relating  to  phyloxera,  rinderpest,  and 
other  pests,  common  regulations  for  protection  of 
life  and  property  at  sea,  the  standardization  of 
weights  and  measures,  alien  immigration  and  re- 
patriation where  no  formal  treaties  exist,  and  a 
great  variety  of  other  issues  which  are  either 
unsuitable  for  international  law  or  treaty,  or  which 
are  not,  in  fact,  brought  under  these  processes — all 
such  issues  are  liable  to  contain  inflammatory 
matter  which  may  not  be  strictly  arbitrable  in  its 
nature. 

Discussion  at  The  Hague  in  1907  showed  how 
impossible  it  was  to  obtain  any  agreement  among 
the  Powers  as  to  the  inclusion  of  such  questions  in  a 
general  treaty  of  arbitration.  For  though  some  of 
the  opposition  to  the  several  items  was  based  upon 
an  objection  either  to  the  "  obligatory  "  or  to  the 
"  general  "  principle  of  a  world-treaty,  there  was 
a  genuine  and  widespread  conviction  that  many  of 
these  disputes  were  not  truly  "  arbitrable,"  at  any 
rate  in  the  shape  in  which  they  would  first  arise. 
The  underlying  objection  was  that  most  of  them 
involved  issues  of  policy. 

Now,    what    is    to    be    done    with    these    non- 


46  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

arbitrable  issues?  They  are  often  the  more 
dangerous  because  they  are  not  reducible  to  sharp 
questions  of  law  or  fact.  America  Has  always 
rightly  recognized  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
not  suitable  for  arbitration.  No  principles  of  a 
Court  of  Arbitration  could  deal  satisfactorily  with 
Germany's  demand  for  "  colonial  expansion  "  or 
"  a  place  in  the  sun,"  or  with  the  political  feel- 
ings and  pressures  contained  in  Pan-Slavism. 
The  intricacy,  intellectual  vagueness,  inflamed 
emotionalism  which  characterize  such  issues 
demand  that  some  other  process  than  arbitration 
be  applied,  at  any  rate  in  the  first  instance.  To 
give  any  reasonable  prospect  of  adjusting  bad 
relations  of  this  kind,  it  is  first  advisable  to 
endeavour  to  make  the  grievances  or  demands 
which  they  contain  more  explicit.  To  give  them 
substance  and  clear  significance  by  ascertaining 
facts  and  obtaining  a  statement  of  demands  or 
complaints  and  their  counterclaims  would  be  the 
first  stage  in  a  process  of  adjustment. 

A  timely  inquiry  into  such  discussions  or 
grievances,  held  by  an  impartial  body,  might  evi- 
dently be  of  service,  either  for  obtaining  a  settle- 
ment by  diplomatic  agreement  or  by  stating  a 
case  suitable  for  arbitration.  This  object  it  was 
sought  to  obtain  at  the  Hague  Conference  of  1899 
by  the  adoption  of  International  Commissions  of 
Inquiry  under  the  following  conditions  :  "In 
differences  of  an  international  nature,  involving 
neither  honour  nor  essential  interests,  and  arising 
from  a  difference  of  opinion  on  matters  of  fact,  the 
signatory  Powers  judge  it  useful  that  parties  who 
have  not  been  able  to  come  to  an  agreement  by 


47 

diplomatic  negotiations  should  institute,  as  far  as 
circumstances  permit,  an  International  Commission 
of  Inquiry,  charged  with  aiding  in  the  settlement  of 
disputes  by  an  impartial  and  thorough  investigation 
and  statement  of  the  facts  "  (Article  9). 

Though  the  terms  of  the  establishment  of  this 
procedure  leave  its  application  purely  optional,  and 
an  attempt  made  by  Russia  and  the  United  States 
in  1899  and  1907  to  give  some  authority  to  the 
report  or  award  of  such  an  Inquiry  was  rejected, 
the  existence  of  this  machinery  of  Inquiry  entitled 
to  examine  and  report  upon  the  facts  of  a  dis- 
pute, not  in  its  existing  shape  capable  of  settlement 
by  diplomacy  or  arbitration,  clearly  indicates  the 
line  of  procedure  along  which  we  may  go  in  seek- 
ing a  pacific  settlement  for  all  issues  adjudged 
not  suitable  for  arbitration. 

But  if  this  instrument  is  to  be  really  serviceable, 
its  uses  and  powers  must  be  amended  and  ampli- 
fied. The  proposal  made  by  Professor  de 
Maartens  l  to  enlarge  the  Commission's  duty  of 
"  aiding  in  the  settlement  of  disputes  by  an  im- 
partial and  thorough  investigation  and  statement 
of  the  facts  "  by  adding  the  further  duty  of 
"  fixing,  if  necessary,  the  responsibility  for  the 
facts  "  is  indispensable  to  a  really  serviceable 
"award." 

What  is  needed  is,  first,  to  enlarge  the  scope  of 
the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  so  as  to  bring  within 
its  purview  all  international  disputes  or  difficulties 
not  considered  suitable  for  arbitration  ;  secondly, 
to  make  the  submission  of  such  issues  compulsory  ; 
thirdly,  to  substitute  a  general  for  all  particular 
1  Hull,  291. 


48    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

treaties  of  reference  ;  fourthly,  to  convert  the 
reports  of  fact  when  necessary  into  an  award  ; 
and  finally,  to  procure  for  that  award  the  sanction 
requisite  to  secure  its  acceptance  by  the  parties 
concerned. 

In  a  word,  Inquiry  should  be  a  preliminary  pro- 
cess for  Conciliation,  and  the  award  of  the  Inquiry 
should  be  made  the  basis  of  a  settlement  as  valid 
as  that  attached  to  the  award  of  the  Arbitration 
Court.  Indeed,  it  is  clear  that  the  relation  between 
the  Conciliation  process  and  the  Arbitration  Court 
must  be  one  of  close  co-operation.  For  in  not  a 
few  instances  the  process  of  Inquiry  may  be  con- 
fined to  the  bare  ascertainment  of  such  facts  as 
make  a  concrete  case  to  be  stated  for  the  Arbitra- 
tion Court.  In  other  words,  it  must  be  competent 
upon  a  fully  equipped  Council  of  Conciliation  either 
to  issue  an  award  and  endeavour  by  such  powers 
of  pressure  as  may  be  assigned'  to  it  to  obtain  its 
acceptance  or  some  satisfactory  compromise,  or 
else  to  hand  over  the  matter  stated  in  a  form 
suitable  for  some  arbitral  or  other  tribunal  to 
determine. 

Since  it  has  been  admitted  that  it  may  be  con- 
venient to  include  in  the  functions  of  the  Arbitra- 
tion Court  some  issues  not  of  law  or  interpretation 
of  international  obligations  but  of  fact,  it  may  be 
well  to  indicate  more  clearly  what  sorts  of  issues 
of  fact  may  be  left  for  arbitration  and  what 
properly  belong  to  the  Inquiry  or  Conciliation  pro- 
cess. The  issues  of  fact  left  to  arbitration  would 
be  such  facts  as  in  reference  to  a  concrete  case 
would  in  a  court  of  justice  be  held  competent  for 
a  jury  to  decide.  There  are,  however,  two  sorts 


SETTLEMENT  BY  CONCILIATION  49 

of  inquiry  into  facts  better  undertaken  by  a 
different  method.  Questions  of  international 
finance  and  commerce  often  involve  expert  know- 
ledge and  minute  work  of  investigation  best  per- 
formed by  a  specially  appointed  Commission  of 
Inquiry.  The  same  is  true  of  many  matters  relating 
to  the  use  of  the  high  seas  for  transport  and  for 
fishing,  the  standardization  of  weights  and 
measures,  epidemics,  and  other  hygienic  matters, 
international  co-operation  for  meteorological  and 
other  scientific  services,  and  for  ascertaining  many 
other  sorts  of  knowledge  requisite  as  a  founda- 
tion for  international  legislation.  Such  matters 
of  inquiry  do  not  necessarily  involve  disputes  or 
ill-feeling,  though  they  are  often  liable  to  produce 
such  friction.  But  they  all  relate  to  questions  of 
common  interest  among  nations  which  require  for 
their  settlement  some  more  or  less  expert  processes 
of  investigation  and  judgment. 

The  other  sorts  of  facts  demanding  inquiry  are 
those  embedded  in  the  large,  vague,  heated  con- 
troversies or  discussions  which  we  have  recognized 
cannot  in  their  crude  state  be  submitted  for  arbi- 
tration. The  Balkan  situation,  the  West-Asiatic 
railway  problem,  or  the  more  general  aspects  of 
the  international  interests  in  Morocco,  Egypt, 
Persia,  China,  are  not  suitable  for  the  handling  of 
an  Arbitration  Court.  But  a  patient,  impartial 
international  Inquiry,  could  it  be  arranged,  might 
discover,  extract,  and  formulate  certain  concrete 
issues  relating  to  the  claims,  fears,  and  interests 
of  the  several  parties,  which  might  then  form  fit 
matter  for  arbitration. 

It  is,  however,  evident  that  a  mere  Inquiry  and 

4 


50  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

report  on  facts  is  not  all  that  requires  to  be 
done.  Powers  of  Conciliation  must  be  definitely 
associated  with  the  process  of  Inquiry  if  a  real 
alternative  to  Arbitration  is  to  be  established. 

The  most  important  experiment  in  this  direction 
is  provided  in  the  form  of  the  Permanent  Inter- 
national Commissions  set  up  by  the  treaties  con- 
cluded in  the  autumn  of  1914  by  the  United  States 
with  Great  Britain  and  with  France.  The 
treaty  '  between  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom,  ratified  on  November  14,  1914,  estab- 
lished a  "  Peace  Commission  "  for  inquiry  into 
and  report  upon  all  disputes  not  covered  by  exist- 
ing agreements. 

Its  chief  operative  Articles  read  as  follows  : 
"  The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  all 
disputes  between  them,  of  every  nature  whatsoever, 
other  than  disputes  the  settlement  of  which  is  pro- 
vided for,  and  in  fact  achieved,  under  existing 
agreements  between  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 
shall,  when  diplomatic  methods  of  adjustment  have 
failed,  be  referred  for  investigation  and  report  to 
a  Permanent  International  Commission  to  be  con- 
stituted in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  next 
succeeding  article  ;  and  they  agree  not  to  declare 
war  or  begin  hostilities  during  such  investigation 
and  before  the  report  is  submitted."2 

"  The  International  Commission  shall  be  com- 
posed of  five  members,  to  be  appointed  as  follows  : 
one  member  shall  be  drawn  from  each  country  by 
the  Government  thereof  ;  one  member  shall  be 
chosen  by  each  Government  from  some  third 
country  ;  the  fifth  shall  be  chosen  by  common 
1  Cd.  7714.  2  Article  I. 


SETTLEMENT  BY  CONCILIATION  51 

agreement  between  the  two  Governments,  it  being 
understood  that  he  shall  not  be  a  citizen  of  either 
country."  l 

"  In  case  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall 
have  failed  to  adjust  a  dispute  by  diplomatic 
methods,  they  shall  at  once  refer  it  to  the  Inter- 
national Commission  for  investigation  and  report. 
The  International  Commission  may,  however,  offer 
its  services  to  that  effect,  and  in  such  case  it  shall 
notify  both  Governments  and  request  their  co- 
operation in  the  investigation."2 

The  Parties  agree  to  furnish  "  all  the  means  and 
facilities  required  for  its  investigation  and  report." 
The  Report  is  to  be  completed  within  a  year  from 
the  beginning  of  the  investigation,  unless  both 
Parties  agree  on  the  extension  or  restriction  of  the 
term. 

Though  in  form  this  procedure  is  simply  one  of 
investigation,  its  evident  purpose  and  result  are 
to  produce  an  atmosphere  and  other  conditions 
favourable  to  conciliation.  The  year's  delay  exerts 
a  cooling  and  a  healing  effect,  allowing  time  for 
the  facts  disclosed  by  a  full  impartial  inquiry  to 
make  their  right  impression  on  the  intelligence  of 
the  disputants,  while  it  likewise  informs  the  public 
opinion  and  directs  the  judgment  and  sympathy 
of  the  neutral  world.  Controversies  thus  dragged 
from  the  mists  of  ignorance  and  passion  into  the 
light  of  established  truth  and  right  will  more  easily 
admit  of  peaceful  settlement,  and  any  refusal  to 
settle  in  conformity  with  what  appears  to  the  out- 
side world  the  plain  direction  of  reason  and  justice 
will  become  continually  more  difficult  to  maintain. 

1  Article  II.  '  Article  III. 


52     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

The  influence  of  the  neutral  world  will  be  im- 
mensely strengthened  by  the  consciousness  of  the 
possession  of  full  and  reliable  knowledge  of  the 
facts. 

It  is  true  that  the  parties  only  bind  themselves 
to  an  Inquiry  and  a  period  of  peaceable  delay, 
and  that  the  report  of  the  Commission  does  not 
in  form  constitute  an  award,  or  involve  any  ex- 
press obligation  upon  the  parties  to  take  any  line 
of  action.  What  it  does  is  to  provide,  after  a 
cooling-off  time,  a  reasoned,  pacific  statement  of 
the  case  with  such  suggestions  for  a  verdict  or  a 
compromise  as  are  involved  in  every  clear  judicial 
summary.  It  supplies  the  atmosphere  and  the 
materials  for  fresh  conciliation,  leaving  liberty  to 
the  parties,  after  the  report  is  given,  to  reopen 
diplomatic  negotiations  under  these  new  conditions. 

How  far  does  this  method  meet  our  require- 
ments for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  non-arbitrable 
issues?  In  addition  to  the  great  intrinsic  merits 
which  we  have  already  recognized,  there  are 
several  others  deserving  attention.  In  the  first 
place,  there  is  no  exclusion  of  issues  from  the  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  on  grounds  of  honour,  vital 
interests,  or  any  other  account.  In  the  second 
place,  there  is  the  right  accorded  to  the  Commission 
of  taking  the  initiative  in  instituting  an  Inquiry. 
This  initiative  is  of  immeasurable  value  in  the 
development  of  adequate  processes  of  peaceful 
settlement.  For  by  bringing  forward  for  investiga- 
tion matters  of  international  dissension  before  they 
have  ripened  into  issues  of  political  dispute,  much 
heat  and  danger  would  be  averted.  A  well- 
informed  Commission,  spying  a  cloud  when  it  was 


SETTLEMENT   BY  CONCILIATION  53 

no  bigger  than  a  man's  hand,  might  stop  many  a 
storm. 

Finally,  the  permanent  character  of  this  Com- 
mission is  a  notable  improvement  upon  the  ad  hoc 
method  of  appointment,  or  even  the  selection  from 
a  panel,  which  often  taints  a  process  of  Inquiry 
from  the  beginning  with  doubts  relating  to  the 
competence  or  the  impartiality  of  the  personnel. 

But,  excellent  as  are  the  provisions  of  this  Peace 
Commission,  it  falls  short  in  several  important 
respects  of  the  full  requirements  of  a  machinery 
for  the  settlement  of  non-arbitrable  issues. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  no  security  that  such 
a  Commission  will  interpret  its  functions  so  liber- 
ally as  to  furnish  a  report  which  is  of  necessity 
and  in  substance  an  award  or  judgment.  A  merely 
impartial  sifting  of  evidence  and  summary  of  facts, 
though  highly  serviceable,  would  only  furnish  an 
opportunity  for  reopening  diplomatic  discussion 
towards  an  amicable  settlement,  which  might 
not  after  all  be  attained.  There  is  in  the  Treaty 
no  provision  for  a  genuine  award,  and  none  for  a 
direct  invitation  to  Conciliation.  An  amplification 
of  the  functions  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry, 
so  as  to  convert  it  into  a  Commission  of  Concilia- 
tion, is  required.  The  report  should  be,  so  far  as 
possible,  a  genuine  award,  containing  proposals 
for  an  equitable  settlement,  and  representatives 
of  the  Governments  concerned  should  be  brought 
together  in  order  that  they  may  agree  either  to 
accept  and  carry  out  the  award,  or  to  adopt  some 
other  settlement,  or  failing  either  of  these  courses, 
to  state  a  case  for  arbitral  settlement. 

By  some  such  extension  of  functions  the  Peace 


54     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

Commission  could  be  developed  into  a  Council  of 
Conciliation,  which,  taken  in  conjunction  with  the 
Court  of  Arbitration  or  of  Arbitral  Justice,  would 
furnish  a  mode  of  peaceful  settlement  for  all  dis- 
putes not  capable  of  diplomatic  arrangement. 
What  is  needed  is  that  the  Powers  should  bind 
themselves  to  the  settlement  of  all  issues  by  some 
method  other  than  arms.  The  obligation  to  sub- 
mit the  case  to  investigation  is  not  enough,  unless 
it  is  accompanied  by  an  obligation  either  to  abide 
by  the  results  of  the  investigation  or  to  adopt  some 
other  pacific  arrangement. 

A  compact  and  workable  machinery  for  pacific 
settlement  will,  of  course,  require  that,  as  in  the 
case  of  Arbitration,  so  here,  all  the  consenting 
States  should  be  brought  into  a  single  Treaty  for 
Investigation  and  Conciliation.  This  will  have  not 
only  the  obvious  advantage  of  unifying  the  pacific 
arrangements  of  the  world,  but  it  will  also  im- 
prove the  structure  of  the  Commission  for  all  work 
of  expert  and  impartial  inquiry  by  affording  a 
larger  choice  of  men  and  a  larger  area  for  the 
collection  and  standardization  of  authoritative  facts. 
A  Council  of  Inquiry  and  Conciliation,  upon 
which  most  of  the  civilized  nations  of  the  earth 
were  represented,  would  probably  substitute  for  the 
method  of  appointment  in  this  Anglo-American 
Treaty  another  which  not  only  would  secure  com- 
pleter  and  more  evident  impartiality,  but  would 
by  this  very  character  mobilize  for  the  execution 
of  the  award  a  far  more  general  consensus  of 
public  sentiment  throughout  the  civilized  world. 

Reserving,  however,  for  later  consideration  this 
important  question  of  the  composition  and  appoint- 


SETTLEMENT  BY   CONCILIATION  55 

ment  of  the  Council  of  Conciliation,  and  the  similar 
question  in  relation  to  the  Court  of  Arbitration,  we 
must  briefly  discuss  the  way  in  which  disputes 
may  best  be  brought  into  these  processes  of  pacific 
settlement.  Here  are  two  related  questions,  that 
of  initiation  and  that  of  determination  of  com- 
petency. If  disputes  are  at  some  stage  before 
danger-point  is  reached,  to  be  removed  from  diplo- 
matic controversy  for  inquiry  and  settlement  before 
a  Court  of  Arbitration  or  a  Council  of  Concilia- 
tion, it  will  not  suffice  to  leave  this  action  to  the 
motion  of  the  contestants  alone.  For  if  it  is  left 
to  the  two  Governments  to  agree  upon  such  a 
reference  they  may  fail  to  do  so,  and  the  dispute 
may  drag  on  with  grave  present  injury  and  the 
danger  of  a  sudden  outbreak  of  public  passion  in 
one  or  both  nations,  which  may  either  lead  to 
violent  action,  or  may  otherwise  render  any  subse- 
quent process  of  pacific  settlement  more  difficult. 
Even  were  they  led  to  an  agreement  either  to 
arbitrate  or  to  conciliate  their  differences,  their 
choice  between  these  processes  might  not  be  a 
good  one.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would  not  be 
sufficient  to  confer  upon  any  single  interested  party 
the  right  to  appeal  to  Arbitration  or  Conciliation 
and  thereby  compel  the  other  reluctantly  to  come 
in.  For  though  it  might  be  well  to  have  this 
power  of  joint  or  several  initiation  on  the  part  of 
the  contestant  parties  as  the  ordinary  method  of 
procedure,  it  would  be  desirable  that  a  separate 
power  of  initiation  should  be  vested  in  the  Arbitra- 
tion or  Conciliation  bodies  themselves  or  in  some 
other  Court  of  First  Instance. 

We  have  already  assigned  to  the  Council  of  Con- 


56     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

ciliation  the  duty  of  exercising  an  initiative  of 
inquiry  into  important  and  delicate  issues  which 
are  not  in  their  existing  form  matters  of  definite 
dispute  or  difference.  But  in  dealing  with  actual 
matters  or  conditions  of  international  friction,  it 
would  probably  be  best  to  leave  the  initial  action 
to  a  Joint  Standing  Committee  representing  the 
two  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  bodies,  unless 
some  such  further  development  of  international 
government  as  we  discuss  later  is  found  practic- 
able. The  functions  of  such  a  Committee  would 
be  to  watch  the  course  of  gathering  controversies 
and,  in  default  of  an  appeal  from  one  or  both  of 
the  parties  concerned,  to  invite  them  to  appear 
before  a  preliminary  inquiry,  the  objects  of  which 
should  be  to  ascertain  whether  the  matter  was  suit- 
able for  settlement  in  Arbitration  or  for  submission 
to  the  freer  process  of  investigation  and  report 
employed  by  the  Conciliation  Council.  The  Treaty 
establishing  a  League  of  Nations  would,  therefore, 
in  the  first  instance,  bind  the  signatory  Powers, 
not  to  a  particular  mode  of  settlement  by  Arbitra- 
tion or  otherwise,  but  to  submit  all  issues  on  request 
to  a  Joint  Committee  of  Investigation,  empowered 
to  determine  whether  the  particular  issue  was  by 
reason  of  its  nature,  or  the  point  oif  its  develop- 
ment, suitable  for  settlement  by  Arbitration  or 
Conciliation,  or  by  a  preliminary  process  of  Inquiry 
by  the  Council  of  Conciliation  with  a  view  to 
subsequent  reference  to  Arbitration.1  The  essen- 
tial point  in  such  a  Treaty  would  be  to  bind  the 

1  It  would,  however,  probably  be  right  that  the  Arbitration 
Court  should  retain  a  final  right  of  veto  upon  matters  submitted 
to  them  as  arbitrable. 


SETTLEMENT   BY  CONCILIATION  57 

Powers  to  refrain  from  acts  of  hostility,  and  to 
entrust  to  the  representative  Commission  the  duty 
of  determining  what  process  of  pacific  settlement 
among  those  provided  by  the  Treaty  should  in  each 
case  be  adopted.  The  signatory  Powers  would 
then  undertake,  first,  to  have  recourse  to  this  Joint 
Committee  for  a  preliminary  inquiry  ;  secondly, 
to  submit  their  case  to  such  process  of  Arbitra- 
tion or  Conciliation  as  the  Joint  Committee  might 
determine  to  be  applicable  to  the  case  ;  and  thirdly, 
to  accept  the  award  or  report  of  either  of  these 
processes  as  a  basis  of  settlement,  refraining  in 
the  meantime  from  any  act  or  preparation  of 
hostility. 

Such  would  be  the  substance  of  a  League  con- 
structed on  the  basis  of  furnishing  adequate  and 
appropriate  organs  of  pacific  settlement  in  impartial 
and  representative  international  bodies. 

If  the  majority  of  civilized  States,  including  most 
of  the  Great  Powers,  were  willing  to  enter  such 
a  League,  and  possessed  sufficient  confidence  in 
the  justice  and  efficiency  of  its  procedure  and  in 
its  ability  to  secure  submission  to  its  awards,  not 
merely  would  the  cause  of  peace  be  greatly 
advanced  but  the  question  of  reduction  of  arma- 
ments would  for  the  first  time  come  within  the 
range  of  practical  politics.  For  the  play  of 
militant  motives  would  now  be  reversed.  The 
aggressive  motive  for  armaments  would  be 
weakened  by  the  recognition  that  acts  of  aggres- 
sion were  no  longer  feasible,  the  defensive  motive 
by  the  recognition  that  the  full  defence  of  each 
nation  no  longer  devolved  upon  its  own  armed 
resources  or  those  of  its  few  temporary  allies. 


58     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

Under  such  conditions  the  difficulties  which  would 
seem  to  beset  the  attempt  to  find  a  basis  for 
agreed  reduction  of  armaments  would  largely  dis- 
appear. Motives  of  national  economy  would  tend 
to  prevail  in  each  of  the  confederates,  and  so 
powerful  an  impulse  towards  disarmament  might 
by  given  in  some  instances  that  the  agreement 
upon  armaments  which  would  form  a  natural 
adjunct  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  League  might 
have  to  bind  the  signatories  to  maintain  a  proper 
quota  of  military  and  naval  forces  for  common 
purposes  of  defence. 

The  efficiency  of  such  a  League  of  Peace  and 
the  establishment  of  the  necessary  confidence  in 
its  lasting  power  to  fulfil  its  pacific  functions  would 
depend  mainly  upon  three  considerations  which 
now  await  discussion.  First,  the  appointment  and 
composition  of  the  Court  of  Arbitration  and  the 
Council  of  Inquiry  and  Conciliation.  Secondly, 
the  powers  wielded  by  the  League  to  secure  the 
fulfilment  of  the  undertakings  of  the  Powers  to 
submit  all  issues  to  pacific  settlement  and  to  accept 
and  carry  out  the  awards  of  the  Court  and  Council. 
Thirdly,  such  changes  in  the  conduct  of  diplomacy 
and  of  international  politics,  especially  in  trade 
and  finance,  as  will  expel  those  antagonisms  of 
interest  which  have  been  the  chief  feeders  of 
enmity,  jealousy,  and  mutual  suspicion. 


CHAPTER    V 

COURT    AND    COUNCIL: 
THEIR   APPOINTMENT  AND    PERSONNEL 

THE  proposal  to  resort  to  Arbitration  and  Con- 
ciliation for  the  settlement  of  all  disagreements 
between  nations  that  cannot  be  composed  by 
ordinary  diplomatic  methods  will  appear  to  most 
persons  acceptable  and  feasible  because  it  seems 
to  involve  no  novel,  untried  principle,  but  to  be 
only  an  extension  of  existing  practices.  But  while 
this  view  is  substantially  true,  it  would  be  foolish 
to  ignore  or  to  extenuate  the  magnitude  of  the 
steps  that  constitute  that  extension. 

Two  great  advances  must  be  made  if  our  scheme 
for  the  settlement  of  disputes  is  to  be  achieved. 
The  substitution  of  a  general  for  a  number  of 
particular  international  agreements,  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  genuinely  international  Court  of 
Arbitration  and  Council  of  Inquiry  and  Concilia- 
tion, mark  the  first  great  advance  towards  inter- 
national regulation.  Existing  agreements  for 
arbitration  and  conciliation  are  contained  in  a  great 
number  and  variety  of  treaties  between  separate 
pairs  of  nations,  and  the  personal  constitution  of 
the  courts  which  they  provide  is  in  most  instances 

59 


60     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

determined  by  the  interested  parties.  The  Arbitral 
Court  at  The  Hague  was  indeed  constituted  at 
the  first  Conference  on  a  wide  international  basis, 
but  the  actual  tribunal  appointed  to  try  a  case 
between  two  nations  was  corriposed  of  two  nominees 
of  each  nation  out  of  the  international  panel,  with 
an  umpire  drawn  by  agreement  of  the  two  parties, 
or,  failing  that,  by  a  third  person  selected  by  the 
parties.  This  same  method  was  also  adopted  for 
a  Commission  of  Inquiry.  Though  it  was  per- 
missible for  the  parties  in  dispute  to  agree  upon 
any  other  method  of  selecting  a  tribunal  out  of  the 
members  of  the  Permanent  Court,  it  was  expected 
that  the  members  chosen  by  each  party  would  be 
members  of  their  own  nationality  nominated  by 
them  to  serve  on  the  Court,  or  members  of  some 
other  nationality  that  owed  their  nomination  to  the 
party  now  calling  on  their  services.  Though  the 
Conference  of  1 907  modified  this  interested  method 
of  appointment,  by  providing  that  only  one  of  the 
two  arbitrators  selected  by  each  nation  may  be 
a  citizen  of  the  country  that  selected  him,  or  an 
original  nominee  of  that  country,  the  fact  that  the 
actual  constitution  of  the  Tribunal  was  fixed  by 
the  selecting  of  persons  supposed  by  the  two  parties 
respectively  to  be  favourably  disposed  to  their  case 
clearly  derogates  from  the  international  impar- 
tiality of  the  proceedings.  The  same  criticism 
applies  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  whether  as 
established  by  the  Hague  Convention  or,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  American  Treaties  already  con- 
cluded, by  the  two  parties  undertaking  to  submit 
their  disputes  to  a  specially  constituted  Com- 
mission. 


COURT  AND  COUNCIL  61 

If  these  processes  are  to  become  generally  and 
fully  international,  both  the  form  of  the  treaty  and 
the  constitution  of  the  Court  or  Commission  must 
bear  the  impress,  not  of  separate  arrangements 
between  pairs  of  Powers  each  playing  for  its  own 
hand,  but  of  a  procedure  informed  throughout  by 
the  wider  international  spirit.  This  can  be  best 
accomplished  by  inviting  the  Powers  to  enter  one 
general  obligatory  treaty  referring  their  disputes 
to  such  a  Court  or  Council,  and  leaving  to  that 
Court  or  Council  as  a  whole  the  appointment  of 
the  personnel  of  the  body  adjudicating  or  inquiring 
into  each  matter  of  dispute. 

It  may,  of  course,  be  difficult  for  certain  Powers 
to  consent  to  enter  upon  any  process  of  settlement 
where  their  own  representatives  will  only  at  the 
most  possess  a  minority  voice.  But  if  full  con- 
fidence is  to  be  secured  for  the  impartiality  of 
such  a  process,  the  axiom  of  justice  that  no  one 
can  be  a  judge  of  his  own  case  must  be  observed. 
This  reform  of  constitution  and  procedure  would 
have  another  very  salutary  effect.  So  long  as  a 
case  of  arbitration  or  inquiry  is  conducted  by 
a  body  which,  as  regards  the  majority  of  its 
members,  is  in  composition  partisan,  the  justice 
of  the  matter  is  always  in  danger  of  being  sub- 
ordinated either  to  a  test  of  strength  or  to  the 
conditions  of  a  compromise  indefensible  in  prin- 
ciple and  contributing  nothing  to  the  body  of 
international  law  or  sound  usage.  Nations 
engaging  to  submit  their  disputes  to  such  a 
process  will  always  incline  to  appoint  as  their 
representatives  upon  the  panel  of  the  Court  or 
Council  able  advocates  who  will  be  expected  to 


champion  their  cause,  and  though  the  permanency 
of  the  constitution  of  these  bodies  may  give  some 
independence  to  the  personnel  in  dealing  with 
particular  cases,  the  patriotic  bias  will  always  come 
into  suspicion. 

Still  more  important  is  this  consideration  in  its 
bearing  on  the  type  of  person  which  the  several 
Powers  appoint  as  their  representatives.  Here  a 
distinction  may  be  drawn  between  the  Arbitral 
Court  and  the  Conciliation  Council  in  virtue  of 
the  different  nature  of  their  work.  The  functions 
of  the  former  being  distinctively  judicial,  it  would 
seem  natural  and  proper  that  men  of  legal  eminence 
and  conversant  with  international  law  should 
usually  be  appointed.  But  the  composition  of  the 
Council  of  Conciliation  requires  a  different  sort 
of  representative.  The  inquiries  it  will  be  called 
upon  to  undertake  will  often  be  broader  in  scope, 
more  delicate  in  subject-matter,  and  less  susceptible 
to  definite  awards  than  the  cases  which  come  before 
the  Arbitral  Court.  A  large  discretion  must  be 
accorded  to  its  methods  of  inquiry,  which  should 
not  be  closely  governed  by  legal  rules  or  usages. 
Conciliation  being  the  end,  the  report  of  such  an 
Inquiry  will  be  presented,  not  usually  in  the  shape 
of  a  definite  judgment  or  award,  but  as  a  summary 
of  evidence  with  an  opinion  given  in  the  form  of 
suggestions  for  one  or  more  modes  of  settlement. 
Not  infrequently  the  report  of  the  Inquiry  might 
take  shape  in  a  statement  of  a  case  for  Arbitration. 
The  direct  value  and  weight  of  such  a  report,  and 
the  willingness  of  the  parties  to  adopt  it  as  a  basis 
for  diplomatic  settlement,  must  evidently  depend 
upon  the  measure  of  intellectual  and  moral 


COURT  AND  COUNCIL  63 

authority  which  the  character  and  procedure  of 
the  Council  can  command.  For  whatever  sanction 
or  support  can  be  devised  for  this  process  of 
Conciliation,  the  recommendations  which  its  report 
may  contain  cannot  in  themselves  possess  the  force 
of  the  judicial  decision  or  the  definite  award  of  the 
Arbitration  Court,  nor  can  they  be  defended  as  a 
logically  sound  application  of  recognized  rules  of 
international  law.  In  other  words,  the  value  of 
Conciliation  depends  more  upon  the  personal  inde- 
pendence, ability,  discretion,  and  integrity  of  the 
members  of  the  Council  than  in  the  case  of  Arbitra- 
tion. Moreover,  we  recognize  that  the  most 
dangerous  disputes  are  likely  to  come  up,  at  all 
events  in  the  first  instance,  before  the  Council 
rather  than  the  Arbitration  Court.  It  is  there- 
fore essential  that  the  members  drawn  for  this 
process  shall,  so  far  as  possible,  not  merely  possess 
the  high  personal  qualifications  mentioned  above, 
but  shall  be  known  by  the  world  at  large,  and 
especially  by  their  fellow-countrymen,  to  possess 
them.  For  the  essential  meaning  of  Conciliation 
is  peaceful  persuasion,  and  the  recommendations 
of  the  Council  will  therefore  depend  for  their 
efficacy  upon  the  influence  they  exercise,  first  upon 
public  opinion  in  the  nations  directly  affected  by 
the  dispute  or  difference  for  which  a  peaceful 
settlement  is  sought,  and  secondly,  upon  the  wider 
judgment  of  the  society  of  nations  represented  in 
the  Council.  The  crucial  test  of  the  efficacy  of 
the  process  will  be  the  voluntary  acceptance  by  a 
nation  of  recommendations  that  are  adverse  to  its 
former  claims  and  interests  because  of  its  con- 
fidence in  the  impartiality  and  efficiency  of  the 


64    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

Inquiry,  and  its  recognition  that  the  recommenda- 
tions command  the  general  assent  of  disinterested 
nations. 

It  is,  of  course,  impossible  to  expect  at  the 
outset  of  such  an  experiment  in  internationalism 
that  an  ideally  constituted  Council  of  men  of  inter- 
national mind  will  be  obtained.  There  will  be 
a  tendency  among  most  nations  to  appoint  members 
who  can  be  relied  upon  to  represent  effectively 
upon  the  Board  the  particular  interests  and  points 
of  view  of  their  nation.  Nor  is  this  disposition 
wholly  to  be  reprobated.  The  sentiment  and 
intellectual  attitude  of  genuine  internationalism  can 
only  be  acquired  and  confirmed  by  actual  experi- 
ence in  international  co-operation.  Until  the 
needed  experience  is  got,  the  internationalism  of 
such  a  Council  must  be  somewhat  inchoate  and 
mechanical,  an  equilibrium  of  national  interests 
and  feelings  rather  than  a  positively  international 
mind.  It  is  this  consideration  that  makes  it  so 
important  to  substitute  a  general  treaty  for  specific 
treaties  between  pairs  of  nations,  and  to  substitute 
for  Courts  and  Commissions  manned  by  repre- 
sentatives of  the  contestant  nations  bodies  that 
are  genuinely  international  in  composition.  For 
the  suspicion  and  the  self-regarding  nationalism 
which  express  themselves  at  first  in  the  selection 
of  reliable  nationalists  rather  than  of  completely 
impartial  men  for  representatives  on  international 
Court  and  Council,  will  gradually  disappear  when 
it  is  realized  that  the  forms  of  procedure  as  well 
as  the  spirit  are  framed  so  as  to  educate  the 
international  mind.  It  will,  however,  continue  to 
be  important  that  the  representatives  of  any  nation 


COURT  AND  COUNCIL  65 

on  the  Council  should  be  men  commanding  the 
high  respect  of  their  fellow-countrymen.  For,  in 
the  first  place,  this  will  be  essential  to  secure  for 
them  their  proper  status  on  the  Council,  and 
secondly,  it  will  enable  them  the  better  to  ensure 
the  fair  consideration  by  the  public  opinion  of 
their  country  of  any  proposals  with  which  they 
might  associate  themselves.  For  we  are  through- 
out assuming  that  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs 
and  international  relations  must  in  the  future  no 
longer  remain  a  close  monopoly  of  a  small 
governing  and  diplomatic  caste,  but  must  be 
brought  under  the  control  of  public  opinion 
operating  through  representative  institutions.  This 
new  situation  will  have  a  vital  bearing  on  the  type 
of  representatives  best  fitted  for  work  upon  the 
Council.  Not  lawyers  or  professional  politicians 
are  primarily  wanted  for  this  work,  but  able, 
broad-minded  men  of  large  personal  experience 
of  the  people  and  the  popular  activities  of  their 
country,  experience  amplified  by  contact  with  the 
peoples  and  activities  of  other  countries,  men 
accustomed  in  large,  free  intercourse  to  test  and 
assimilate  new  facts  and  valuations  and  to  practise 
arts  of  mediation  and  of  arrangement.  Such  men, 
drawn  from  the  ranks  of  great  employers,  the 
labour  movements,  the  Churches,  the  world  of 
science,  literature,  or  journalism,  or  from  one  or 
other  of  the  learned  professions,  would  form  the 
proper  personnel  of  such  a  Council.  Endowed 
with  a  sufficient  fixity  of  office  and  supplied  with 
ample  means,  secretarial  and  other,  and  with  the 
right  of  commanding  expert  assistance  for  special 
inquiries,  this  type  of  Council  would  form  the  best 

5 


66     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

security  for   the  peace  of  nations   that   the  world 
could  furnish. 

If  such  a  Council  could  be  entrusted  with  the 
settlement  of  those  large  disturbing  issues  which  in 
the  past,  under  current  methods  of  diplomacy,  have 
ripened  into  dangerous  quarrels,  it  would  be  an 
immeasurable  gain.  For  the  diplomatic  method 
suffers  from  two  fatal  defects.  In  the  first  place, 
it  is  a  discussion  and  a  settlement,  if  settlement 
is  attained,  by  avowed  partisans.  It  is  a  test  of 
skill  and  strength  by  which  one  party  strives  to 
get  the  better  of  the  other,  irrespective  of  the 
equities  of  the  case.  It  is  in  effect  a  modus 
operandi  of  the  Balance  of  Power.  Though 
the  players  in  this  game  make  use  of  certain 
"  rules  "  of  international  law,  treaty  engagements, 
or  usages,  their  ultimate  sanctions  have  no  right 
relation  to  accepted  law  or  justice,  but  are 
grounded  in  "  reasons  of  State  " — i.e.  the  supposed 
necessities  or  utilities  of  the  nation  they  are  said 
to  represent.  Though  German  statesmen  and 
political  philosophers  have  been  more  explicit  in 
their  avowal  of  this  principle  and  perhaps  more 
consistent  in  its  practice,  it  has  been  the  operative 
and  determinant  factor  in  all  diplomacy.  In  a 
method  where  there  is  no  provision  for  a  dis- 
interested valuation  or  decision,  how  can  it  be 
otherwise?  For  no  appeals  to  international  law 
or  usage,  even  were  these  rules  far  more  settled 
and  authoritative  than  is  actually  the  case,  can 
dispense  with  an  impartial  tribunal  for  their 
application  and  interpretation.  Moreover,  as  we 
have  recognized,  the  issues  which  give  rise  to  most 
danger  are  usually  those  which  cannot  in  their 


COURT  AND  COUNCIL  67 

nature  be  brought  to  any  simple  test  of  law  or 
fact. 

The  second  defect  lies  in  the  art  of  diplomacy 
itself  and  in  the  type  of  men  who  practise  it  in 
the  Embassies  and  Foreign  Offices  of  Europe.  No 
one  can  study  modern  diplomacy  in  any  of  its 
critical  phases  without  realizing  the  wide  gulf 
which  severs  that  art  from  the  immense  human 
interests  it  handles.  First,  consider  the  personnel 
of  its  operators,  men  drawn  exclusively  from  the 
aristocracy  and  the  wealthy  governing  class  of 
each  nation,  men  whose  education  and  associa- 
tions, interests,  tastes,  and  habits  of  thought  are 
those  of  a  caste  strongly  entrenched  in  economic 
and  social  privileges  and  with  few  opportunities 
for  gaining  knowledge  of  or  sympathy  with  the 
life  of  the  general  body  of  the  nation. 

Trace  the  life  of  these  men  in  this  country 
from  the  nursery  to  the  Public  School,  the  Univer- 
sity, and  through  the  preparatory  stages  of  a 
diplomatic  career,  you  will  recognize  how  little 
they  can  be  regarded  as  representative  of  the 
interests  and  well-being  of  their  nation.  Their 
initial  outlook  upon  life  is  that  of  ease,  security, 
and  luxury,  with  that  self-confidence  and  domina- 
tion which  are  common  to  the  class  from  which 
they  spring.  This  temper  of  mind  easily  accords 
with  a  firm  acceptance  of  ideas  of  the  natural 
antagonism  of  the  interests  of  nations.  Drawn 
from  this  narrow  section  of  society,  they  enter  a 
calling  strongly  stamped  with  the  traditions  of  an 
even  less  enlightened  and  more  autocratically 
ordered  past,  in  which  the  normal  relations  between 
States  and  Governments  are  envisaged  in  terms  of 


68    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

suspicion,  hostility,  and  jealousy.  The  conduct 
of  diplomacy  has  always  remained  accommodated 
to  this  traditional  attitude  :  its  common  phrase- 
ology, false-friendly,  circumlocutory,  and  non- 
committal, full  of  duplicity  and  secret  reserves, 
even  using  a  bluff  frankness  as  a  choice  method 
of  deception,  attests  the  mala  fides  of  the  art. 

So  long  as  the  administration  of  our  foreign 
policy  remains  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  men 
selected  from  the  one  per  cent,  of  families  in  a 
position  to  provide  an  independent  income  of  at 
least  £400  a  year  for  a  son  entering  the  Diplo- 
matic Service,  the  ideas,  valuations,  and  methods 
of  a  sporting  aristo -plutocracy  of  leisure  will  con- 
tinue to  mould  our  foreign  relations.  Even  if 
the  ablest  and  best-disposed  members  of  this  one 
per  cent,  were  chosen  for  this  most  responsible 
work,  the  narrow  basis  of  selection  would  suffi- 
ciently condemn  the  system.  For  though  here 
and  there  an  individual  is  able  to  liberate  himself 
from  the  traditional  outlook  of  his  class  and  to 
cultivate  popular  sympathies,  class  sentiment  must 
dominate  the  normal  conduct  of  affairs. 

Add  to  this  the  habitual  secrecy  in  which  all 
important  negotiations  and  decisions  are  shrouded, 
and  the  absence  even  in  the  so-called  democratic 
States  of  any  real  influence  of  the  representative 
element  upon  the  critical  acts  which  may  determine 
peace  or  war,  and  the  full  peril  of  the  present 
secret  bureaucratic  policy  is  evident.1 

1  The  Anglo-French  Convention  of  1904  affords  an  instructive 
example  of  duplicity  in  the  respective  statements  of  its  "  public  " 
and  its  "secret"  Articles.  Articles  I  and  II  of  the  "Public 
Declaration"  open  thus  : 


COURT  AND   COUNCIL  69 

This  secret  class  diplomacy  and  its  personnel  are 
linked  by  a  score  of  hidden  influences  and  interests 
with  the  profession  and  the  creed  of  militarism 
and  with  the  powerful  business  interests  which 
feed  upon  expenditure  in  armaments. 

It  comes,  then,  to  this,  that  at  present  inter- 
national relations  are  determined  by  a  controlling 
personnel  whose  ideas,  interests,  sentiments,  and 
modes  of  dealing  are  utterly  unfitted  to  express 
the  needs  or  will  of  the  nations  which  they  mis- 
represent, or  to  work  towards  the  establishment  of 
permanently  peaceful  relations  between  nations. 

As  a  mode  of  dealing  with  grave  and  intricate 
matters  involving  deeply  both  the  sentiments  and 
the  interests  of  peoples  the  diplomatic  intercourse 
by  interchange  of  letters,  punctuated  by  over- 
lapping telegrams,  between  persons  residing  in 
different  capitals,  often  unacquainted  with  one 
another's  personal  qualities  and  necessarily  pre- 
cluded from  all  understanding  of  the  nicer  facts 
and  feelings  in  the  other's  case,  is  a  monument  of 
ineptitude.  Even  if  these  same  men,  foreign 
ministers  and  ambassadors,  whose  misunderstand- 
ings, cross -purposes,  and  mutual  suspicions  brand 

"  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  declare  that  they  have 
no  intention  of  altering  the  political  status  of  Egypt." 

"  The  Government  of  the  French  Republic  declare  that  they 
have  no  intention  of  altering  the  political  status  of  Morocco." 

The  first  of  the  secret  Articles  (as  published  by  Le  Temps  in 
November  191 1)  reads  as  follows  : — 

"  In  the  event  of  either  Government  finding  itself  con- 
strained, by  the  force  of  circumstances,  to  modify  the  policy  in 
respect  to  Egypt  or  Morocco,  the  engagements  which  they  have 
undertaken  towards  each  other  in  Articles  IV,  VI,  and  VII  of  the 
Declaration  of  to-day's  date  would  remain  intact." 


every  page  of  diplomatic  correspondence,  were  set 
to  "  thresh  out  "  the  same  matters  round  a  table, 
it  is  certain  that  the  more  human  relations  then 
subsisting  and  the  fuller  facilities  for  probing  the 
dark  and  doubtful  topics  would  make  pacific  com- 
promise far  more  possible.  Indeed,  if  these  un- 
representative types  of  men,  with  their  false, 
antiquated  conception  of  States  and  statecraft, 
could  be  superseded  by  groups  of  men  representing 
the  great  popular  interests  and  sentiments  of  their 
respective  nations,  the  existing  fears  and  risks  of 
the  failure  of  diplomacy  would  be  very  sensibly 
reduced.  Though  industrial  conferences  and  Con- 
ciliation Boards  do  not  give  absolute  security  for 
the  solution  of  industrial  disputes,  the  personal 
contact  helps  to  clear  away  much  misunderstand- 
ing, and  gives  scope  for  the  healing  influences 
of  humanity  to  express  themselves. 

How  much  more  effective  would  be  this 
method  of  conciliation  if  each  party  had  to 
put  its  case  before  an  International  Council, 
the  great  majority  of  the  members  of  which 
had  no  other  interest  than  to  discover  the 
truth,  conciliate  the  disputants,  and  keep  the 
peace  I  Diplomacy  is  conducted  in  an  atmosphere 
of  estrangement,  suspicion,  or  positive  antagonism, 
and  proceeds  by  intrigue,  deceit,  bluff,  or  bargain- 
ing to  seek  a  settlement  which  it  may  fail  to  reach 
and  which,  if  it  is  reached,  expresses  either  an 
unsatisfying  and  unconvincing  compromise  or  the 
triumph  of  one  party,  the  failure  of  the  other. 
Most  settlements  so  reached  are  regarded  as 
temporary  expedients  and  leave  trouble  behind. 
International  conciliation,  conducted  on  the  lines 


COURT  AND  COUNCIL  71 

here  proposed,  would  apply  the  skill,  knowledge, 
and  discretion  of  the  Society  of  Nations  to  the 
disinterested  task  of  finding  "  the  best  way  out  " 
and  of  urging  its  acceptance,  with  the  fullest 
authority  of  informed  public  opinion.  If  nations 
could  be  got  to  perceive  the  supreme  importance 
of  this  task  and  to  appoint  as  their  representa- 
tives upon  the  Council  honest,  able,  and  experi- 
enced men,  capable  of  realizing  the  majesty  of 
the  position  which  they  occupied  as  guardians  of 
the  public  peace,  the  foundation  of  international 
government  would  be  fairly  laid. 


CHAPTER    VI 
INTERNATIONAL    FORCE 

IT  may  easily  be  granted  that  after  the  experi- 
ences of  this  devastating  war  there  will  arise  among 
the  nations  a  disposition  to  give  favourable  con- 
sideiation  to  the  proposal  here  set  forth  of  a  Treaty 
by  which  the  signatory  Powers  shall  bind  them- 
selves to  arbitrate  all  their  arbitrable  disputes  and 
to  submit  all  others  to  a  process  of  Inquiry  and 
Conciliation.  But  some  will  ask  :  "If  we  enter 
such  an  engagement  with  the  full  intention  of 
accepting  the  awards  of  Arbitration  and  complying 
with  the  findings  of  the  Council  of  Conciliation, 
what  assurance  have  we  that  all  our  co-signatories 
will  do  the  same?  Unless  you  can  show  us  that 
other  nations  more  aggressive  and  less  scrupulous 
than  ourselves  will  feel,  or  can  be  made  to  feel, 
the  binding  force  of  their  treaty  obligations,  the 
chief  advantage  of  your  League  of  Nations  is  not 
attained.  For  we  shall  still  be  compelled  to  main- 
tain our  separate  national  armaments,  and  to 
increase  them  if  any  neighbouring  nation  chooses 
to  increase  theirs."  This  objection,  unless  it  can 
be  met,  is  fatal.  Can  it  be  met?  Let  us  first 
be  clear  as  to  what  is  lacking.  We  are  assuming 
that  a  number  of  civilized  States,  including  all  or 


INTERNATIONAL   FORCE  73 

most  of  the  Great  Powers,  are  willing  to  sign 
a  general  treaty  agreeing  to  submit  any  disputes 
which  do  not  appear  capable  of  settlement  by 
ordinary  diplomacy  either  to  an  international  Court 
of  Arbitration  or  to  a  Council  of  Inquiry  and 
Conciliation. 

In  the  matter  of  arbitrable  issues  they  agree 
to  submit  their  case  and  to  accept  and  carry  out 
the  award  of  the  Court.  In  the  matter  of  non- 
arbitrable  issues  they  also  agree  to  submit  their 
case  and  to  take  no  military  action  during  the 
process  of  inquiry.  But  they  do  not  bind  them- 
selves to  accept  the  findings  of  the  Council  of 
Conciliation  or  to  adopt  its  recommendations. 

Now,  it  is  evident  that  if  these  processes  are  to 
become  fully  efficient  for  the  preservation  of  peace, 
some  common  sanction  of  the  Powers  must  support 
the  pledge  of  the  individual  signatories.  Here 
arise  two  important  questions.  What  is  the  nature 
of  that  sanction?  Is  any  definite  concerted  action 
of  the  signatory  Powers  required  to  make  the 
sanction  operative?  If  so,  what  international  body 
should  be  invested  with  the  necessary  executive 
power?  Otherwise  no  confidence  will  be  estab- 
lished for  these  pacific  modes  of  settlement.  The 
mere  substitution  of  a  general  agreement  of 
Arbitration  and  Conciliation  for  the  numerous 
particular  agreements  which  exist  already,  even 
if  its  scope  was  extended  so  as  to  include  every 
kind  of  dispute,  would  not,  it  may  be  urged,  go 
far  towards  guaranteeing  Europe  against  the  possi- 
bility, or  probability,  of  another  war.  For,  under 
a  sufficient  strain  of  feeling  or  stress  of  circum- 
stances, history  shows  that  not  Germany  alone, 


74     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

or  Russia,  but  every  State  has  been  willing  to 
violate  or  to  condone  in  others  the  violation  of 
treaty  obligations.1  Even  allowing  for  some  recent 
quickening  of  the  public  conscience,  it  would  be 
idle  to  pretend  that  the  signature  of  such  a  treaty 
as  is  here  described  would  give  the  requisite 
assurance  for  the  fulfilment  of  its  obligations 
under  all  conditions  and  by  every  signatory 
Power. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  admitted  that  the  co-operation 
of  a  large  number  of  Governments  in  a  solemn 
treaty  of  such  momentous  import  would  in  itself 
strengthen  the  conscience  of  the  world  and  evoke 
a  power  of  international  sentiment  which  most 
States  would  find  it  difficult  to  disregard.  But 
is  it  credible  that  this  moral  and  intellectual 
sanction  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  treaty  obliga- 
tions will  suffice?  This  sufficiency,  be  it  remem- 
bered, must  be  twofold.  The  moral  sanction  must 
be  strong  enough,  not  only  to  hold  the  least 
scrupulous  of  States  to  its  pledges  but  to  convince 
the  most  sceptical  of  States  that  it  possesses  such 
a  power.  Now,  there  have  been  pacifists,  not  a 
few,  who  in  the  past  have  been  willing  to  rely 
upon  the  public  opinion  and  conscience  of  the 
civilized  world  for  a  sufficient  sanction.  Nor  has 
this  faith  in  the  power  of  public  opinion  been 

1  Recent  instances  are  the  breach  of  the  Algeciras  Act  by 
France,  with  the  backing  of  Great  Britain,  in  1911  ;  the  breach 
of  the  Berlin  Treaty  by  Austria,  with  the  backing  of  Germany, 
in  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- Herzegovina  in  1908  ;  the  breach  by 
Russia,  with  Great  Britain's  consent,  of  the  stipulations  of  the 
Anglo-Russian  Convention,  securing  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  Persia  ;  and  the  recent  breach  by  Japan  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Treaty  in  relation  to  China. 


INTERNATIONAL   FORCE  75 

confined  to  political  idealists  and  humanitarians. 
So  experienced  a  statesman  as  ex-President  Taft, 
writing  a  few  months  before  the  outbreak  of  this 
war  in  support  of  a  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice  for 
the  authoritative  settlement  of  "  all  justiciable  con- 
troversies," thus  states  the  issue  :  "  But  the  query 
is  made,  '  How  will  judgments  of  such  a  Court 
be  enforced?  What  will  be  the  sanction  for  their 
execution?  '  I  am  very  little  concerned  about  that. 
After  we  have  gotten  the  cases  into  Court  and 
decided  and  the  judgments  embodied  in  a  solemn 
declaration  of  a  Court  thus  established,  few  nations 
will  care  to  face  the  condemnation  of  international 
public  opinion  and  disobey  the  judgment.  When 
a  judgment  of  that  Court  is  defied  it  will  be  time 
enough  to  devise  methods  to  prevent  the  recur- 
rence of  such  an  international  breach  of  faith."  J 

Here,  be  it  observed,  Mr.  Taft  posits  the  exist- 
ence of  an  international  Court  of  Arbitral  Justice, 
dealing  exclusively  with  "  justiciable  "  cases  suit- 
able for  legal  settlement.  His  proposals  furnish 
no  machinery  for  dealing  with  those  more  intricate 
and  more  inflammatory  issues  which,  in  accordance 
with  our  scheme,  would  come  before  the  Council 
of  Conciliation.  Now,  the  terrible  experience  of 
this  last  year,  with  all  its  wreckage  of  treaty 
rights  and  international  laws  and  conventions,  has 
definitely  Weakened  the  current  faith  in  the  plighted 
word  of  nations  and  in  the  compelling  or  restrain- 
ing force  of  international  public  opinion.  Very 
few  will  now  be  found  willing  to  trust  the  price- 
less cause  of  civilization  to  this  moral  guardianship 
alone,  or  to  wait  for  "  the  recurrence  of  such 
1  "  The  United  States  and  Peace,"  p.  150. 


;6  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

an  international  breach  of  faith  "  before  devising 
a  stronger  guarantee. 

Our  League  of  Nations  would  certainly  require 
its  members,  at  the  outset,  to  pledge  themselves 
to  bring  concerted  pressure,  by  armed  force  if 
necessary,  upon  any  signatory  Power  which  de- 
clined to  fulfil  its  treaty  obligations.  Unless  the 
force  of  international  opinion  in  support  of  arbitral 
and  conciliatory  modes  of  settlement  were  strong 
enough  to  stand  the  strain  of  such  a  demand,  both 
at  times  when  Powers  entered  such  a  treaty  and 
in  emergencies  when  they  might  be  called  upon 
to  enforce  the  terms,  the  proposal  of  a  League  is 
foredoomed  to  failure.  For  it  is  at  least  probable 
that  cases  would  arise,  at  any  rate  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  international  arrangement,  when  some 
powerful  State,  acting  either  under  sudden  fierce 
resentment,  or  even  by  calculation  of  advantages, 
might  seek  to  break  away  from  its  engagement,  in 
order  to  work  its  will  upon  some  other  State  with 
which  it  has  a  quarrel.  If  the  League  is  to  be 
effective,  it  must  prepare  for  this  contingency  by 
the  only  possible  method,  that  of  bringing  the 
united  strength  of  all  loyal  members  against  the 
recalcitrant  Power  or  Powers.  It  might,  no  doubt, 
be  urged  that  this  right  of  concerted  action  against 
a  violator  would  be  latent  in  the  situation,  and 
that,  without  any  express  obligation,  the  loyal 
signatory  Powers  might  be  expected  to  take  such 
measures  as  they  deemed  suitable  and  necessary 
for  the  vindication  of  the  treaty.  The  difficulties 
of  arranging  any  method  of  joint  action  and  of 
forming  an  executive  to  wield  such  power  will 
dispose  some  persons  to  leave  the  ultimate  enforce- 


INTERNATIONAL  FORCE  77 

ment  of  the  treaty  to  some  such  ad  hoc  voluntary 
co-operation.  This  apparently  is,  or  was,  the  view 
of  Mr.  Taft.  But  though  the  recent  experience 
of  arbitration  indicates  that  States  have  in  nearly 
every  instance,  however  reluctantly,  accepted  the 
award  of  an  Arbitration  Court  which  went  against 
their  interests,  we  have  no  sufficient  ground  for 
holding  that  they  would  do  so  if  there  were  in- 
cluded in  the  scope  of  arbitral  reference  issues 
of  grave  importance  affecting  "  honour  and  vital 
interests,"  or  that  they  would  consent  to  refer  to 
a  Council  of  Conciliation  the  still  more  inflam- 
matory matters  which  so  often  lead  to  war.  In 
the  existing  rudimentary  condition  of  the  society 
of  nations  it  would  seem  necessary  to  secure  the 
integrity  of  the  treaty  by  express  provisions  for 
its  enforcement. 

Now,  within  the  scope  of  our  arrangement  for 
settling  disputes  there  are  five  opportunities  for 
recalcitrance. 

The  first  two  have  reference  to  arbitrable  issues. 
A  nation  might  refuse  to  submit  a  case  to  Arbitra- 
tion either  because  it  denied  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  international  Court  or  because  it  feared  the 
result  of  Arbitration,  or  it  might  decline  to  accept 
or  carry  out  an  arbitral  award  which  went  against 
its  interests.  The  proposed  process  of  Inquiry 
and  Conciliation  affords  three  opportunities  for 
recalcitrance.  A  State  might  refuse  to  submit  to 
an  Inquiry.  It  might  resort  to  some  act  or  pre- 
paration of  hostility  during  the  prescribed  period. 
Or,  finally,  it  might  refuse  to  make  a  peaceful 
settlement  after  the  Council  had  made  its  report. 

If  a  breach  of  the  public  peace  by  any  of  these 


acts  is  to  be  prevented,  executive  powers  must 
be  entrusted  to  some  international  body  for  the 
application  either  of  preventive  or  punitive 
measures.  It  may  be  argued  that  since  the  prime 
purpose  of  the  League  is  to  prevent  war,  it  would 
suffice  if  the  signatory  States  undertook  to  take 
concerted  action  against  any  Power  which,  in 
defiance  of  its  treaty  obligations,  actually  opened 
hostilities  against  another  Power.  The  breach  of 
its  undertaking  to  submit  a  case  to  Arbitration  or 
Conciliation,  or  to  accept  the  arbitral  award,  or  to 
seek  a  settlement  in  accordance  with  the  Council's 
findings,  would  not,  on  this  hypothesis,  oblige  the 
Powers  to  take  concerted  action,  unless  and  until 
such  breach  was  followed  by  some  overt  act  of 
armed  hostility.  It  is,  indeed,  extremely  probable 
that  a  League  of  Nations  would  be  disposed,  at 
any  rate  in  the  first  instance,  to  adopt  this  restricted 
view  of  its  executive  duties.  For  it  would  be 
far  easier  to  get  States  to  consent  to  take  concerted 
action  against  an  actual  aggressor  resorting  to 
war  in  defiance  of  his  undertakings  than  to  consent 
to  do  so  in  order  to  enforce  the  performance  of 
these  undertakings.  It  is,  therefore,  likely  that 
the  first  agreement  for  common  action  against  a 
breach  of  the  international  peace  would  take  some 
such  form  as  this  :  "  All  the  Powers  represented 
on  the  Court  or  Council  to  bind  themselves  by 
treaty,  that,  in  case  any  Power  resorts  to  hostilities 
against  another,  without  first  submitting  its  case 
to  arbitration  or  to  conciliation,  or  before  the 
expiration  of  the  prescribed  period  of  delay 
involved  in  these  processes,  or  in  defiance  of  an 
arbitral  award,  they  will  support  the  Power  so 


INTERNATIONAL  FORCE  79 

attacked  by  such  concerted  measures,  diplomatic, 
economic,  or  forcible,  as  in  their  collective 
judgment  are  most  effective  and  appropriate  to 
the  circumstances  of  the  case." 

A  concerted  action,  however,  confined  to  the 
single  case  of  repressing  hostilities  undertaken  by 
a  State  refusing  Arbitration  or  Inquiry,  could 
hardly  be  considered  an  adequate  protection  of 
the  public  peace.  No  means  would  have  been 
provided  either  to  redress  an  injury,  other  than 
war,  inflicted  by  one  State  upon  another,  or  to 
secure  the  peaceful  settlement  of  any  dispute, 
although  the  right  and  duty  to  do  these  very  things 
are  conferred  upon  it  by  the  Treaty  constituting 
the  League.  The  powerful  wrongdoer  could  with 
impunity  refuse  arbitration  or  inquiry  and  could 
continue  his  oppression  and  injustice,  provided  he 
took  no  step  of  actual  hostility.  A  State,  for  in- 
stance, might  deny  protection  to  the  life  and 
property  of  members  of  a  neighbouring  State 
sojourning  or  travelling  within  its  domains,  or  cut 
off  its  access  to  the  sea  and  starve  its  trade, 
or  assist  a  rebel  party  to  prepare  civil  war 
within  its  borders.  Nay,  further,  the  injured 
State  not  merely  would  have  no  security  or 
protection  from  the  concert  of  the  Powers,  but 
it  might  have  lost  the  right  it  formerly  would  have 
had  of  taking  up  arms  on  its  own  account  against 
its  oppressor.  For  such  a  step  might  constitute 
an  act  of  formal  aggression  which  it  would  be 
the  business  of  the  League  to  repress.  Having 
regard  to  the  necessity  of  building  up  an  adequate 
authority  for  the  international  order,  it  would,  I 
think,  be  recognized  that  the  provisions  of  the 


8o     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

Treaty  establishing  means  for  the  peaceful  settle- 
ment of  disputes  must  be  covered  by  a  fuller  and 
a  firmer  sanction,  involving  a  general  obligation 
of  the  signatory  Powers  to  take  concerted  action 
to  secure  the  performance  of  all  the  treaty  under- 
takings. The  first  Great  Power  which  was  per- 
mitted with  impunity  to  refuse  an  order  of  the 
Council  to  meet  a  charge  of  oppression  tendered 
by  a  weaker  Power  would  strike  a  most  damaging 
blow  at  the  new  fabric  of  internationalism.  For 
it  will  be  recognized  that  a  League  of  Nations, 
confined  in  its  executive  aspect  to  the  repression 
of  hostilities  when  they  occur,  is  inadequate  to  the 
elementary  needs  of  the  time.  The  Treaty  con- 
stituting it  gives  it  the  duty  of  settling  disputes 
between  nations.  It  must  have  the  power  to 
perform  this  duty.  Public  opinion  and  moral 
authority  will  not  in  all  cases  suffice  to  induce 
nations  to  submit  their  case  at  the  request  of  an 
International  Council,  to  wait  the  result,  and  to 
accept  the  award.  It  would  be  idle  to  pretend 
that  they  will  suffice.  If  nations  are  invited 
solemnly  to  bind  themselves  to  arbitrate  or  to 
conciliate  their  quarrels  and  to  accept  the  awards 
of  an  impartial  international  tribunal,  is  it  too  much 
to  invite  them  to  back  their  pledge  to  do  these 
things  by  a  further  pledge  to  take  part  in  corn- 
compelling  their  co-signatories  to  fulfil  their  first 
pledge?  I  am  told  by  some  that  the  proposal  to 
go  so  far  as  this  is  impracticable.  Not  enough 
States,  it  is  urged,  would  consent  to  enter  a  League 
pledging  themselves  to  take  part  in  contingent  wars 
which  may  involve  no  important  national  interests 
of  their  own,  and  where  their  sympathies  may 


INTERNATIONAL  FORCE  81 

even  lie  with  the  recalcitrant  Power  upon  the  merits 
of  the  case.  Other  States,  it  is  also  urged,  which 
might  be  willing  to  enter  the  Union  if  they  thought 
that  they  could  break  away  with  impunity,  pro- 
vided the  temptation  were  strong  enough,  would 
also  be  deterred  by  the  more  drastic  remedies. 

The  objections  are  doubtless  weighty.  For  the 
substance  of  our  proposal  involves  a  clear  deroga- 
tion of  the  rights  of  sovereignty  as  hitherto 
possessed  by  independent  States.  Each  State  is 
invited  to  cede  the  right  of  peace  and  war  to  an 
international  body,  upon  which  its  own  representa- 
tives will  be  in  a  small  and  permanent  minority. 
Not  only  will  it  no  longer  have  the  right  to  make 
war  proprio  motu,  but  it  will  bind  itself  to  make 
concerted  war  at  the  behest  of  this  new  inter- 
national authority.  This  is  the  form  of  the  invita- 
tion which,  it  is  said,  will  seem  intolerable  to  a 
proud  and  self-respecting  State.  But  will  it  so 
seem  when  the  substance  of  the  proposal  is 
considered?  Will  a  peaceful  nation  whose  arms 
are  for  defence,  and  which  desires  to  make  no 
forcible  invasion  upon  the  rights  of  other  nations, 
suffer  any  real  diminution  of  its  own  rights  and 
powers?  Its  defence  will  be  incomparably  stronger 
than  before,  for  all  its  territorial  and  other  rights 
and  possessions  will  be  secured  by  the  force  of  the 
other  members  of  the  League,  hi  addition  to  its 
own.  It  is  true  that  as  a  counterpoise  it  incurs 
the  liability  of  having  to  take  part  in  concerted 
action  with  other  Powers  against  a  treaty-breaking 
Power  with  which  it  may  have  been  in  friendly 
relations.  To  some  critics  this  appears  an  in- 
superable obstacle.  When  it  came  to  the  point, 

6 


82     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

we  are  asked,  how  could  you  expect  that  such  a 
Power  as  Austria  should  fulfil  her  engagement  to 
bring  armed  pressure  upon  Germany  to  compel 
the  latter  to  carry  out  her  treaty  obligations?  Or 
could  you  trust  Russia  to  join  in  coercing  a  Balkan 
Federation,  or  Great  Britain  to  take  up  arms 
against  the  United  States  in  a  quarrel  which  was 
not  hers?  But  these  objections  seem  to  show 
some  lack  of  imagination.  For  they  are  based  on 
an  assumption  that  all  the  motives  which  hitherto 
have  drawn  nations  into  particular  offensive  or 
defensive  alliances  and  groups  will  remain  as 
strong  as  before,  and  that,  in  fact,  there  must 
survive  inside  the  great  alliance  here  described 
those  particular  alliances  with  their  disruptive 
influences  which  have  defeated  all  previous 
attempts  to  maintain  an  effective  Concert  of 
Europe.  Now,  it  would,  of  course,  be  foolish  to 
ignore  the  certainty  that  for  some  time  to  come 
the  amities  and  enmities  of  the  present  struggle 
will  be  represented  in  special  associations  and 
divisions  which  must  weaken  and  imperil  the  larger 
international  co-operation.  But  history  teaches  no 
clearer  lesson  than  that  of  the  facile  dissolution 
of  alliances  which  are  not  sustained  by  a  powerful, 
evident,  and  continuous  solidarity  of  interests.  The 
nineteenth  century  was  rife  with  the  swift  permuta- 
tions and  combinations  of  alliance  between  Euro- 
pean States.  The  cement  of  a  bloody  war, 
conducted  in  alliance,  is  notoriously  weak  for  bind- 
ing nations.  As  the  popular  passions  for  war 
flare  up  swiftly  into  full  intensity,  so  the  animosities 
they  leave  behind  die  down  much  more  rapidly 
than  is  expected.  As  with  the  economic  so  with 


INTERNATIONAL   FORCE  83 

the  moral  damages,  even  of  the  most  destructive 
and  exhausting  wars,  the  rate  of  recovery  exceeds 
all    expectations.       While     the     first    feelings    of 
triumph  and  of  bitterness  animate  the  victors  and 
the  vanquished,  while  the  recent  memories  of  the 
combat  fill  the  mind  and  heart  of  the  nations,  while 
the  direful  consequences  of  the  war  are  impressed 
upon   every   home   and    every   industry,    while   the 
territorial     changes    and     indemnities     and    other 
shocks    to   pride   and    pocket   are    still    fresh,    the 
reception  even  of  the  best  devised  schemes  of  inter- 
national   co-operation   is    likely    to   be   tepid,    and 
the  maintenance  of  the  old  alliances  may  cross  and 
hamper    the   new    arrangements.      But   this    early 
difficulty   will   rapidly   diminish   if   the   League   of 
Nations  can  once  be  set  upon  a  fairly  stable  foot- 
ing and  be  given  opportunity  to  assert  its  inherent 
virtues.       For    if    the    intelligence    and    faith    of 
nations    are   strong    enough    once   to    establish    it, 
the  ambitions,  the  fears,  and  the  suspicions,  which 
are  the  spiritual  nutriment  of  special  alliances  and 
groups,  would  wither  and  decay.     So  long  as  an 
ambitious,    unscrupulous,    aggressive    State    thinks 
that,  by  appeal  to  the  special  interests  or  fears  of 
one  or  two  neighbours,  it  can  further  its  separate 
ends  as  a  world-Power,  it  will  continue  to  try  to 
form   secret   or   open   alliances   involving   peril   to 
the  peace  of  the  world.     But  if  such  a  State  found 
itself  confronted  by  a  numerous  body  of  States  (of 
which    it   and   the    particular   States    it    sought    to 
detach    were    also    members)    prepared    to    bring 
against  it  an  overwhelming  force  of  economic  or 
military   pressure,   the   design   of  forming   such   a 
special  alliance  or  group  would  seem  futile.   Again, 


84    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  that  every 
special  alliance  is  motived,  as  regards  one  or  more 
members,  not  by  aggressive  intentions  but  by  fear. 
Remove  fear  as  a  motive  for  alliances,  and  no 
alliances,  involving  peril  to  world-peace,  would  be 
established.  Now,  once  grant  the  actual  achieve- 
ment of  our  League,  with  power  to  repress  the 
depredations  and  oppressions  of  one  Power  upon 
another,  the  fear-motive  would  no  longer  bring 
nations  into  particular  alliances.  Neither  for 
aggression  nor  for  defence  would  these  inner 
groupings  any  longer  be  valid.  The  psychological 
economy  of  the  general  as  opposed  to  the  particular 
alliance  is  complete.  But  this  economy,  it  must 
be  insisted,  depends  upon  a  clear  acceptance  of 
the  necessity  of  an  international  executive  vested 
with  adequate  powers  to  enforce  the  common  will 
of  nations. 

The  existence  of  such  an  international  order 
would  be  itself  the  answer  to  the  objection  that 
nations  could  not  in  fact  be  relied  upon  to  carry 
out  their  general  treaty  obligations  by  reason  of 
the  superior  binding  force  which  would  attach  to 
their  special  alliances  with  nations  of  kindred  blood 
or  interests.  The  raison  d'etre  for  these  special 
alliances  disappearing,  they  would  be  even  shorter 
lived  and  less  reliable  than  in  the  past.  So  long, 
however,  as  such  special  relations  continue  to  exist 
between  two  nations,  it  would  be  a  heavy  strain 
upon  the  new  international  order  to  call  upon  one 
nation  to  take  an  active  part  in  coercing  another 
with  which  it  had  close  ties,  although  the  latter 
might  have  broken  its  obligations  to  the  wider 
society  of  nations.  The  delicacy  of  such  a  situation 


INTERNATIONAL  FORCE  85 

would  doubtless  make  it  desirable  that  the  Inter- 
national Executive  should  be  permitted  to  exercise 
its  discretion  in  exempting  a  nation  so  situated 
from  this  particular  act  of  international  service. 

But  to  refuse  such  executive  powers,  upon  the  plea 
that  certain  States  will  either  decline  to  enter  the 
League  if  they  are  given,  or  will  conspire  to  break 
their  pledges  and  defy  the  consequences  if  they 
do  enter,  is  tantamount  to  an  admission  of  a  lack 
of  faith  in  the  efficacy  of  the  whole  proposal  as 
a  safeguard  of  the  public  peace.  Unless  the  desire 
for  peace  and  the  degree  of  confidence  in  the 
similar  desire  of  other  nations  are  strong  enough 
in  the  proposed  members  of  the  League  to  induce 
them  to  undergo  a  self-denying  ordinance  in  the 
employment  of  military  and  naval  forces,  and  to 
consent  to  place  these  forces  at  the  disposal  of 
an  International  Executive  for  the  preservation  of 
world-peace,  it  seems  unlikely  that  any  treaty 
they  may  enter  will  possess  enduring  power. 

The  issue  is  of  quite  critical  importance.  This 
League  of  Nations  must  be  regarded  as  the  begin- 
nings of  an  attempt  to  make  a  fresh  advance  in 
that  evolution  of  human  society  which  on  its 
political  side  has  grown  from  the  primitive  family 
or  tribe  to  the  modern  national  State  or  Empire. 
Indeed,  its  feasibility  ultimately  rests  upon  the 
fact  that  it  evokes  and  posits  no  new  or  untried 
human  powers,  no  new  or  untried  political  forms, 
but  simply  applies  upon  a  larger  scale  those  same 
powers  and  forms  which  have  been  successfully 
applied  upon  the  smaller  scale.  It  is  the 
foundation-stone  of  a  larger  and  more  compre- 
hensive human  society,  of  which  nations  are  the 


86     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

constituent  members,  made  in  the  pattern  of  the 
smaller  federations  of  which  history  has  given  so 
many  instances. 

The  question  of  an  Executive,  invested  with  cer- 
tain ultimate  powers  of  safeguarding  the  fabric  of 
constitutional  and  legal  rights  and  obligations,  has 
arisen  in  every  form  and  scale  of  political  asso- 
ciation. Never  and  nowhere  has  it  been  found 
possible  for  a  human  association  to  dispense  with 
the  power  to  compel  its  members  to  observe  its 
laws.  Whenever  this  has  been  attempted  it  has 
failed.  The  present  war,  indeed,  is  the  most  tragic- 
ally complete  instance  of  the  futility  of  expecting 
public  law  to  operate  and  treaty  obligations  to 
be  kept  inviolate  without  an  express  and  adequate 
and  generally  known  provision  for  enforcing  them. 
The  reliance  solely  upon  conscience,  the  inner  sense 
of  justice,  and  on  public  opinion,  has  never  been 
found  adequate  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace 
and  the  security  of  laws  within  the  smaller 
structures  of  society.  Is  it  reasonable  to  expect 
that  this  reliance  can  be  adequate  in  the  early 
stages  of  the  large  new  association  which  brings 
together  under  common  rules  States  hitherto 
acknowledging  no  clear  moral  obligations  in  their 
relations  with  one  another? 

There  are,  in  effect,  two  separate  and  very 
diverse  objections  made  to  what  is  sometimes  called 
the  "  Coercive  Super-State."  The  first  is  that 
independent  States  will  not  so  far  surrender  their 
sovereignty  as  to  enter  such  a  Super-State.  With 
that  objection  I  have  already  dealt.  If  it  were 
valid,  it  would  carry  with  it  the  despair  of  all 
attempts  to  secure  a  durable  peace,  and  would 


INTERNATIONAL   FORCE  87 

throw  nations  back  upon  the  necessity  of  seek- 
ing to  maintain  a  precarious  equipoise  of  nations 
and  groups  by  mechanical  Balances  of  Power. 

The  other  objection  comes,  not  from  the  hard, 
sceptical  politician  but  from  a  certain  type  of 
idealist,  who  objects  to  the  introduction  of  any 
coercive  element  of  force  into  the  control  of  inter- 
national relations.  He  holds  that  the  nations 
entering  such  a  League  can  be  trusted  to  fulfil 
their  obligations  :  that  the  history  of  arbitration 
shows  it  :  that  the  conscience  and  public  opinion 
of  the  world  are  sufficient  sanctions  :  and  that 
these  sanctions  of  moral  force  and  reason  are 
degraded  and  impaired  by  placing  in  the  back- 
ground a  sanction  of  physical  coercion.  If  force 
in  the  hands  of  a  State  is  an  evil,  in  the  hands 
of  a  Super-State  it  is  a  greater  evil.  So  runs  the 
familiar  argument.  It  is  the  argument  of  the 
moral  force  anarchist  in  State  politics,  in  education, 
in  penology,  and  generally  in  the  arts  of  social 
conduct.  There  is  nothing  novel  in  its  applica- 
tion here  to  international  relations.  History  does 
not  bear  out  any  of  its  contentions.  Nations 
cannot,  any  more  than  individuals,  be  trusted  to 
fulfil  all  obligations.  For,  though  arbitral  awards 
have  in  nearly  all  cases  been  accepted,  the  number 
of  arbitral  cases  involving  vital  interests  and  in- 
flammatory questions  has  been  very  few,  while 
recent  violations  of  treaties  and  international  laws 
prove  that  a  moral  sanction  is  often  an  inadequate 
safeguard.  But  the  fundamental  error  is  the 
assumption  of  an  absolute  antagonism  between 
moral  and  physical  force  and  the  conviction  that 
in  any  act  of  human  conduct  the  latter  can  be 


88  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

dispensed  with.  No  such  antagonism  exists.  There 
is  no  display  of  moral  force  in  any  act  of  human 
conduct  which  does  not  make  some  use  of  physical 
force  as  its  instrument.  Such  force  is  in  itself 
no  remedy,  but  it  is  a  factor  in  every  remedy  which 
the  intellect  and  conscience  of  men  are  able  to 
devise.  There  is  no  purely  moral  suasion,  no 
absolutely  spiritual  government.  Civilization,  the 
progress  of  humanity,  no  doubt,  consists  in  the 
growing  preponderance  of  moral  and  intellectual 
over  the  material  factors  in  every  art.  But  matter 
and  force  do  not  disappear.  They  continue  to  be 
essentials  in  every  mode  of  human  expression  and 
achievement,  individual  or  social,  though  they  play 
a  diminishing  part.  This  is  the  tendency  of  pro- 
gress, viz.  to  reduce  the  proportion  of  the  physic- 
ally coercive  element  in  all  control.  But  it  cannot 
be  dispensed  with,  or  suddenly  reduced,  without 
disaster.  Moreover,  the  idea  that  a  large  new 
extension  of  the  scale  of  human  co-operation,  the 
beginning  of  an  effective  social  life  among  nations, 
can  be  conducted  on  a  higher  moral  plane  than  the 
social  life  within  the  most  civilized  of  nations,  dis- 
pensing with  that  element  of  coercion  in  govern- 
ment which  no  State  dare  dispense  with,  cannot 
claim  serious  consideration.  The  evil  which  the 
use  of  force  involves  varies,  not  with  the  amount 
of  force  but  with  the  mode  of  its  employment  and 
the  end  to  which  it  is  applied.  Force  employed 
as  the  only  means  of  breaking  down  a  forcible 
obstacle  to  justice  is  not  an  evil  but  a  good,  pro- 
vided it  is  not  excessive.  Nor  can  it  be  held  that 
force  is  in  itself  degrading  either  to  the  user  or 
the  sufferer.  So  far  as  it  is  realized  to  be  a  neces- 


INTERNATIONAL   FORCE  89 

sary  feature  in  the  achievement  of  a  just  and 
reasonable  end,  it  does  not  degrade.  The 
degradation  of  war  does  not  consist  in  the  employ- 
ment of  physical  force  ;  it  consists  in  employing 
a  maximum  of  physical  force  where  a  minimum 
would  suffice,  and  in  employing  it  for  purely 
national  purposes  of  the  equity  and  utility  of  which 
there  is  no  disinterested  guarantee.  The  evil  of 
war  is  that  its  result  or  settlement  has  no  assured 
relation  to  reason  or  justice.  In  a  world  where 
reason  and  justice  have  been  ingredients  of  grow- 
ing magnitude  in  human  affairs,  war  reverses  the 
process.  The  gain  of  substituting  the  use  of  inter- 
national for  national  force  is  twofold.  In  the  first 
place,  it  reduces  the  magnitude  of  the  r61e  of 
force  in  the  human  economy.  For,  as  I  have 
shown,  the  indispensable  condition  of  a  general 
reduction  of  national  armaments  is  this  substitution 
of  international  for  national  employment  of  them. 
There  would  be  much  less  force,  and  it  would  be 
far  less  frequently  used.  The  second  gain,  how- 
ever, is  the  determinant  moral  consideration. 
Assuming — and  this  is  not  in  question — that  the 
International  Executive  only  employed  force  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  public  order,  and  restrain- 
ing a  lawless  nation  from  a  lawless  use  of  force, 
this  would  be  a  definitely  moral  use.  The  exist- 
ence of  this  weapon  does  not  degrade  the  nations 
who  need  no  such  restraint  to  make  them  keep  their 
pledges.  Paul  expressed  this  truth  with  accuracy 
when  he  said  that  the  law  was  not  a  terror  to  those 
who  obeyed  it,  but  only  to  the  evildoer. 


CHAPTER    VII 
THE    ECONOMIC    BOYCOTT 

IN  this  discussion  of  an  International  Executive 
entrusted  with  powers  to  compel  the  fulfilment  of 
treaty  obligations,  it  must  not  be  assumed  that 
coercion  can  only  be  exercised  by  the  employment 
of  armed  force.  The  boycott  is  a  weapon  which 
could  be  employed  with  paralysing  power  by  a 
circle  of  nations  upon  an  offender  against  the  public 
law  of  the  world.  No  nation  to-day,  least  of  all 
the  great  industrial  and  military  Powers,  is  or 
can  become  socially  and  economically  self- 
sufficient.  It  depends  in  countless  ways  upon' 
intercourse  with  other  nations.  If  all  or  most 
of  these  avenues  of  intercourse  were  stopped,  it 
would  soon  be  reduced  to  worse  straits  than  those 
which  Germany  is  now  experiencing.  If  all  diplo- 
matic intercourse  were  withdrawn  ;  if  the  inter- 
national postal  and  telegraphic  systems  were  closed 
to  a  public  law-breaker  ;  if  all  inter-State  railway 
trains  stopped  at  his  frontiers  ;  if  no  foreign  ships 
entered  his  ports,  and  ships  carrying  his  flag  were 
excluded  from  every  foreign  port  ;  if  all  coaling 
stations  were  closed  to  him  ;  if  no  acts  of  sale  or 
purchase  were  permitted  to  him  in  the  outside  world 

— if  such  a  political  and  commercial  boycott  were 

90 


THE   ECONOMIC   BOYCOTT  91 

seriously  threatened,  what  country  could  long  stand 
out  against  it?  Nay,  the  far  less  rigorous  measure 
of  a  financial  boycott,  the  closure  of  all  foreign 
exchanges  to  members  of  the  outlaw  State,  the 
prohibition  of  all  quotations  on  foreign  Stock 
Exchanges,  and  of  all  dealings  in  stocks  and 
shares,  all  discounting  and  acceptances  of  trade 
bills,  all  loans  for  public  or  private  purposes,  and 
all  payments  of  moneys  due — such  a  withdrawal  of 
financial  intercourse,  if  thoroughly  applied  and  per- 
sisted in,  would  be  likely  to  bring  to  its  senses 
the  least  scrupulous  of  States.  Assuming  that  the 
members  of  the  League  included  all  or  most  of 
the  important  commercial  and  financial  nations, 
and  that  they  could  be  relied  upon  to  press 
energetically  all  or  even  a  few  of  these  forms  of 
boycott,  could  any  country  long  resist  such 
pressure?  Would  not  the  threat  of  it  and  the 
knowledge  that  it  could  be  used  form  a  potent 
restraint  upon  the  law-breaker?  Even  the  single 
weapon  of  a  complete  postal  and  telegraphic  boy- 
cott would  have  enormous  efficiency  were  it  rigor- 
ously applied.  Every  section  of  the  industrial  and 
commercial  community  would  bring  organized 
pressure  upon  its  Government  to  withdraw  from 
so  intolerable  a  position  and  to  return  to  its  inter- 
national allegiance.  It  may  be  said,  Why  is  it 
that  such  a  powerful  weapon  of  such  obvious 
efficacy  has  never  been  applied?  The  answer 
is  that  the  conditions  for  its  rapid  and  concerted 
application  have  never  hitherto  existed.  For  in 
order  that  it  may  be  effective,  a  considerable 
number  of  nations  must  have  previously  under- 
taken to  apply  it  simultaneously  and  by  common 


92     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

action.  And,  what  is  more,  each  nation  must  have 
confidence  in  the  bona  fides  of  the  intention  of 
other  nations  to  apply  it.  For  the  detailed  applica- 
tion of  the  boycott,  in  most  points,  must  of  necessity 
remain  in  the  hands  of  the  several  national  Govern- 
ments. Here  comes  the  practical  difficulty.  Every 
boycott  has  a  certain  injurious  rebound.  It  hits 
back  the  nation  that  applies  it.  The  injury  of 
suspended  intercourse  is,  of  course,  not  equal, 
otherwise  the  process  would  be  futile.  If  the  whole 
circle  of  A's  neighbours  boycott  him,  each  suffers 
half  the  loss  of  his  separate  intercourse  with  A, 
but  A  suffers  this  loss  multiplied  by  the  number 
of  his  neighbours.  Now  if  A's  intercourse  with 
all  his  neighbours  is  of  equal  magnitude,  each  of 
them  can  probably  afford  easily  to  bear  the  sacri- 
fice involved  in  the  boycott,  trusting  to  the  early 
effect  of  their  action  in  bringing  A  to  terms.  But 
if  one  or  two  of  A's  neighbours  are  in  much  closer 
relations  with  A  than  the  others,  and  if,  as  may 
be  the  case,  they  are  getting  more  advantage  from 
this  intercourse  than  A,  the  risk  or  sacrifice  they 
are  called  upon  to  undergo  will  be  proportionately 
greater.  They  must  bear  the  chief  brunt  of  a 
policy  in  the  adoption  of  which  they  have  not  the 
determinant  voice. 

Take,  for  example,  the  case  of  Germany.  An 
all-round  boycott  applied  to  her  would  evidently 
cause  more  damaging  reactions  to  Holland,  Bel- 
gium, and  Denmark  than  to  any  of  the  greater 
nations  whose  united  voice  might  have  determined 
its  application.  The  injury  to  Holland,  in  par- 
ticular, might  in  the  first  instance  be  almost  as 
grave  as  that  sustained  by  Germany,  the  supposed 


THE   ECONOMIC   BOYCOTT  93 

object  of  the  boycott.  It  would  evidently  be  neces- 
sary to  make  provision  against  this  unequal 
incidence  by  devising  a  system  of  compensations  or 
indemnity  to  meet  thel:ase  of  such  a  special  injury 
or  sacrifice. 

A  brief  allusion  to  the  other  side  of  the  objection 
will  suffice,  viz.  the  fact  that  any  such  boycott 
would  be  far  less  potent  or  immediate  in  its 
pressure  against  some  nations  than  against  others. 
While  Great  Britain  would  have  to  yield  at  once  to 
the  threat  of  such  pressure,  Russia,  or  even  the 
United  States,  could  stand  out  for  a  considerable 
time,  and  China  might  even  regard  the  boycott 
as  a  blessing.  But  it  is  pretty  evident  that  in  the 
long  run  no  civilized  nation  could  endure  such  isola- 
tion, and  that  this  weapon  is  one  which  the  League 
might  in  certain  cases  advantageously  employ. 

Other  aspects  of  the  social -economic  boycott 
raise  other  difficulties.  While  certain  modes  and 
paths  of  intercourse  lie  directly  under  the  control 
of  the  Governments  of  the  co-operating  States, 
others  belong  to  private  enterprise.  Though 
postal,  railway,  and  telegraphic  intercourse  could 
be  cut  off  easily  by  agreements  between  Govern- 
ments, private  trading  could  not  so  easily  be 
stopped.  It  is  not  found  a  simple  matter  to  stop 
all  trading  between  members  of  nations  actually 
at  war  when  national  sentiment  sides  strongly  with 
the  legal  prohibition.  It  might  be  much  more 
difficult  to  prevent  all  commercial  intercourse  for 
private  gain  when  there  was  no  special  hostility 
between  the  two  nations  in  question.  But  this  is, 
after  all,  only  a  minor  difficulty.  Provided  that 
the  respective  Governments  were  prepared  to  use 


94    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

their  normal  powers  of  control  over  the  principal 
modes  of  communication  and  of  transport,  the 
potency  of  the  boycott  so  established  would  appear 
exceedingly  effective. 

It  involves,  however,  a  risk  which  needs 
recognition.  The  extreme  pressure  of  the  boycott 
might  lead  to  forcible  reprisals  on  the  part  of 
the  boycotted  State  which  would,  in  fact,  precipi- 
tate a  war.  Declaring  what  would  be  in  effect 
a  blockade  by  sea  and  land,  it  might  be  necessary 
for  the  League  to  patrol  the  seas  in  order  to  stop 
"  illegal  traffic,"  and  to  keep  some  force  along 
the  land  frontiers  for  general  purposes.  A  boy- 
cotted nation  might,  in  the  stress  and  anger  of 
the  case,  begin  hostilities  against  those  of  its  neigh- 
bours who  were  most  active  in  the  operations  of 
the  boycott.  In  that  event  the  economic  boycott 
would  have  to  be  supported  by  armed  pressure. 
This  would  also  be  the  case  where  the  breach  of 
international  law  against  which  action  was  taken 
consisted,  not  in  refusing  to  arbitrate  or  conciliate 
an  issue  but  in  an  actual  opening  of  hostilities. 
Such  an  act  of  war,  directed  necessarily  against 
some  one  or  more  States,  could  not  be  met  merely 
by  a  boycott.  It  would  involve  armed  co-operation 
as  well,  the  economic  boycott  forming  an  accom- 
paniment. 

There  is  another  method  of  bringing  financial 
pressure  upon  a  law -breaking  State  which  deserves 
consideration.  It  is  put  forward  in  the  following 
terms  by  Mr.  F.  N.  Keen  in  his  able  little  book 
"  The  World  in  Alliance  "  '  :  "  The  States  com- 
prised in  the  international  scheme  might  be 
1  P.  58.  Published  by  Walter  Southwood. 


THE   ECONOMIC   BOYCOTT  95 

required  to  keep  deposited  with,  or  under  the  con- 
trol of,  the  International  Council  sums  of  money, 
proportioned  in  some  way  to  their  relative  popula- 
tions or  financial  resources,  which  might  be  made 
available  to  answer  international  obligations,  and 
an  international  bank  might  be  organized,  which 
would  facilitate  the  giving  of  security  by  States 
to  the  International  Council  for  the  performance 
of  their  obligations  and  the  enforcement  of  pay- 
ments between  one  State  and  another  (as  well  as 
probably  assisting  in  the  creation  of  an  inter- 
national currency  and  discharging  other  useful 
international  functions) . " 

The  organized  concentration  of  international 
finance  by  the  formation  of  an  international  bank 
is  a  line  of  action  which  might  immensely 
strengthen  that  body  of  pacific  forces  the  rising 
importance  of  which  Mr.  Norman  Angell  has  so 
effectively  expounded.  It  might  consolidate  to  an 
almost  incalculable  degree  the  effective  unity  of 
the  International  League  by  placing  under  it  the 
solid  foundation  of  world -peace,  while  the  power 
which  such  an  institution  would  wield,  either  for 
purposes  of  fiscal  or  financial  boycott,  would  be 
enormous. 

But  however  highly  we  estimate  the  potentialities 
of  the  boycott  as  a  valuable  adjunct  to  the  pressure 
of  public  opinion  in  compelling  obedience  to  treaty 
obligations,  it  is  idle  to  pretend  that  the  confidence 
required  to  induce  the  chief  nations  to  rely  upon 
the  due  performance  of  these  obligations  by  all 
their  co-signatories  will  be  possible  without  placing 
at  their  disposal,  for  use  in  the  last  resort,  an 
adequate  armed  force  to  break  the  resistance  of 


96     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

an  armed  law-breaking  State.  Somewhere  behind 
international  law  there  must  be  placed  a  power  of 
international  compulsion  by  arms.  If  that  force 
were  really  adequate,  it  is  probable  that  it  would 
never  be  necessary  to  employ  it  for  any  purpose 
save  that  of  repelling  invasions  or  dangerous  dis- 
orders on  the  part  of  outsiders.  Its  existence  and 
the  knowledge  of  its  presence  might  suffice  to 
restrain  the  aggressive  or  lawless  tendencies  which 
will  survive  in  members  of  the  League.  But  in 
the  beginnings  of  the  organization  of  international 
society  it  is  at  least  possible,  perhaps  likely,  that 
some  dangerous  outbreak  of  the  old  spirit  of  state- 
absolutism  should  occur,  and  that  some  arrogant 
or  greedy  Power,  within  the  circle  of  the  League, 
might  endeavour  to  defy  the  public  law. 

For  the  States  entering  such  a  League  will  be 
of  various  grades  of  political  development  : 
some  may  enter  with  reluctance  and  rather  because 
they  fear  to  be  left  out  than  because  they  believe 
in  or  desire  the  success  of  the  League.  It  is  idle 
to  imagine  that  a  society  starting  with  so  little 
inner  unity  of  status  and  of  purpose  can  dispense 
entirely  with  the  backing  of  physical  force  with 
which  the  most  highly  evolved  of  national  societies 
has  been  unable  to  dispense. 

What  form,  then,  should  the  required  inter- 
national force  take,  and  who  should  exercise  it? 

The  proposal  to  endow  some  executive  inter- 
national body  with  the  power  of  levying  and  main- 
taining a  new  land  and  sea  force,  superior  to  that 
of  any  Power  or  combination  it  may  be  called 
upon  to  meet,  scarcely  merits  consideration. 
Apart  from  the  hopelessness  of  getting  the  Powers 


THE   ECONOMIC   BOYCOTT  97 

to  consent  to  set  up  a  Super-State  upon  this  basis, 
the  mere  suggestion  of  curing1  militarism  by 
creating  a  large  additional  army  and  navy  would 
be  intolerable.  Nor  is  it  any  more  reasonable 
to  expect  the  Powers  to  abandon  their  separate 
national  forces,  simply  contributing  their  quota 
towards  an  international  force  under  the  permanent 
control  of  an  International  Executive.  No  such 
abandonment  of  sovereign  power,  no  such  com- 
plete confidence  in  the  new  internationalism,  could 
for  a  long  time  to  come  be  even  contemplated. 
Each  nation  would  insist  upon  retaining  within 
its  own  territory  and  at  its  own  disposal  the  forces 
necessary  to  preserve  internal  order  and  to  meet 
at  the  outset  any  sudden  attack  made  from  out- 
side. It  is  evident,  in  other  words,  that  the  forces 
required  by  the  International  League  in  the  last 
resort,  for  the  maintenance  of  public  law  and  the 
repression  of  breaches  of  the  treaty,  must  be  com- 
posed of  contingents  drawn  upon  some  agreed  plan 
from  the  national  forces  and  placed  for  the  work 
in  hand  at  the  disposal  of  an  international  com- 
mand. Such  armed  co -operation  is,  of  course, 
not  unknown.  Several  times  within  recent  years 
concerted  action  has  been  taken  by  several 
European  Powers,  and  though  the  Pekin  expedi- 
tion in  1900  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  very  favour- 
able example,  it  illustrates  the  willingness  of 
Powers  to  act  together  for  some  common  end  which 
seems  to  them  of  sufficient  importance.1  Is  it 

1  The  Dulcigno  demonstration  in  1880,  the  blockade  of  Crete 
in  1897,  the  demonstration  at  Antivari  and  the  occupation  of 
Scutari  in  1913,  are  other  instances,  not  to  mention  the  great 
Alliance  of  Powers  in  the  present  war. 

7 


98     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

too  much  to  expect  that  the  nations  entering  the 
Confederation  will  realize  with  sufficient  clearness 
the  importance  of  preserving  the  integrity  of  their 
international  agreement  to  be  willing  to  entrust 
a  permanent  executive  with  the  duty  of  comman- 
deering the  forces  necessary  to  achieve  this  purpose 
when  they  may  be  required? 

It  will  doubtless  be  objected  that  there  is  a 
world  of  difference  between  the  occasional  willing- 
ness of  a  group  of  Powers  to  take  concerted  action 
upon  a  particular  occasion,  for  which  each  reserves 
full  liberty  of  determination  as  to  whether  and 
to  what  extent  it  will  co-operate,  and  the  proposal 
before  us.  It  is  absurd,  we  shall  be  told,  to  expect 
that  States  bred  in  the  sense  of  sovereignty  and 
military  pride  will  seriously  entertain  a  proposal 
which  may  bring  them  into  war  in  a  quarrel  not 
specifically  theirs  and  compel  them  to  furnish 
troops  to  serve  under  an  international  staff.  But 
many  events  that  have  seemed  as  absurd  are 
brought  to  pass.  A  few  decades  ago  nothing 
would  have  seemed  more  absurd  than  to  suppose 
that  our  nation  would  be  willing  to  equip  an  Expe- 
ditionary Force  of  several  million  men  to  operate 
upon  the  Continent  under  the  supreme  control  of 
a  French  General.  Whether,  in  fact,  such  co- 
operation as  we  here  desiderate  is  feasible  at  any 
early  period  will  depend  upon  two  factors  :  first, 
the  realization  on  the  part  of  Governments  and 
peoples  of  the  civilized  world  of  the  supreme  im- 
portance of  the  issue  at  stake  hi  this  endeavour 
to  lay  a  strong  foundation  for  the  society  of 
nations  ;  secondly,  the  diminution  hi  the  influence 
of  militarism  and  navalism  as  factors  in  national 


THE   ECONOMIC   BOYCOTT  99 

life  that  is  likely  to  occur  if  sufficient  belief  in 
the  permanence  and  efficacy  of  the  new  arrange- 
ment is  once  secured.  If  nations  can  be  brought 
to  believe  that  national  armies  and  navies  are  too 
dangerous  toys  to  be  entrusted  to  the  indiscretion 
of  national  statesmen  and  generals,  and  are  only 
safe  if  they  are  held  in  trust  for  the  wider  world 
community,  this  conviction  will  modify  the  sur- 
viving sentiments  of  national  pride  and  national 
pugnacity  and  make  it  easier  to  accept  the  new 
international  status.  Moreover,  if,  as  the  first- 
fruits  of  the  new  order,  a  sensible  reduction  of 
national  armaments  can  be  achieved,  this  lessening 
of  the  part  which  armed  force  plays  within  each 
national  economy  will  be  attended  by  a  correspond- 
ing increase  in  the  willingness  to  place  the  reduced 
forces  at  the  international  disposal.  For  the  root 
motive  of  the  international  policy  is  the  desire  of 
each  nation  to  get  a  larger  amount  of  security  at 
a  smaller  cost  than  under  the  old  order.  Those, 
therefore,  who  confidently  assert  that  States  will 
not  consent  on  any  terms  to  entrust  their  national 
forces  to  an  international  command  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  treaty  obligations  under  the  pro- 
posed scheme  in  effect  simply  assert  the  perma- 
nency of  the  reign  of  unreason  in  the  relations 
between  States. 

For  though  the  general  agreement  of  States 
to  submit  their  disagreements  to  processes  of 
arbitration  and  conciliation  with  pledges  to  abide 
by  the  results  would  be  a  considerable  advance 
towards  better  international  relations,  even  if  no 
sanction  beyond  the  force  of  public  opinion  existed 
to  enforce  the  fulfilment  of  the  obligations,  it  would 


not  suffice  to  establish  such  confidence  in  future 
peace  as  to  secure  any  sensible  and  simultaneous 
reduction  of  armed  preparations.  No  Government 
would  consent  to  any  weakening  of  its  national 
forces  so  long  as  there  was  danger  that  some 
Power  might  repudiate  its  treaty  obligations.  This 
being  the  case,  the  burdens  and  the  perilous  influ- 
ences of  militarism  and  navalism  would  remain 
entrenched  as  strongly  as  before  in  the  European 
system,  advertising,  by  their  very  presence,  the 
lack  of  faith  in  the  efficacy  of  the  new  pacific 
arrangements.  So  long  as  these  national  arma- 
ments remained  unchecked  the  old  conception  of 
State  absolutism  would  still  survive.  There  would 
still  be  danger  of  militarist  Governments  intriguing 
for  aggression  or  defence  in  new  groupings,  and 
new  efforts  to  tip  the  balance  of  armed  power 
in  their  favour. 

It  is  ultimately  to  the  dread  and  despair  of  this 
alternative  that  I  look  for  the  motive-power  to 
induce  nations  to  make  the  abatements  of  national 
separatism  necessary  to  establish  an  international 
society.  Whether  the  end  of  this  war  will  leave 
these  motives  sufficiently  powerful  to  achieve  this 
object  will  probably  depend  upon  the  degree  of 
enlightenment  among  mankind  at  large  upon  the 
old  ideas  of  States  and  statecraft. 


CHAPTER    VIII 
THE   INTERNATIONAL   EXECUTIVE 

WE  are  now  brought  to  the  consideration  relating 
to  the  sort  of  International  Executive  to  be 
entrusted  with  the  powers  required  for  the 
execution  of  international  mandates. 

Assuming  that  it  is  -desirable  for  the  nations 
constituting  the  League  of  Nations  to  take  con- 
certed measures  to  secure  the  fulfilment  of  treaty 
obligations,  who  shall  organize  and  carry  into  effect 
these  measures?  There  are  several  forms  which 
this  International  Executive  might  take.  The 
Court  of  Arbitration  and  the  Committee  of  Con- 
ciliation, or  one  of  them,  might  be  entrusted  with 
executive  powers.  Or  the  Concert  of  the  Powers 
as  constituted  by  Conferences  of  foreign  ministers 
or  their  nominees  might,  as  heretofore  upon  occa- 
sion, be  recognized  as  the  executive.  Or,  finally, 
some  new  representative  international  body  might 
be  endowed  with  the  necessary  powers. 

Now,  a  very  little  consideration  is  required  in 
order  to  rule  out  the  first  proposal,  to  give  execu- 
tive powers  to  the  Arbitration  and  Conciliation 
bodies.  Neither  the  type  of  man  required  for  the 
work  of  Arbitration  and  Conciliation,  nor  the  public 
status  of  this  Court  and  Committee,  will  be  suit- 


UNTVERSTTY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SAKTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 


102  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

able  for  the  exercise  of  important  executive  powers. 
It  is,  we  saw,  desirable  that  the  personnel  of  the 
Arbitration  Court  should  consist  chiefly  of  dis- 
tinguished judges  or  jurists,  men  of  high  profes- 
sional eminence  in  their  respective  countries,  but 
not  necessarily  or  normally  endowed  either  with 
executive  gifts  or  with  wide  personal  influence 
among  their  countrymen.  The  functions  of  the 
Conciliation  Committee,  as  we  have  sketched  them, 
are  of  a  different  order,  and  the  type  of  man 
required  to  perform  them  will  have  more  of  the 
practical  experience  which  makes  of  him  "  a  repre- 
sentative man."  But  in  both  cases  it  is  desirable 
that  the  terms  of  appointment  to  the  office 
be  such  as  to  secure  the  utmost  independence 
of  judgment  and  complete  freedom  from  political 
pressure  from  the  Government  of  the  nation  which 
is  represented.  For  this  purpose  it  is  held  proper 
that  in  both  instances  the  term  of  office  should 
be  of  considerable  duration,  so  that  the  members 
of  these  bodies  may  be  imbued  as  strongly  as 
possible  with  the  international  points  of  view  and 
sentiments  befitting  their  office.  But  these  very 
qualities  for  the  performance  of  this  judicial  and 
conciliatory  work  are  defects  for  the  performance 
of  the  executive  duties  which  we  contemplate.  For 
it  is  evidently  of  the  utmost  importance  that  an 
International  Executive,  not  wielding  full  indepen- 
dent resources  of  its  own  but  requiring  to  appeal 
to  the  constituent  nations  for  co-operation,  in  order 
to  enforce  the  common  will  against  a  breaker  of 
the  public  peace,  should  consist  of  members  who 
are  in  direct  touch  with  the  public  sentiments  of 
their  countrymen,  and  whose  judgments  will  be 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   EXECUTIVE         103 

likely  to  have  preponderant  influence  upon  the 
public  opinion  of  their  nation.  For  to  the  Execu- 
tive will  be  entrusted  in  extreme  need  the  decision 
as  to  what  coercive  steps  should  be  taken,  economic 
or  forcible,  and  by  what  nations  and  by  what 
levies,  in  order  to  prevent  a  breach  of  the  inter- 
national treaty  or  to  repress  hostilities  undertaken 
in  defiance  of  the  public  law.  It  would  be  wrong 
to  ignore  the  delicacy  of  such  work  or  the  im- 
portance of  securing  that  the  representatives 
empowered  to  commit  their  respective  nations  to 
such  responsibilities  be  likely  to  secure  the  willing 
assent  of  these  nations.  On  these  two  grounds, 
then,  the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  arbitral 
and  conciliation  bodies,  and  the  representative 
qualities  required  for  the  executive,  it  seems  un- 
wise to  entrust  the  Court  and  the  Committee  with 
the  enforcement  of  their  awards  or  judgments. 
Indeed,  as  regards  the  Committee,  there  is  the 
further  difficulty  that  its  reports,  with  suggestions 
and  recommendations,  cannot  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  have  the  same  direct  authority  as  is  ascribed 
to  the  awards  or  judgments  of  the  Arbitration 
Court.  As  proposals  for  conciliation  they  will 
necessarily  carry  in  their  form  and  tone  the  quality 
of  advice  and  of  persuasion  rather  than  of  express 
command.  They  cannot  in  all  cases  be  taken 
as  mandates  which  the  executive  authority  should 
be  entitled  or  required  to  enforce.  At  the  same 
time,  to  refuse  them  all  authority,  and  to  leave 
it  open  to  the  several  parties  to  disregard  the 
recommendations,  would  weaken  and  might  ruin 
the  confidence  of  the  nations  in  the  most  important 
instrument  for  securing  the  peace  of  the  world. 


io4     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

It  is  quite  evident  that,  whatever  Executive  is 
formed,  its  chief  function  will  be  to  secure  that 
nations  shall  not  disregard  the  reports  of  the  Com- 
mittee, but  that  some  agreement  for  pacific 
settlement  along  the  lines  of  the  Committee's 
recommendations,  or  otherwise,  shall  be  carried 
into  effect. 

The  performance  of  this  duty  would  require  that, 
if  the  Committee's  recommendations  were  not  such 
as  to  win  the  assent  of  the  parties  concerned,  they 
should  be  taken  into  consideration  by  some  other 
international  body,  vested  with  the  power  to  frame 
out  of  them  some  definite  policy  which  they  were 
prepared  to  enforce. 

What  will  be  this  third  body,  endowed  with  final 
judicial  and  executive  powers?  Two  answers  may 
be  given  to  this  question.  It  may  be  said  that  a 
Conference  of  Foreign  Ministers  or  other 
accredited  plenipotentiaries  would  be  the  natural 
body  to  exercise  such  final  judgment  and  to  take 
such  concerted  action  as  was  demanded  by  the 
occasion. 

The  acknowledged  claims  for  this  method  are 
two.  First,  that  it  involves  no  new  structure,  but 
relies  upon  a  method  which  has  frequently  been 
employed,  and  which  would  almost  automatically 
come  into  operation  if  no  other  arrangement  were 
made  to  secure  the  enforcement  of  the  treaty 
obligations,  and  to  maintain  the  public  peace  when 
conciliation  appeared  likely  to  fail.  Secondly,  that 
the  Foreign  Ministers,  representing  their  respective 
Governments,  are  the  persons  best  entitled  to  claim 
to  carry  with  them  the  influential  public  opinion 
of  their  countries,  and  are  in  the  strongest  position 


THE   INTERNATIONAL  EXECUTIVE         105 

to  bring  about  whatever  concerted  action,  economic 
or  forcible,  is  required  to  secure  the  public  peace. 
Under  these  circumstances  there  would  be  a  strong 
disposition  on  the  part  of  the  signatory  Powers 
to  such  a  treaty  as  we  are  considering  to  say 
nothing  about  enforcement  of  the  treaty  obliga- 
tions or  an  International  Executive,  but  to  leave 
it  to  the  course  of  events.  This  would  imply,  not 
that  they  had  so  much  confidence  in  the  faith  and 
goodwill  of  all  the  signatories  to  the  treaty  of 
alliance  that  they  deemed  all  express  provisions 
for  enforcement  redundant,  but  that  they  shrank 
from  the  difficulty  of  securing  agreement  at  the 
outset  to  any  proposal  to  establish  a  formal  Inter- 
national Executive.  For  this  reason  they  would 
prefer  to  leave  it  open  to  the  Foreign  Ministers 
to  deal  with  any  case  of  infraction  or  evasion  of 
treaty  obligations  according  to  the  special  circum- 
stances. The  elasticity  of  this  method  will  be 
likely  to  commend  itself  to  the  gathering  of  states- 
men and  diplomatists  in  whose  hands  any  arrange- 
ment for  bettering  the  international  relations  after 
the  war  is  likely  to  be  left. 

It  will  be  defended  as  the  most  practical  method 
of  dealing  with  the  situation. 

But,  regarded  as  a  security  for  settling  with- 
out war  the  dangerous  issues  which  have  been 
submitted  to  a  Committee  of  Inquiry  and  Con- 
ciliation, or  which  some  nation  has  refused  to 
submit,  the  proposal  has  a  fatal  defect.  It  plunges 
the  most  critical  and  inflammatory  issues  back  into 
that  very  atmosphere  of  diplomatic  intercourse 
which  history  has  shown  to  be  so  ill-adapted  for 
pacific  settlement.  For  if,  as  would  be  the  case, 


io6    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

all  questions  of  enforcing  the  treaty  obligations 
into  which  the  nations  had  entered,  and  the  still 
more  delicate  question  of  deciding  what  course 
to  take  when  a  nation  refused  the  suggestions 
of  the  Council  of  Conciliation  and  proceeded  to 
enforce  its  claims  by  hostilities,  were  left  to  a 
Conference  of  Foreign  Ministers,  calling  themselves 
the  Concert  of  the  Powers,  no  presumption  of 
successful  arrangement  is  possible.  For  not  merely 
would  the  members  of  this  Conference  approach 
the  issue,  as  distinctively  national  representatives, 
with  a  minimum  of  the  international  spirit  which 
may  have  governed  the  procedure  of  the  Court  and 
Council,  but  they  would  have  the  whole  weight  of 
tradition  against  the  effective  unity  demanded  for 
a  strong  common  action.  For  the  actual  issue  will 
be  that  of  coercing  a  Power  which  admittedly  has 
either  broken  an  express  treaty  obligation,  or  has 
taken  aggressive  action  against  another  signatory 
Power  in  defiance  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
Council.  Now  the  firm  usage  of  these  Conferences 
has  been  that  the  sovereign  States  represented  thus 
cannot  take  action  except  by  unanimous  agree- 
ment. No  majority  of  Powers  has  any  claim  to 
force  the  acceptance  of  its  decision  by  a  minority  : 
such  a  demand  would  be  resented  as  implying  a 
cession  of  sovereignty.  This  means  that  one 
obdurate  Power  has  always  been  able  to  nullify 
the  Concert,  or  alternatively  has  been  able  to  force 
a  compromise  that  affords  no  satisfactory  or  per- 
manent solution.  Where,  as  would  be  the  case 
in  the  circumstances  we  contemplate,  the  issue  is 
the  sharp  one  of  bringing  economic  or  military 
coercion  to  bear  upon  a  Power  represented  in 


107 

the  actual  conference,  this  tradition  of  concerted 
action,  or  of  compromise,  would  be  fatal.  The 
distinctively  national  standpoint  of  the  representa- 
tives, the  habit  of  intrigue,  the  method  of  com- 
promise, to  say  nothing  of  the  actual  presence  of 
the  law-breaker  upon  the  judgment-seat,  would 
make  agreement  upon  any  drastic  coercion  of  a 
powerful  State  almost  impossible. 

Nor  would  it  be  possible  to  put  the  matter 
straight  by  proposing  to  shed  the  custom  of  una- 
nimity which  has  conditioned  action  of  the  Concert 
in  the  past,  and  to  introduce  the  practice  of  deter- 
mination of  the  grave  issues  submitted  to  the 
Powers  by  a  majority  vote.  In  the  first  place, 
unless  the  Powers  could  be  induced  to  set  up  and 
operate  some  sort  of  Constitution  for  their  conduct 
of  affairs  in  Conference,  there  would  be  nothing 
to  bind  a  minority  even  of  one  to  accept  the  will 
of  a  majority.  Nor  is  there  any  likelihood  that  a 
Power  or  Powers,  otherwise  disposed  either  to 
break  a  treaty  obligation  or  to  refuse  compliance 
to  the  recommendations  of  a  Conciliation  Council, 
would,  in  fact,  accept  as  binding  such  a  vote. 
There  is,  moreover,  this  further  weakness  inherent 
in  a  Conference  of  Powers.  Whereas  the  Council 
of  Conciliation  gives  weight  in  its  Constitution 
and  its  work  to  the  relative  importance  of  nations, 
as  indicated  by  their  populousness  and  presumed 
strength,  no  such  distinction  is  made,  or  could  be 
made,  at  a  Conference  of  Foreign  Ministers.  The 
difficulty  is  not  perhaps  so  great  in  a  Conference 
restricted  to  a  few  Powers,  all  of  them  "  Great." 
But  in  a  Conference  where  every  State  claims  an 
equal  voice,  it  would  be  possible  that  an  issue 


io8     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

might  arise  in  which  a  majority  decision  was  taken 
claiming  to  commit  against  their  will  to  participa- 
tion in  some  expensive  economic  boycott  or  mili- 
tary expedition  a  minority  of  States  comprising 
some  of  the  largest  and  strongest  nations  in  the 
League.  Though  this  division  might  not  be 
probable,  it  would  at  least  be  possible,  and  the 
first  time  it  occurred  it  would  most  likely  strain 
the  solidarity  of  the  Conference  to  its  breaking- 
point. 

A  Conference  of  Foreign  Ministers  cannot,  there- 
fore, seriously  be  regarded  in  the  light  of  an  Inter- 
national Executive  to  which  could  be  submitted 
the  important  trust  of  securing  the  fulfilment  of 
treaty  obligations  and  the  prevention  of  hostilities. 
The  processes  of  Arbitration  and  of  Conciliation,  the 
results  of  which  they  were  invited  to  uphold,  should, 
so  far  as  possible,  embody  the  corporate  wisdom 
and  permanent  welfare  of  the  civilized  society  of 
nations.  But  this  Executive  would  embody  the 
resultant  of  the  separate  national  pulls,  determined 
by  passing  conceptions  of  expediency,  and  coloured 
by  the  personal  sentiments  and  prepossessions  of 
men  bred  in  the  usages  of  a  narrowly  national 
statecraft.  There  would  be  no  natural  accord 
between  the  spirits  of  the  two  processes.  The 
internationalism  would  break  down  in  practice  on 
all  critical  occasions  when  the  members  of  the 
League  were  called  upon  for  corporate  action.  .7 

What  is  the  reason  of  this  breakdown  in  our 
scheme?  It  is  not  that  no  Executive  is  provided 
for  the  International  Government,  but  that  there 
is  a  wide  discrepancy  between  the  representative 
character  of  the  Council  and  that  of  the  Con- 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   EXECUTIVE         109 

ference  of  Powers  which,  in  default  of  any  other 
body,  would  be  called  upon  to  act  as  an  Executive. 
The  remedy  is  tolerably  obvious.     It  is  to  provide 
an  Executive  which  shall  be  as  representative  and 
as    genuinely    international    as    the    bodies    which 
perform  the  functions  of  arbitration,  inquiry,  and 
conciliation.      This,   of  course,   involves   an  action 
requiring  great  faith  and  courage,  viz.  the  creation 
of  a  permanent   International  Council,   elected  by 
the  constituent  nations  upon  terms  similar  to  those 
laid    down    for    the    Conciliation    Committee    and 
entrusted    with    those    deliberative    and    executive 
functions   which    in   a   feeble   and   spasmodic   way 
are     wielded     by     the     Conferences     of     Foreign 
Ministers   meeting,    usually   too    late,    in   times    of 
crisis.      •  Without    such    a    representative    body    in 
permanent  being,   a  deep   sense   of  unreality   will 
continue  to  attach  to  the  Court  of  Arbitration  and 
the  Committees  of  Conciliation  and  to  the  treaty 
which  shall  claim  to  establish  them  as  authorita- 
tive   modes    of    settlement.      For    their    authority 
will   remain    radically    defective    unless    the    same 
international     will     that     creates     them     is     also 
empowered  to  ensure  the  harvesting  of  the  fruits 
they  may  bring  forth.     Why  should  not  the  nations 
which  desire  to  secure  peace  and  to  support  public 
law    be    assumed    to    be    willing    and    capable    of 
making   such   surrender   of   national   individualism 
or  absolute  sovereignty  as  would  undoubtedly  be 
involved    in    setting    up    an    authoritative    elective 
Council  with   full   powers   to   make   and    interpret 
international    law    and    to    regulate    international 
relations  in  conformity  with  considerations  of  the 
general  welfare?      Why   should   not   the   Court  of 


no     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

Arbitration  and  the  Committee  of  Conciliation  be 
instruments  of  the  International  Council  upon  which 
would  naturally  devolve  the  duty  of  taking  what 
measures  were  necessary  to  secure  the  acceptance 
of  awards  and  proposals  of  settlement,  and  of 
exercising  any  economic  or  forcible  pressure  which 
might  be  necessary?  We  should  then  possess  the 
rudiments  of  an  international  Government,  which 
might  be  invested  with  such  powers,  legislative, 
judicial,  and  executive,  as  are  essential  to  all 
government. 

Before  considering  how  far  such  an  enlargement 
of  our  scheme  is  practicable,  it  will  be  well  to 
remind  readers  that  none  of  the  smaller  schemes 
appears  to  be  effective  in  ensuring  the  maintenance 
of  peace,  the  reduction  of  armaments,  and  the 
enforcement  of  public  law,  recognized  as  primary 
essentials  of  the  required  policy.  An  agreement 
upon  reduction  of  armaments  we  saw  to  be  utterly 
impracticable  until  the  motives  which  hitherto  have 
led  to  increasing  and  competing  armaments  were 
reversed,  and  no  mere  agreement  by  negotiation 
or  treaty  would  reverse  these  motives.  A  League 
of  Peace  for  mutual  defence  against  aggression, 
even  if  it  could  be  formed,  would  prove  ineffective 
without  some  carefully  contrived  machinery  for 
settling  differences  before  they  ripened  towards 
hostility.  But  all  such  instruments  of  settlement, 
in  order  to  inspire  the  necessary  confidence,  must 
in  the  last  resort  wield  some  authority  to  compel 
the  obedience  of  reluctant  parties.  After  careful 
consideration  we  rejected  the  claim  that  a  purely 
moral  sanction,  the  appeal  to  public  opinion,  would 
suffice  to  ensure  acceptance  of  awards,  and  to 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   EXECUTIVE         in 

inspire  in  all  the  Powers  invited  to  come  into 
the  League  full  confidence  that  its  awards  would  be 
carried  into  effect.  Finally,  we  rejected  the  view 
that  the  Conciliation  Committee  could  be  entrusted 
with  the  necessary  coercive  powers,  while  the  pro- 
posal to  leave  the  several  Powers  the  liberty  they 
have  always  possessed  to  agree  in  Conference  upon 
concerted  action  was  shown  to  be  a  shirking  of 
the  issue,  and  to  afford  no  reasonable  likelihood 
of  providing  a  solution  in  conformity  with  the 
international  purpose  which  inspires  the  whole 
arrangement. 


CHAPTER    IX 
AN    INTERNATIONAL    GOVERNMENT 

PART    I 
Problems  of  Nationality 

WE  have  approached  the  proposal  of  a  representa- 
tive International  Council  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  need  of  an  authoritative  Executive  if  the 
arrangements  for  pacific  settlement  of  inter- 
national differences  are  to  work  effectively.  But 
this  in  itself  would  furnish  an  exceedingly  defective 
statement  of  the  case  for  an  International  Council. 
It  presupposes  a  purely  statical  condition  of  inter- 
national relations  and  of  public  law,  and  suggests 
that  the  co-operative  action  between  nations  could 
conveniently  be  confined  to  the  stoppage  of 
threatened  or  actual  breaches  of  the  established 
law.  If  every  nation  could  be  regarded  as 
permanently  fixed  within  agreed  and  definite 
territorial  boundaries,  with  no  needs,  claims,  or 
ambitions  for  political  expansion  or  change  of 
status  ;  if  all  relations  of  trade,  finance,  or  indus- 
trial development  between  the  members  of  civilized 
States  and  those  of  backward  countries  could  safely 
or  possibly  be  left  to  private  enterprise  ;  if  the 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        113 

changing  fiscal  policy,  commercial  and  maritime 
laws,  immigration  policy,  etc.,  of  one  nation  did 
not  vitally  affect  the  welfare  of  other  nations  ;  if 
such  occurrences  as  the  making  of  a  Panama 
Canal,  a  revolution  in  China,  the  spread  of  bubonic 
plague  or  sleeping-sickness,  involved  no  novel 
points  of  international  conduct  and  evoked  no  new 
needs  for  international  co-operation,  our  Council 
might  be  confined  to  the  narrower  task  of  securing 
the  fulfilment  of  treaty  obligations.  But  none  of 
these  assumptions  is  possible.  We  live  in  a  world 
of  change,  and  all  political  arrangements  must  be 
endowed  with  capacity  of  growth.  No  mechanical 
arrangement  for  the  interpretation  and  enforce- 
ment of  existing  treaties,  laws,  and  usages  will 
be  adequate  to  the  security  of  peace.  There  must 
be  power  to  alter  past  arrangements  and  to  devise 
new  laws,  new  usages,  and  new  modes  of  co- 
operation. The  words  rebus  sic  stantibus  are  not 
only  implicit  in  every  treaty,  but  in  all  human 
arrangements  whatsoever.  These  considerations 
make  it  clear  that  our  machinery  of  pacific  settle- 
ment and  the  work  of  our  International  Council 
cannot  be  purely  judicial  and  executive.  This, 
indeed,  has  already  been  admitted  in  effect  by  the 
larger  duty  of  inquiry  and  conciliation  assigned  to 
the  Conciliation  Council.  The  functions  of  that 
body  are  differentiated  from  that  of  the  Arbitra- 
tion Court  by  the  very  fact  that,  whereas  this  latter 
is  concerned  with  issues  susceptible  of  determina- 
tion by  law  or  definite  usage,  the  former  is 
concerned  with  issues  not  so  determinable.  Its 
reports,  based  not  upon  the  automatic  application 
of  existing  rules,  but  upon  broader  principles  of 

8 


ii4     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

equity  and  welfare,  in  their  reference  to  new 
"  issues  "  or  "  situations  "  that  have  arisen,  will, 
if  they  are  effective,  form  the  nucleus  of  new  inter- 
national legislation  and  usages.  The  report  of  a 
Conciliation  Committee,  with  its  recommendations, 
would  not,  indeed,  as  we  have  recognized,  be  held 
to  have  the  same  definite  authority  as  belongs  to 
an  award  of  the  Arbitral  Tribunal,  nor  has  it 
been  proposed  to  enforce  the  acceptance  of  its 
recommendations.  But  none  the  less,  if  the  body 
of  international  law  is  to  grow,  in  order  to  keep 
pace  with  the  changing  facts  of  the  time,  it  is 
these  reports  of  Inquiry  and  Conciliation  and  the 
precedents  they  furnish  which  would  rightly  and 
naturally  furnish  the  material  and  principles  for 
this  growth.  But  there  must  be  some  provision 
for  adopting  and  adapting  them  to  this  end  and 
of  incorporating  them  into  the  body  of  international 
law.  In  other  words,  there  must  be  a  legislative 
as  well  as  an  executive  power  vested  in  our  Inter- 
national Council.  The  report  of  a  Conciliation 
Committee,  whether  it  be  concerned  with  a  dispute 
between  two  nations,  not  justiciable  in  character, 
or  with  a  deeper  inquiry  into  some  "  situation  " 
which  has  not  yet  ripened  into  a  dispute,  should 
be  formally  presented  to  the  International  Council, 
and  should  form  material  for  its  deliberation  with 
a  view  to  framing  definite  proposals.  If  the  matter 
dealt  with  is  a  difference  between  two  or  more 
States,  the  International  Council  should,  giving  due 
consideration  to  the  Report,  formulate  terms  of 
settlement  which  should  then  have  the  same 
authority  as  an  award  of  the  Arbitration  Tribunal, 
and  should,  if  necessary,  be  enforced  by  the 


AN    INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        115 

executive  officers  of  the  Council.  In  this  way  the 
fatal  defect  in  the  pacific  machinery  of  settlement 
described  in  Chapter  IV,  which  furnished  no  means 
of  settlement  in  case  a  State  refused  the  recom- 
mendations and,  after  waiting  the  prescribed 
period,  proceeded  to  hostilities,  would  be  remedied. 
A  means  would  have  been  provided  for  stopping 
the  last  and  most  dangerous  leak  in  the  arrange- 
ments for  securing  a  pacific  settlement. 

But  such  a  settlement,  formulated  by  the  Inter- 
national Council,  would  in  substance  be  a  legisla- 
tive rather  than  a  judicial  act.1  It  would  take  the 
recommendations  of  the  Conciliation  Committee  as 
a  basis  for  a  rule  of  conduct,  derived,  not  from 
existing  law  or  usage,  but  from  general  principles 
of  reason  and  justice  as  applied  to  a  set  of  circum- 
stances constituting  the  "  case  "  or  "  situation." 
The  reasoning  upon  which  the  "  rule  "  was  estab- 
lished would  be  regarded  as  valid  for  other  similar 
cases,  and  would  constitute  an  addition  to  the  body 
of  international  law. 

The  same  would  apply  to  the  results  or  reports 
of  other  inquiries  of  the  Committee,  directed  not 
to  definite  disputes  but  to  potentially  dangerous 
situations  in  which,  perhaps,  the  interests  of 
several  countries  might  be  involved.  An  inquiry 
of  this  order,  directed  to  the  problem  of  the 
financial  and  industrial  development  of  China  or 

1  The  natural  tendency  of  any  stable  European  concert  to 
evolve  a  legislative  function  was  illustrated  by  the  action  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  in  making  rules  for  the  repression  of  the 
slave  trade,  for  the  free  navigation  of  rivers,  &c.  It  must,  how- 
ever, be  borne  in  mind  that  this  legislative  function  was  but 
rudimentary,  in  that  its  decisions  were  only  valid  by  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  several  Governments. 


Morocco,  the  problem  of  Asiatic  immigration,  or 
the  maintenance  of  slavery  under  the  title  of  in- 
dentured labour,  would  probably  have  led  to 
decisions  which  would  not  merely  remove  the 
dangers  that  such  issues  contain  when  left  to 
the  several  States  to  settle  in  accordance  with  their 
separate  views  of  their  several  interests  and  claims, 
but  would  have  evolved  and  established  principles 
hereafter  endowed  with  the  force  of  public  law. 

A  legislative  function  would  thus  attach  itself 
to  our  International  Council  as  a  natural  conse- 
quence and  development  of  its  judicial  and 
executive  functions,  the  judicial  interpretation  of 
the  right  and  reason  of  particular  concrete  cases 
of  conduct  forming  the  basis  of  those  general  rules 
which  constitute  the  body  of  public  law. 

If  a  really  efficacious  scheme  for  the  establish- 
ment of  peaceable  relations  is  to  be  secured,  it 
must  assign  to  some  duly  accredited  international 
body  such  powers,  legislative  as  well  as  judicial 
and  executive.  Nor  is  there  any  reason  to  suppose 
that  a  Council  so  constituted  would,  or  need,  con- 
fine itself  to  the  purely  preventive  functions 
hitherto  ascribed  to  it.  There  is  an  immense  and 
ever-growing  field  of  constructive  international  co- 
operation which,  though  largely  non-political, 
requires  governmental  aid  and  supervision.  To 
the  postal  and  telegraphic  services,  which  are 
already  regulated  by  international  arrangements, 
add  the  rest  of  the  vast  and  complex  machinery 
of  communications  and  transport  by  land  and  sea, 
the  latter  subject  to  many  rules  of  international 
law  and  usage,  the  monetary  and  financial  system, 
the  intricate  machinery  of  international  commerce, 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        117 

the  standardization  of  money,  weights,  and 
measures,  the  prevention  of  disease,  human,  animal, 
and  vegetable,  the  spread  of  reliable  information 
regarding  crops,  demands  for  labour,  and  trading 
opportunities.  Many  of  these  primarily  utilitarian 
objects  involve  scientific  and  expert  co-operation 
to  which  the  concerted  action  of  Governments  is 
essential.  For  some  of  these  tasks  provision  is 
already  made  for  such  co-operation,  either  by 
standing  bureaux,  as  the  International  Postal 
Bureau  at  Berne,  or  by  special  Conferences  or 
Congresses  attended  by  officials  of  the  several 
Governments  concerned. 

But  an  immensely  enhanced  economy  would  be 
given  to  this  co-operation  if  its  various  branches 
could  be  gathered  into  a  single  centre  and  placed 
under  a  single  international  supervision  and  con- 
trol. Many  of  these  international  affairs,  at  present 
conducted  along  the  conflicting,  uncertain,  and 
shifting  lines  of  special  treaties  or  other  agree- 
ments between  separate  pairs  of  Powers,  might 
be  reduced  to  a  common,  intelligible,  and  reliable 
system,  with  provisions  for  periodical  revision  and 
improvement,  if  they  could  be  brought  within  the 
purview  of  the  international  authority. 

The  number  and  importance  of  matters  com- 
prising this  field  of  positive  internationalism  must 
continually  grow.  Though  many  or  most  of  them 
may  be  conducted  mainly  along  the  channels  of 
privately  arranged  associations,  there  will  be  points 
where  they  touch  and  involve  political  arrange- 
ments, and  where,  on  the  one  hand,  friction  may 
be  avoided,  on  the  other,  positive  advantages  may 
be  obtained  by  utilizing  international  political 


n8     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

machinery.  This  is  partially  applicable  to  the 
commercial  and  financial  processes  of  transport  and 
communication  by  which  men,  goods,  news,  and 
money  are  moved  about  the  world.  This  inter- 
course, so  far  as  it  is  governed  by  the  needs,  wills, 
and  ideas  of  individuals,  constitutes  a  cosmopolitan 
rather  than  a  distinctively  international  movement, 
but  its  regulations  would  naturally  fall  within  the 
scope  of  our  international  government,  which,  in 
so  far  as  it  imbibed  the  spirit  of  this  human  inter- 
course, would  itself  become  more  cosmopolitan. 

I  have  spoken  of  these  large  tasks  of  positive 
constructive  co-operation  by  which  nations  might 
better  develop  and  appropriate  the  natural  and 
human  resources  of  the  earth,  as  distinguishable 
from  the  preventive  work  of  pacifism  which  presses 
most  urgently  upon  a  world  weary  of  war.  But 
this  difference  between  constructive  and  preventive 
work  cannot  ultimately  be  maintained.  For  a  little 
reflection  will  suffice  to  show  that  the  humbler 
schemes  of  safeguarding  peace  by  processes  of 
Arbitration  and  Conciliation  are  not  likely  to  prove 
safe  and  satisfactory  so  long  as  nothing  is  done 
to  cure  the  deep,  underlying  causes  of  the 
grievances,  ambitions,  and  antagonisms  of  national 
or  quasi-national  interests  which  have  always  been 
the  great  disturbers  of  the  peace.  We  have  already 
recognized  that  it  is  not  desirable  always  to  wait 
until  some  difference  or  dispute  has  reached  .the 
danger-level  before  bringing  to  bear  the  instrument 
of  international  inquiry,  and  that  Conciliation  Com- 
mittees might  well  seize  time  by  the  forelock  in 
investigating  situations  which  are  potentially 
dangerous.  But  unless  the  International  Council 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        119 

be  empowered  to  deliberate  upon  the  results  of 
such  inquiries,  and  to  frame  and  carry  into  effect 
proposals  for  dealing  with  the  potentially  dan- 
gerous situations  in  time,  our  machinery  of  pacific 
settlement  will  remain  very  incomplete.  Inquiry 
will  not  stay  the  process  of  events  heading  to  a 
dangerous  situation,  which,  in  spite  of  Arbitration 
and  Conciliation,  may  in  the  end  lead  to  war. 
The  strongest  of  all  arguments  in  favour  of  an 
International  Council,  vested  with  the  larger  powers 
here  claimed,  is  the  urgent  need  of  some  impartial, 
authoritative  power  for  settling  on  large  construc- 
tive lines  the  two  great  related  classes  of  problems 
which  poison  good  international  relations  and  make 
for  breaches  of  the  public  peace.  These  are  the 
problems  of  so-called  nationality  in  relation  to 
territory  and  government,  and  the  economic 
problems  involving  international  differences. 

Taking  the  course  of  modern  history,  and  par- 
ticularly of  the  last  century,  we  recognize  to  what 
a  large  extent  wars  have  been  consciously  motived 
by  the  desire  of  subject  nationalities  to  secure 
self-government  and  the  control  of  the  territories 
which  they  people,  and  by  the  desire  of  members 
of  one  nation  to  assist  in  liberating  from  subjec-, 
tion  those  of  kindred  race,  language,  or  religion 
in  a  neighbouring  country,  or  of  effecting  with 
them  an  independent  political  union  upon  a  basis 
of  common  nationality.  For  our  purpose  it  is  not 
necessary  to  discuss  the  logic  of  such  a  term  as 
"  nationality,"  or  to  consider  how  far  race, 
geography,  language,  literature,  and  religion  con- 
stitute the  likeness  which  inspires  the  sentiment 
of  nationality.  It  is  the  community  of  sentiment 


120     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

and  the  powerful  sympathy  based  on  it  that  count 
for  our  consideration  here.  Where  the  feelings 
evoked  are  so  strong  that  they  are  likely  to 
endanger  peace  in  an  attempt  to  extort  a  territorial 
or  governmental  change,  the  International  Council 
ought  to  be  empowered  to  intervene,  and  to  pro- 
pose and  carry  into  effect  any  changes  of  frontiers 
or  of  political  allegiance  which  seem  desirable. 
It  is  important  to  recognize  that  these  questions 
cannot  be  settled  once  for  all,  but  must  continue 
to  arise.  Even  if,  as  the  result  of  the  peace  fol- 
lowing this  war,  the  map  of  Europe  could  be 
satisfactorily  drawn  along  strict  lines  of  nationality 
(a  manifestly  impossible  supposition),  there  is  no 
reasonable  assurance  that  in  twenty  or  fifty  years' 
time  these  arrangements  would  continue  to  be  satis- 
factory. Unequal  growths  of  population  in  two 
adjoining  districts  of  contiguous  States,  or  of  two 
diverse  nationalities  within  the  same  State,  the 
migrations  from  thicker  to  thinner  populated 
countries,  which  will  continually  occur,  and  at 
more  rapid  pace  with  improved  education  and 
facilities  of  movement,  will  continually  give  rise 
to  fresh  demands  for  frontier  readjustments  along 
lines  of  "  nationality  "  and  for  the  self-government 
of  large  "  nationalist  "  enclaves  within  the  larger 
States.  Great  migrating  populations  from  Russia 
or  China  that  have  settled  in  and  developed  large 
tracts  of  Corea  or  Mongolia  may  reasonably  claim 
rights  of  self-government.  Even  within  great 
States  with  democratic  institutions  similar  problems 
might  conceivably  arise.  If  Russian  or  Scan- 
dinavian communities  of  large  size  in  parts  of 
North-West  Canada,  remote  from  the  general 


AN    INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        121 

development  of  Canadian  life,  built  up  what  were 
in  effect  separate  civilizations,  preserving  their  own 
languages,  religions,  economic  and  social  usages, 
they  might  create  new  nationalities  which  would 
not  find  adequate  political  expression  within  the 
limits  of  the  local  political  institutions  of  Canada, 
but  might  crave  a  larger  national  autonomy.  In 
this  very  manner  the  nationality  of  Canada 
itself  and  our  other  dominions  has  come  into 
being.  Where  liberal  political  institutions  thrive, 
such  new  internal  growths  of  nationality  are 
indeed  less  likely  to  cause  trouble.  But  the  world 
is  large,  and  with  the  large  scale  of  modern  migra- 
tions it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  demands  for 
territorial  readjustments  upon  grounds  of  nation- 
ality will  continue  to  occur.  Differences  and 
disputes  connected  with  such  demands  ought  surely 
to  form  proper  subjects  for  settlement  by  an  Inter- 
national Council,  informed  by  the  accepted 
principle  of  all  good  government,  the  consent  of 
the  governed.  There  will  be  raised,  of  course, 
two  important  and  obvious  objections,  one  con- 
stitutional, the  other  practical.  The  former  has 
reference  to  the  desirability  of  assigning  to  an 
International  Government  a  power  to  interfere  with 
"  the  domestic  affairs  "  of  the  respective  nations. 
Such  interference,  it  will  be  urged,  speedily  brought 
to  ruin  the  Confederation  of  Europe  framed  a 
century  ago.  True,  this  interference  was  wielded 
in  the  interests  of  conservatism  or  reaction,  and 
not  of  liberalism.  But  we  are  not  now  living  in 
an  era  of  accepted  liberalism,  and  it  may  be  urged 
that  such  States  as  Russia  and  Germany,  which 
we  should  desire  to  include  within  our  international 


122     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

arrangements,  would  certainly  refuse  to  enter  if 
so  large  a  claim  were  made  upon  their  rights  of 
sovereignty.  Even  within  the  British  Empire  there 
remain  large  areas  rife  with  the  spirit  of  unsatisfied 
nationality.  Should  we  consent  to  have  the 
demands  of  India  for  self-government  submitted 
to  an  International  Council,  which,  perhaps,  had 
just  adjudicated  on  the  claims  of  Finland  and 
Albania  ? 

Those  who  regard  this  war  as  primarily  waged 
for  the  independence  and  the  rights  of  smaller 
or  weaker  nationalities,  and  for  whom  the  security 
of  these  rights  is  the  first  essential  of  a  sound 
settlement,  cannot  evade  the  wider  issue  here 
raised.  The  reinstatement  and  indemnification  of 
Belgium,  the  liberation  from  Austria  and  Germany 
of  their  Slav  and  other  non-Germanic  nationalities, 
and  the  adjustment  of  the  conflicting  territorial 
claims  of  the  existing  Balkan  States,  even  if  these 
objects  can  be  satisfactorily  attained,  will  be  very 
far  from  meeting  the  full  demands  of  European 
nationalism,  to  say  nothing  of  the  Asiatic  nationali- 
ties, such  as  Persia  and  Armenia.  Indeed,  if  the 
principle  of  nationality  be  once  evoked  as  a  basis 
of  pacific  internationalism,  it  will  be  impossible  on 
any  other  pretext  than  that  of  conquest  to  defend 
its  confinement  to  the  cases  of  the  non-Germanic 
provinces  of  the  conquered  Powers.  Though  the 
conditions  of  the  Peace  itself  may  look  no  farther 
than  this  restricted  application  of  the  doctrine, 
it  will  not  be  possible  for  any  Conference  taking 
the  wider  survey  to  ignore  the  pressure  of  the 
claims  of  Finland,  Poland,  and  perhaps  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  to  autonomy.  Such  a  Conference,  setting 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        123 

itself  sincerely  to  seek  security  for  the  pacific  future 
of  Europe,  would  be  compelled  to  urge  a  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  other  burning  problems  of 
nationality  within  the  European  system.  If, 
further,  any  International  Council,  even  of  the  less 
ambitious  order,  were  entrusted  with  the  right  and 
duty  of  instituting  inquiries  into  situations  fraught 
with  danger  to  the  public  peace,  and  of  making 
recommendations  for  the  solution  of  such  diffi- 
culties, it  would  be  compelled  to  take  cognizance, 
not  only  of  any  existing  unsettled  claims  of 
nationality  but  of  the  new  claims  which  would 
emerge  from  processes  of  migration  and  peaceful 
penetration  in  various  countries.  A  representa- 
tive International  Council  endowed  with  govern- 
mental powers  would  then  be  placed  in  this 
dilemma  :  By  basing  itself  upon  a  recognition  of 
the  territorial  status  quo,  after  the  preliminary 
readjustments  of  the  Peace,  and  refraining  from 
all  "  interference  "  with  the  actual  dominions  of 
the  sovereign  signatory  States,  it  would  debar  itself 
from  any  effective  constitutional  means  of  dealing 
with  a  class  of  issues  which,  from  the  passionate 
sympathy  they  evoke,  will  continue  to  endanger 
the  public  peace  and  to  bring  into  disrepute  the 
process  of  conciliation.  For  if  no  express  right 
of  adjusting  the  claims  of  nationalities  is  assigned 
to  the  International  Council,  the  pacific  recom- 
mendations of  a  Court  of  Conciliation  are  likely 
to  be  treated  with  contumely  if  they  recommend 
the  voluntary  cession  of  territory  upon  grounds  of 
nationality.  A  refusal  of  such  powers  would,  there- 
fore, leave  untouched  a  fruitful  source  of  inter- 
national trouble.  Per  contra,  if  Sovereign  Powers 


i24     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

are  invited  to  enter  an  international  arrangement 
by  which  their  territorial  integrity  might  be  im- 
paired by  a  Council  set  in  motion  by  a  nationalist 
agitation  within  their  borders  and  supported  by 
the  racial  or  religious  sympathies  of  some  power- 
ful neighbour,  it  seems  exceedingly  unlikely  that 
they  would  seriously  entertain  such  a  proposal. 

This  issue,  of  course,  brings  out  most  sharply 
the  inherent  difficulty  of  reconciling  the  two  stand- 
points of  national  liberty  and  international  govern- 
ment. Both  are  objects  essential  to  the  security 
and  progress  of  civilization.  So  far  as  subject 
peoples  are  struggling  for  self-government,  it  seems 
evident  that  any  scheme  for  securing  peace  must 
recognize  this  liberation  as  an  indispensable  con- 
dition of  effective  internationalism.  Before  nations 
can  live  together  in  society  they  must  have  their 
existence  acknowledged  and  safely  guaranteed. 
Nationhood  must  not  be  denied  to  any  people  who 
by  racial,  geographical,  linguistic,  religious  affini- 
ties and  by  the  feeling  of  community  based  on 
them,  possess  the  essential  character  of  nationality. 
This  I  take  to  be  what  Kant  meant  when  in  his 
great  essay  he  laid  down  the  principle,  "  The  law 
of  nations  shall  be  founded  on  a  federation  of  free 
States."  This  is  indeed  a  hard  saying,  for  it 
rules  out,  not  only  the  subject  nationality  but  the 
State  which  by  the  very  fact  of  exercising 
dominion  impairs  its  own  freedom. 

The  real  solution  of  the  problem  lies,  however, 
in  substituting,  as  far  as  possible,  the  word  and 
the  idea  of  autonomy,  effective  self-government, 
for  the  more  confused  and  intransigeant  idea  of 
nationality  which  often  craves  for  itself  an  abso- 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        125 

lutism  of  independence  and  of  sovereignty  that  is 
inherently  antagonistic  to  the  needs  of  an  inter- 
national society.  Autonomy  is  at  once  a  more 
elastic  and  a  more  business-like  conception. 
History  shows  that  where  the  people  of  a  district 
or  locality  are  free  to  manage  all  those  affairs 
which  strongly  interest  them  and  closely  affect  their 
lives — e.g.  trade  and  industry,  religion,  language, 
education — are  not  interfered  with  in  their  home- 
life,  and  are  not  unduly  burdened  with  taxation, 
military  service,  and  other  demands  of  an  outside 
or  a  central  Government,  the  differences  of  race, 
language,  and  creed  which  may  sever  them  from 
the  other  members  of  the  State  or  Empire  of  which 
they  are  a  part  do  not  arouse  deep  discontent  or 
any  disturbing  passion  of  "  nationality."  The 
French  provinces  of  the  Canadian  Dominion,  the 
Polish  province  of  Galicia  under  Austrian  rule, 
are  striking  instances  of  the  efficacy  of  autonomy. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  prospect  of 
peaceful  Internationalism  depends  more  upon  the 
substitution  of  the  conception  and  the  practice  of 
autonomy  for  nationalism  than  upon  any  other 
change.  For  nationalism  has  always  overstressed 
the  separation  and  the  sovereignty  of  nations,  feed- 
ing those  very  sentiments  of  power  and  moral 
absolutism  to  which  German  political  philosophy 
has  given  such  unflinching  expression. 

Moreover,  the  concept  of  autonomy,  with  its 
elasticity,  can  alone  furnish  a  solution  for  that 
terrible  problem  of  the  "  rights  of  minorities  " 
which  is  a  thorn  in  the  side  of  almost  all  nationalist 
movements.  Local  self-government  is  the  greatest 
political  healer,  and  if  it  be  coupled  with  pro- 


126     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

portionate  representation  in  districts  where  no  local 
homogeneity  is  attainable,  the  practical  demands 
for  liberty  and  self-government  are  satisfied. 

It  is  along  these  lines  of  effective  autonomy  that 
the  international  policy  of  the  future  should  direct 
its  pressure,  rather  than  to  the  complete  break-up 
of  composite  empires  or  kingdoms  in  order  to  erect 
new  independent  States  upon  a  basis  of  nationalist 
sentiment.  In  the  Peace  treaty  which  concludes 
this  war  it  is  earnestly  to  be  desired  that  the  para- 
mount importance  of  this  consideration  will  be 
realized,  and  that  no  violent  fusion  of  territory  on 
grounds  of  nationality  will  take  place  for  the 
establishment  of  independent  buffer  States,  when 
guarantees  for  effective  autonomy  would  be  equally 
acceptable  and  far  less  dangerous  for  the  peoples 
directly  concerned,  and  would  leave  behind  less 
bitterness  in  the  conquered  nations. 

It  is  perhaps  impossible  to  expect  that  any  large 
number  of  independent  States  entering  into  such 
an  international  arrangement  as  we  have  premised 
would  at  the  outset  even  consider  a  proposal  to 
confer  upon  an  International  Council  any  general 
Power  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  oppressed  or  sub- 
ject "  nationalities  "  except  in  cases  where  the  keen 
sympathy  of  some  other  nation  of  kindred  blood, 
or  with  other  close  bonds  of  attachment,  threatened 
a  serious  breach  of  the  public  peace.  But  an  Inter- 
national Council,  committed,  by  the  initial  policy 
of  the  Peace  Congress  from  which  it  sprang,  to 
the  healing  influence  of  autonomy  and  confirmed 
by  experience  in  the  efficacy  of  this  principle, 
would  probably  find  itself  able  to  exercise  a 
genuinely  educative  influence  through  the  repre- 


AN  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT   127 

sentatives  of  an  oppressive  Power  for  securing 
an  effective  remedy  without  the  necessity  of  any 
direct  authoritative  intervention. 

I  do  not,  however,  desire  to  beg  any  question 
as  to  the  early  possibility  of  getting  "  Sovereign 
Powers  "  to  consent  to  invest  an  International 
Council  with  any  sufficient  powers  to  settle  issues  of 
nationality  along  the  lines  of  autonomy.  I  have 
merely  wished  to  indicate  the  desirability  of 
building  up,  when  it  is  possible,  such  international 
control,  so  as  to  prevent  the  birth  and  growth 
of  one  class  of  disputes  which  history  shows  to  be 
most  dangerous. 


PART    II 
Problems  of  Economic  Opportunity 

STILL  more  urgent  is  the  claim  that  an  Inter- 
national Council  shall  obtain  and  exercise  some 
sufficient  power  of  considering  and  settling  cer- 
tain large  questions  of  economic  policy  which 
bring  modern  nations  into  conflict.  The  grow- 
ing co-operation  of  citizens  belonging  to  different 
countries  for  all  economic  purposes,  the  inter- 
change of  goods,  the  use  of  the  common  ocean 
highways,  the  opening  up  of  new  markets,  the 
development  by  capital  of  the  resources  of 
backward  countries,  the  lending  and  borrow- 
ing of  Governments  and  of  private  companies, 
the  movements  of  labour  from  one  country 
to  another  for  the  furtherance  of  world-industry 
—these  mutually  beneficial  activities  have  given 
rise  to  much  friction  and  antagonism  between 


i28     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

groups  of  interested  persons  in  different  nations 
who  have  been  able  to  impose  their  ideas  and 
interests  upon  the  public  policy  of  their  Govern- 
ments and  sometimes  to  feed  national  animosities 
of  a  dangerous  sort. 

The  growing  dependence  of  modern  civilized 
and  thickly  populated  countries  for  the  necessaries 
of  life  and  industry,  for  commercial  profits,  and 
for  gainful  investments  of  capital  upon  free  access 
to  other  countries,  especially  to  countries  differing 
from  themselves  in  climate,  natural  resources,  and 
degree  of  economic  development,  is  of  necessity 
a  consideration  of  increasing  weight  in  the  foreign 
policy  of  to-day.  Every  active  industrial  or  com- 
mercial nation  is  therefore  fain  to  watch  and  guard 
its  existing  opportunities  for  foreign  trade  and 
investment,  and  to  plan  ahead  for  enlarged  oppor- 
tunities to  meet  the  anticipated  future  needs  of 
an  expanding  trade  and  a  growing  population. 
It  views  with  fear,  suspicion,  and  jealousy  every 
attempt  of  a  foreign  country  to  curtail  its  liberty 
of  access  to  other  countries  and  its  equal  opportuni- 
ties for  advantageous  trade  or  exploitation.  The 
chief  substance  of  the  treaties,  conventions,  and 
agreements  between  modern  nations  in  recent  times 
has  consisted  in  arrangements  about  commercial 
and  financial  opportunities,  mostly  in  countries  out- 
side the  acknowledged  control  of  the  negotiating 
parties.  The  real  origins  of  most  quarrels  between 
such  nations  have  related  to  tariffs,  railway,  bank- 
ing, commercial,  and  financial  operations  in  lands 
belonging  to  one  or  other  of  the  parties,  or  in 
lands  where  some  sphere  of  special  interest  was 
claimed.  Egypt,  Morocco,  Persia,  Asia  Minor, 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        129 

China,  Congo,  Mexico,  are  the  most  sensitive  spots 
affecting  international  relations  outside  of  Europe, 
testifying  to  the  predominance  of  economic  con- 
siderations in  foreign  policy.  The  stress  laid  upon 
such  countries  hinges  in  the  last  resort  upon  the 
need  of  "  open  doors  "  or  upon  the  desire  to 
close  doors  to  other  countries.  These  keenly  felt 
desires  to  safeguard  existing  foreign  markets  for 
goods  and  capital,  to  obtain  by  diplomatic  pressure 
or  by  force  new  markets,  and  in  other  cases  to 
monopolize  markets,  have  everywhere  been  the 
chief  directing  influences  in  foreign  policy,  the  chief 
causes  of  competing  armaments,  and  the  permanent 
underlying  menaces  to  peace. 

The  present  war,  when  regard  is  had  to  the 
real  directing  pressure  behind  all  diplomatic  acts 
and  superficial  political  ferments,  is  in  the  main  a 
product  of  these  economic  antagonisms.  This  point 
of  view  is  concisely  and  effectively  expressed  in  a 
striking  memorandum  presented  by  the  Reform 
Club  of  New  York  to  President  Wilson  : — 

Consider  the  situation  of  the  present  belligerents. 

Servia  wants  a  window  on  the  sea,  and  is  shut  out  by  Austrian 
influence. 

Austria  wants  an  outlet  in  the  East,  Constantinople  or 
Salonica. 

Russia  wants  ice-free  ports  on  the  Baltic  and  Pacific,  Con- 
stantinople, and  a  free  outlet  from  the  Black  Sea  into  the 
Mediterranean. 

Germany  claims  to  be  hemmed  in  by  a  ring  of  steel,  and  needs 
the  facilities  of  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  for  her  Rhine  Valley 
commerce,  security  against  being  shut  out  from  the  East  by 
commercial  restrictions  on  the  overland  route,  and  freedom  of 
the  seas  for  her  foreign  commerce. 

England  must  receive  uninterrupted  supplies  of  food  and  raw 
materials,  and  her  oversea  communications  must  be  maintained. 

9 


1 3o     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

This  is  true  also  of  France,  Germany,  Belgium,  and  other 
European  countries. 

Japan,  like  Germany,  must  have  opportunity  for  her  expanding 
population,  industries,  and  commerce. 

The  foreign  policies  of  the  nations  still  at  peace  are  also 
determined  by  trade  relations.  Our  own  country  desires  the 
open  door  in  the  East. 

South  and  North  American  States  and  Scandinavia  are  already 
protesting  against  the  war's  interference  with  their  ocean  trade. 

All  nations  that  are  not  in  possession  of  satisfactory  harbours 
on  the  sea  demand  outlets,  and  cannot  and  ought  not  to  be 
contented  till  they  get  them. 

Nations  desiring  to  extend  their  colonial  enterprises  entertain 
those  ambitions  for  commercial  reasons,  either  to  possess 
markets  from  which  they  cannot  be  excluded,  or  to  develop 
such  markets  for  themselves  and  be  able  to  exclude  others  from 
them  when  they  so  determine. 

The  generalization  from  these  statements  of  fact 
is  expressed  in  the  formula,  "  The  desire  for  com- 
mercial privilege  and  for  freedom  from  commercial 
restraint  is  the  primary  cause  of  war." 

Now,  that  the  foreign  policies  of  nations  are, 
in  fact,  determined  mainly  by  these  commercial 
and  financial  considerations,  and  that  the  desire 
to  secure  economic  privilege  and  to  escape 
economic  restraints  is  a  chief  cause  of  war,  are 
indisputable  propositions.  So  long  as  these 
motives  are  left  free  to  work  in  the  future  as  in 
the  past  there  will  be  constant  friction  among  the 
commercially  developed  nations,  giving  rise  to 
dangerous  quarrels  that  will  strain,  perhaps  to  the 
breaking-point,  any  arrangements  for  arbitration 
that  may  be  made.  An  International  Council  could 
not  be  indifferent  to  this  situation.  What  could 
it  do?  What  ought  it  to  be  empowered  to  do? 
Before  attempting  an  answer  to  this  question,  it 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        131 

may  be  well  to  distinguish  between  the  real  and 
the  false  antagonisms  of  economic  interests  between 
nations.  Here  a  clear-cut  distinction  must  be 
made  between  the  two  desires  which  the  Reform 
Club  statement  asserts  to  be  "  the  primary  cause 
of  war."  The  desire  for  commercial  privilege  is 
not  on  all  fours  with  the  desire  for  freedom  from 
commercial  restraint,  or  "  the  open  door."  Com- 
mercial privilege,  whether  expressed  in  tariffs  or 
bounties,  in  concessions  or  monopolies,  or  in 
"  close  "  colonies,  protectorates,  and  "  spheres  of 
influence,"  is  in  no  true  sense  a  "  national  " 
interest,  nor  is  it  an  expression  of  a  "  national  " 
desire.  These  acts  of  policy  result,  partly  from 
the  voluntary  adoption  by  unenlightened  states- 
men of  false  notions  of  national  economy,  but 
mainly  from  the  pressure  of  particular  commer- 
cial, manufacturing,  or  financial  interests  within 
each  nation.  This  usurpation  of  foreign  policy 
by  private  interests  usually  inflicts  two  commercial 
injuries  upon  the  nation  it  pretends  to  serve.  So 
far  as  it  operates  by  tariffs,  bounties,  or  "  mono- 
polies," it  injures  the  total  productive  powers  of 
the  nation  by  disposing  them  in  an  uneconomical 
manner,  which  comes  home  in  diminished  powers 
of  national  consumption.  So  far  as  it  operates 
by  a  strong  foreign  and  colonial  policy,  in  order 
to  win  privilege  and  profits  for  special  groups 
or  interests  within  the  nation,  it  imposes  enormous 
burdens  of  taxation  for  the  maintenance  of  those 
armed  forces  and  the  conduct  of  the  wars  and 
expeditions  which  are  entailed  by  such  a  policy. 
Even  in  cases  where  this  policy  opens  up  new  areas 
of  profitable  trade,  not  only  for  special  business 


1 32  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

interests,  but  for  the  larger  body  of  a  national 
trade,  a  faithful  statement  of  the  per  contra 
account,  in  the  shape  of  direct  and  indirect  public 
expenditure,  would  usually  show  a  large  net  deficit 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  nation.  In  a  word, 
Protection,  Imperialism,  and  a  "  spirited  foreign 
policy  "  do  not  pay  a  nation.  Economic  privi- 
leges are  not  legitimate  objects  of  national  desire, 
and  Governments  intelligently  sensitive  to  national 
interests  will  not  seek  such  privileges. 

On  the  other  hand,  equality  of  commercial  and 
financial  opportunities  in  the  shape  of  freedom 
of  access  by  sea  and  land  to  foreign  countries,  free- 
dom of  trade  with  the  inhabitants  of  such  coun- 
tries, and  equal  opportunities  for  capital  and  labour 
to  take  part  in  the  economic  development  of  such 
countries  are  advantages,  not  only  for  the  particu- 
lar interests  directly  engaged  in  such  intercourse 
but  for  the  nation  as  a  whole.  So  far,  there- 
fore, as  the  desire  "  for  freedom  from  commercial 
restraint  "  is  a  cause  of  war,  we  are  confronted 
with  a  real  grievance  affecting  the  interests  of  a 
nation,  not  only  of  a  group.  The  fears  of  a 
nation  lest  their  commerce  and  manufactures 
should  be  injured  by  protective  tariffs  or  by  '"'  close 
colonization  "  on  the  part  of  other  nations  have 
a  real  foundation.  Such  a  policy  may  even 
endanger  supplies  of  foods  and  other  necessaries 
upon  which  nations  have  grown  to  rely.  At  any 
rate,  their  manufacturing  and  commercial  progress 
is  liable  to  be  seriously  hampered  if  other  advanced 
nations  close  against  their  goods,  not  only  their 
own  markets  but  those  of  their  colonies  and  pro- 
tectorates. Reflection  will  show  that  the  aggressive 


AN   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT        133 

factor  of  German  militarism  was  able  by  the  recent 
course  of  events  to  work  powerfully  upon  the  fears 
of  the  business  classes  of  the  country  lest  German 
trade  should  be  subjected  to  this  strangling  pro- 
cess, and  that  without  such  appeals  it  is  unlikely 
that  the  nation  could  have  been  worked  up  to 
the  temper  required  for  war.  The  close  Protec- 
tionism of  the  French  colonial  system,  recently 
and  in  defiance  of  treaty  rights  extended  to 
Morocco,  the  counter-working  of  Great  Britain  and 
France  against  the  efforts  of  Germany  to  secure 
"  places  in  the  sun,"  and,  lastly  and  chiefly,  the 
conviction  that  Great  Britain  was  likely  soon  to 
abandon  the  Free  Trade  hitherto  practised  through- 
out her  Empire  were  important  factors  in  the 
causation  of  the  war.1 

1  A  well-known  Belgian  economist  gives  the  following 
account  of  this  economic  motif  in  German  policy  : — 

"  L'Empire  d'Allemagne  a  une  population  constamment 
croissante  (a  raison  de  pres  d'un  million  par  annee)  de  pres 
de  70  millions  d'hahitants  dont  les  industries  et  le  commerce  ne 
sont  assures  que  de  leur  marche  interieur  et  de  marches  coloniaux 
relativement  insignifiants.  Le  territoire  de  1'empire  allemand 
est  exactement  dix  fois  moindre  que  celui  de  1'empire  britannique 
et  ne  sera  susceptible  d'etre  occupe  dans  1'avenir  que  par  un 
nombre  supplementaire  fort  limite  d'habitants  et  de  consomma- 
teurs  des  produits  allemands.  Quant  a  tous  ses  autres  marches, 
le  peuple  allemand,  dont  les  besoins,  les  desirs  et  les  moyens 
d'expansion  exterieure  sont  des  plus  considerables — et  entiere- 
ment  legitimes — se  trouve,  il  faut  le  reconnaitre,  dans  une 
situation  precaire. 

"  L'esprit  protectionniste  place  les  relations  des  peuples  sous 
un  regime  de  simple  tolerance,  toujours  susceptible  de  se  trans- 
former en  parfaite  intolerance,  celle-ci  pouvant  s'appliquer  alors 
aux  hommes  comme  aux  produits.  Ce  n'est  certes  pas  1'un  des 
moindres  inconvenients  du  protectionnisme  que  1'instabilite  et 
1'insecurite  generates  qui  en  resultent — pour  ceux  qui  le  prati- 


134    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

Disputes  arising  from  these  economic  causes  are 
even  deeper  seated  and  more  dangerous  than  those 
connected  with  the  claims  of  nationality  and 
autonomy.  Indeed,  political  autonomy  is  shorn 
of  most  of  its  value  unless  it  is  accompanied  by 
a  large  measure  of  economic  liberty  as  regards 
commercial  relations  with  the  outside  world.  The 
case  of  Servia,  liable  at  any  moment  to  be  denied 
access  to  the  sea,  or  to  be  cut  off  by  Austria 
from  her  chief  land  markets,  is  a  case  in  point. 
Or  once  again,  would  the  autonomy  of  such  a 
country  as  Hungary,  Bohemia,  or  Poland,  how- 
ever valid  its  political  guarantees,  satisfy  the  legiti- 
mate aspirations  of  its  population  if  high  tariff- 
walls  encompassed  it  on  every  frontier?  Such 
instances  make  it  evident  that  no  settlement  of 
"  the  map  of  Europe  "  on  lines  of  nationality 
can  suffice  to  establish  peace.  The  effective  liberty 
of  every  people  demands  freedom  of  commercial 

quent,  comme  pour  ceux  centre  lesquels  il  est  dirige.  Pro- 
tectionniste,  1'Allemagne  cause  aux  autres  et  subit,  elle-meme,  ces 
inconvenients.  La  Russie  n'annon?ait-elle  pas,  en  juillet  dernier, 
qu'elle  avait  en  vue  de  profondes  modifications  du  trait e  de 
commerce  russo-allemand  echeant  en  1916?  La  France  ne  se 
disposait-elle  pas  a  se  procurer  par  un  nouvel  accroissement  de 
ses  droits  douaniers  les  ressources  necessaires  a  1'application  de 
la  '  loi  de  trois  ans '  ?  Les  citoyens  des  Etats-Unis,  sont-ils,  en 
majorite  assuree,  convertis  a  la  politique  de  la  liberte  des  im- 
portations ?  Et  faut-il  exclure  des  possibilites  que  1'Angleterre 
compte  dans  10  ou  15  annees  une  majorite  d'electeurs  favorables 
a  un  projet  de  tariff-reform  et  a  la  constitution  d'un  grand 
empire  economique  f  erme  ? 

"  Que  la  situation  economique  de  I'Allemagne  soit  precaire,  en 
ce  qui  concerne  ses  debouches  etrangers,  ne  peut  pas  etre 
conteste."  ("  Un  Autre  Aspect  de  la  Question  Europeenne  et  une 
Solution,"  par  Henri  Lambert.) 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        135 

intercourse  with  other  peoples.  A  refusal  or  a 
hindrance  of  such  intercourse  deprives  a  people 
of  its  fair  share  of  the  common  fruits  of  the 
earth,  and  deprives  the  other  peoples  of  the  world 
of  any  special  fruits  which  it  is  able  to  contribute 
to  the  common  stock. 

If  any  international  Government  existed,  repre- 
senting the  commonwealth  of  nations,  it  would 
seek  to  remove  all  commercial  restrictions  which 
impair  the  freedom  of  economic  intercourse 
between  nations. 

These  restrictions  are  placed  by  the  Reform 
Club  Memorandum  under  the  four  following 
categories  : — 

First.     There  is  the  restriction  of  tariffs  imposed  by  nations. 

Second.  There  are  restrictions  upon  the  best  uses  of  Inter- 
national commerce,  of  the  terminal  and  land  transfer  facilities 
of  the  great  trade  routes  and  seaports  of  the  world.  A  few  such 
ports  command  entrance  to  and  exit  from  vast  continental 
hinterlands.  It  is  vital  to  these  interior  regions  that  their 
natural  communications  with  the  outside  world  should  be  kept 
widely  open,  and  this  is  equally  vital  to  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Obstructive  control  of  such  ports  and  routes  to  the  detriment  of 
the  world's  commerce  cannot  and  should  not  be  tolerated  by 
States  whose  interests  are  adversely  affected.  But  routes  and 
ports  are  needed  for  use,  not  government  ;  and  port  rivalries 
constantly  tend  towards  offering  the  best  and  equal  facilities  to 
all.  The  swelling  tides  of  commerce  are  clearing  their  own 
channels,  and  mutual  interests  will  more  and  more  prompt  the 
States  through  which  the  principal  trade  routes  pass  to  facilitate 
the  movement  of  commerce. 

Third.  There  are  restrictions  upon  opportunities  to  trade 
with  territories  ruled  as  colonies  or  being  exploited  within 
spheres  of  influence.  This  is  what  now  remains  of  the  old 
mercantile  system  which  flourished  before  our  revolutionary 
war,  and  which  has  been  weakening  ever  since.  Great  Britain 
claims  no  preference  for  herself  in  her  colonies.  Other  States 


136  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

have  been  less  liberal.  The  fear  of  such  restrictions  being 
applied  against  them  is  to-day  the  main  motive  for  a  policy 
of  colonial  oversea  possessions.  If  industrial  States  could  be 
assured  of  the  application  of  the  open-door  policy,  no  State 
would  envy  another  its  colonies.  Colonies  should  be  the 
world's. 

Fourth.  There  are  restrictions  in  the  free  use  of  the  sea. 
Unlike  land  routes,  ocean  routes  are  offered  practically  without 
cost  to  all,  whithersoever  the  sea  runs.  Over  these,  however, 
until  modern  times  commerce  has  been  subject  to  pillage  by 
regular  warships  as  well  as  by  pirates.  The  claims  of  commerce 
have  been  more  slowly  recognized  on  the  sea  than  on  the  land  ; 
and,  to  an  extent  now  unthinkable  on  land,  warring  States  still 
feel  free  to  interfere  with  neutral  traders." 


Now  what  could  an  International  Council  do 
for  the  removal  of  such  injurious  and  provocative 
restrictions  ? 

As  regards  the  tariffs  and  other  methods  of 
Protectionism,  they  could  exercise  no  direct  con- 
trol. For  tariffs  and  other  Protective  instruments, 
however  injurious  to  other  nations  in  their  effect 
and  their  intention,  belong  to  the  financial  systems 
of  the  several  nations  which  employ  them  as  modes 
of  regulation  of  national  trade  and  of  national 
revenue.  Their  removal  could  not  be  effected  by 
such  an  international  Government  as  is  here  con- 
templated. It  must  be  left  to  the  common  sense 
and  goodwill  of  the  several  nations  to  expose  the 
delusions  and  to  overcome  the  selfish  private 
interests  which  impose  so  injurious  a  public  policy 
upon  their  respective  Governments.  But  the  free 
deliberations  of  the  International  Council  would 
be  a  powerful  educative  influence  for  the  exposure 
of  the  fallacies  and  the  injuries  of  Protectionism, 
and  would  furnish  better  facilities  for  mutual 


AN   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT        137 

arrangements  and  the  avoidance  of  tariff  wars. 
As  the  general  benefits  of  international  co-opera- 
tion gained  increasing  recognition  among  states- 
men and  peoples,  it  might  be  expected  that  the 
spurious  nationalism  which  finds  its  commercial 
expression  in  Protection  would  continually  weaken, 
and  that  tariffs,  so  far  as  they  survived,  would  be 
more  and  more  "  for  revenue  only." 

Direct  action  by  mutual  arrangement  for  the 
removal  of  the  other  classes  of  restriction  would, 
however,  fall  within  the  scope  of  an  International 
Council  that  was  empowered  to  deal  with  the  re- 
moval of  the  roots  of  war  and  the  conditions  of 
effective  international  co-operation. 

Equality  of  opportunity  for  commerce,  for 
investment  of  capital,  and  for  participation  in  the 
development  of  the  world's  resources,  is  the  first 
condition  for  the  progress  of  national  civilization 
in  the  world.  In  the  fruits  of  such  progress  every 
people  should  get  its  share,  and  the  co-operation 
in  this  common  task  is  the  surest  bond  of  peace 
among  nations.  Cobden  was  not  mistaken  in  re- 
garding Free  Trade  as  a  great  peacemaker.  But 
he  could  not  foresee  two  counteracting  influences 
due  to  mal-distribution  of  economic  and  political 
power  among  the  respective  classes  in  the  indus- 
trial nations.  The  distribution  of  the  immensely 
growing  product  of  modern  industry  between 
capital  and  labour  has  been  such  as  to  place  at 
the  disposal  of  capitalist  employers  a  producing 
power  which  continually  tends  to  outrun  the  effec- 
tive demand  for  the  goods  which  it  is  able  to 
produce.  In  other  words,  national  production  of 
such  goods  tends  to  exceed  national  consumption, 


138     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

which  is  kept  down  by  the  inadequate  share 
possessed  by  labour  in  the  product  of  industry. 
This  condition  of  affairs  has  driven  competing 
manufacturers  and  traders  to  use  every  means  of 
finding  or  of  forcing  foreign  markets,  in  order 
to  dispose  of  the  surplus  over  the  demands  of 
home  markets.  This  struggle  for  overseas  markets 
has  been  notoriously  a  growing  factor  in  foreign 
policy  and  a  growing  source  of  international 
friction. 

Another  factor  of  increasing  importance  in  the 
recent  conflict  of  nations  has  been  the  competition 
between  groups  of  financiers  and  concessionaires, 
organized  upon  a  "  national "  basis,  to  obtain 
exclusive  or  preferential  control  in  the  undeveloped 
countries  for  the  profitable  use  of  exported  capital. 
Closely  related  to  commercial  competition,  this 
competition  for  lucrative  investments  has  played 
an  even  greater  part  in  producing  dangerous  inter- 
national situations.1  For  these  financial  and  com- 
mercial interests  have  sought  to  use  the  political 
and  the  forcible  resources  of  their  respective 
Governments  to  enable  them  to  obtain  the  con- 
cessions and  other  privileges  they  require  for  the 
security  and  profitable  application  of  their  capital. 
The  control  of  foreign  policy  thus  wielded  has  been 
fraught  with  two  perils  to  world -peace.  It  has 
brought  the  Governments  of  the  competing 
financial  groups  into  constant  friction,  and  it 
has  been  the  most  fruitful  direct  source  of  expe- 
ditionary forces  and  territorial  aggressions  in  the 
coveted  areas.  As  the  struggle  for  lucrative  over- 

1  See  Mr.  H.  N.  Bradford's  important   book,  "  The  War  of 
Steel  and  Gold  "  (G.  Bell  &  Sons). 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        139 

seas  investments  has  come  to  occupy  a  more 
important  part  than  the  struggle  for  ordinary 
the  economic  oppositions  between 
Governments  have  become  more  and 
determinant  factors  in  foreign  policy, 
and  in  the  competition  of  armaments,  upon  which 
Governments  rely  to  support  and  to  achieve  the 
aims  their  economic  masters  impose  upon  them.1 
Any  International  Council  entrusted  with  the 
duty  of  preventing  and  not  merely  of  settling  dis- 
putes would  be  obliged  to  grapple  with  these 
thorny  issues.  Asia,  Africa,  and  South  America 
still  contain  huge  undeveloped  areas  of  economic 
exploitation,  which  to  keen-witted  business  men 
are  "  spheres  of  legitimate  aspiration "  to  be 
realized  by  the  assistance  of  their  respective 
Foreign  Offices  with  the  finances  and  the  forces 
of  the  State  at  their  disposal.  What  should  be 
the  principles  of  international  policy  in  the  "  de- 
velopment "  of  the  resources  of  backward  coun- 
tries? Some  constructive  policy  must  be  applied. 
A  mere  doctrine  of  "  hands  off,"  urged  sometimes 
by  Socialists  in  their  capacity  of  anti -capitalists, 
sometimes  by  extreme  nationalists,  concerned  to 
assert  the  absolute  ownership  of  every  country 
by  its  inhabitants,  is  not  seriously  defensible,  on 
grounds  either  of  ethics  or  of  practical  politics.  The 

1  This  account  of  the  influence  of  financial  competition  must 
not  be  understood  as  an  attack  upon  the  export  of  capital.  The 
free  movement  of  capital,  as  of  goods  and  men  from  one  country 
in  the  world  to  another,  is  in  its  normal  operation  a  pacific  force, 
binding  the  different  creditor  and  debtor  nations  together  by 
mutual  advantages.  Only  when  national  groups  of  capitalists 
employ  political  weapons  to  gain  their  private  ends  does  the 
export  of  capital  become  a  source  of  danger. 


MO     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

occupiers  of  a  land  containing  rich  resources  which 
can  be  developed  for  the  benefit  of  mankind  have 
no  "  right  "  to  withhold  them.  If  they  cannot 
or  do  not  desire  to  develop  them  themselves,  they 
cannot  properly  resent  the  claim  of  outsiders  to 
come  in  and  do  this  work.  The  question  is,  What 
are  the  governing  principles  which  should  regu- 
late such  justifiable  interference?  Two  vices  are 
disclosed  in  the  actual  history  of  such  interferences. 
Upon  the  first — viz.  the  jealousy  and  friction 
created  between  the  dominant  economic  groups 
and  the  Governments  of  competing  States — I  have 
already  dwelt.  The  second  is  the  economic  in- 
justice and  oppression  commonly  inflicted  by  the 
"  civilized  "  exploiters  upon  the  "  natives  "  of  these 
areas  of  exploitation,  and  the  political  injustice 
and  oppression  often  inflicted  by  the  Governments 
of  the  exploiters  through  the  assertion  of  political 
dominion.  If  the  right  of  outside  interference  is 
based  upon  the  claim  to  develop  for  the  general 
good  the  otherwise  wasted  resources  of  a  foreign 
country,  only  so  much  interference,  economic  and 
political,  as  is  required  to  achieve  this  end  is 
prima  facie  justified.  This  common  right  of 
nations  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  be  made  a 
pretext  and  an  opportunity  either  for  a  policy  of 
plunder  and  servitude  by  groups  of  privileged 
profiteers,  or  for  a  policy  of  Imperial  aggrandize- 
ment by  their  Government. 

Now,  an  International  Council,  concerned 
primarily  to  keep  the  peace  and  to  substitute 
co-operative  for  competitive  action  on  the  part 
of  its  constituent  nations,  might  proceed  along 
either  of  two  lines.  It  might  pursue  a  policy  of 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT        141 

political  and  economic  "  partition,"  as  in  the  great 
African  deal  of  1885,  assigning  to  its  several 
members  separate  spheres  of  economic  interest  for 
exploitation,  and  leaving  to  them  the  right  to 
exclude  the  capitalists  and  traders  of  other  civi- 
lized nations  from  concessions  or  trade  within  their 
sphere.  This  would  be  the  worst  international 
arrangement,  both  from  the  political  and  the  eco- 
nomic standpoint.  For  there  could  be  no  security 
that  a  "  fair  "  partition  could  be  made,  prevent- 
ing jealousy  and  affording  durable  satisfaction  ; 
while  the  stimulus  thus  given  to  Protection  and 
to  economic  privilege  would  both  impede  the  best 
development  of  the  exploited  countries  and  foster 
commercial  disputes. 

Or  a  "  partition  "  might  be  made  which,  having 
regard  to  the  special  political  and  economic 
interests  of  particular  nations  by  virtue  of  acces- 
sibility or  established  connections,  would  acknow- 
ledge a  special  right  of  intervention  and  even  of 
political  control,  but  with  an  express  agreement 
to  maintain  an  open  door  and  equality  of  oppor- 
tunity for  the  capital  and  trade  of  other  nations. 
This  principle  has  been  embodied,  more  or  less 
completely,  in  some  recent  treaties  l  between  several 
Powers,  though  the  lack  of  adequate  guarantees 
for  the  faithful  performance  of  the  under- 
takings has  made  such  arrangements  exceedingly 
precarious. 

If,  however,  a  standing  International  Council 
could  be  empowered  to  negotiate  such  partitions, 
with  periodic  arrangements  for  revision,  the 
dangerous  collisions  of  economic  interests  which 

1  E.g.  the  Algegiras  Treaty. 


have  underlain  the  policy  of  political  and  economic 
expansion  in  the  past  might  be  reduced  to  a 
minimum.  For  the  attainment  of  the  "  open 
door  "  would  not  only  stop  the  pressure  which 
competing  groups  have  hitherto  placed  upon  their 
respective  Foreign  Offices  :  it  would  directly  pro- 
mote the  substitution  of  international  for  purely 
national  groups  and  syndicates,  giving  free  play 
to  the  genuinely  co-operative  tendency  of  modern 
finance.  If  powerful  trading  and  financial  groups 
within  each  country  were  no  longer  goading, 
bribing,  or  cajoling  their  respective  Governments 
to  threaten  and  outwit  one  another  in  obtain- 
ing economic  privileges  for  their  respective 
nationals,  the  chief  modern  cause  of  war 
would  disappear.  Although  the  established 
interests  and  modes  of  public  finance  in  the 
parts  of  the  world  already  allotted  might  make 
the  retrospective  application  of  "  equality  of 
economic  opportunity  "  slow  and  difficult,  it  ought 
not  to  be  impossible  to  neutralize  those  areas  which 
have  not  yet  passed  into  exclusive  national  pre- 
serves. The  example  of  Great  Britain  in  her 
Crown  colonies  and  protectorates  would  serve  to 
give  a  lead  along  this  path  to  a  sane  world- 
policy. 

There  is,  however,  one  important  problem  of 
economic  opportunity  for  which  no  early  solution 
could  be  found  by  any  International  Council,  how- 
ever representative.  The  utilization  of  the  economic 
resources  of  the  world  for  the  benefit  of  the  world 
demands  the  open  door,  not  only  for  trade  and 
for  capital  but  for  labour.  If  world  policy  were 
to  be  measured  merely  in  terms  of  the  maxima- 


AN   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT        143 

tion  of  material  wealth,  it  is  pretty  clear  that  the 
principle  of  laissez  faire,  laissez  alter  would  demand 
the  removal  of  all  restrictions  upon  migration,  in 
order  that  labour  might  flow  as  easily  and  rapidly 
as  possible  to  the  area  where  higher  wages  would 
denote  greater  productivity.  Indeed,  such  a 
mobility  of  labour  is  closely  linked  with  the 
mobility  of  capital  that  appertains  to  sound  inter- 
nationalism. Capital  cannot  operate  without 
labour,  and  though  it  may  sometimes  find  a 
suitable  supply  of  labour  on  the  spot,  it  often 
needs  to  draw  it  from  elsewhere.  Now  though 
facilities  of  modern  transport  have  given  im- 
mensely increased  mobility  to  labour,  certain 
obstinate  and  tightening  restrictions  are  placed 
by  many  nations  upon  the  direction,  character,  and 
pace  of  this  flow.  The  great  natural  areas  of 
emigration  are  countries  of  congested  population, 
living  upon  low  standards  of  comfort,  but  capable 
of  hard  or  skilful  work  in  "  new  "  countries.  The 
continent  of  Asia  is  a  rich  reservoir  of  such  labour. 
China  and  India  contain  huge  surpluses  of  popu- 
lation capable  of  common  service  in  America, 
Australasia,  and  South  Africa,  and  willing  to 
undertake  this  service.  But  the  difficulty  of  pro- 
curing the  general  assent  of  civilized  nations  to 
"  an  open  door  "  for  Asiatic  labour  would,  of 
course,  be  insuperable,  and  no  International 
Council  could  undertake  the  task  with  any  prospect 
of  success.  For  restraints  upon  such  free  immi- 
gration do  not  rest  merely  or  mainly  upon 
economic  delusions,  gradually  to  be  dissipated  by 
saner  and  more  scientific  views  of  national  policy, 
as  is  the  case  with  the  restrictions  on  freedom 


144     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

of  commerce  which  the  same  Governments  fre- 
quently apply.  They  are  rooted  more  deeply  in 
a  broader  social-economic  policy  of  those  nations. 
While,  therefore,  it  would  be  possible  that  the 
educative  intercourse  of  international  government 
and  the  improved  facilities  of  international 
arrangements  might  gradually  bring  about  re- 
ductions of  protective  tariffs,  it  could  not  be 
expected  that  a  similar  effect  could  be  produced 
upon  the  immigration  laws  and  other  disqualifica- 
tions which  check  the  free  entrance  and  settle- 
ment of  "  coloured  "  peoples  in  many  countries 
governed  by  white  peoples.  The  claims  of  the 
more  prolific  and  congested  coloured  races  for 
equal  opportunities  in  the  development  of  under - 
peopled  countries  by  their  labour  will  continue 
to  present  problems  for  which  a  Council  repre- 
senting "  civilized  "  Powers  can  find  no  early 
solution.  It  is,  however,  possible  that  some 
comtnon  policy  adopted  by  such  a  Council  might 
mitigate  the  resentment  felt  by  members  of  such 
civilized  countries  as  China,  India,  and  Japan,  by 
securing  to  the  yellow,  black,  and  brown  races 
sufficient  areas  of  free  migration  and  exploitation 
in  the  tropics  to  relieve,  or  at  any  rate  postpone, 
the  graver  issues  of  race  antagonism  which  may 
threaten  the  future  peace  of  the  world. 

There  remains  one  difficulty  inherent  in  the  type 
of  international  Government  we  are  considering. 
The  dealings  of  civilized  and  powerful  States  with 
uncivilized  and  weaker  peoples  have  always  been 
selfish  and  commonly  oppressive.  May  not  a 
Council,  representing  all  the  civilized  and  powerful 
States,  be  similarly  selfish  and  oppressive  in  its 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT       145 

attitude?  Its  power  to  be  oppressive  with  safety 
and  impunity  will  be  far  greater  than  that 
possessed  by  any  "  imperialistic  "  nation  in  the 
past.  Could  the  white  nations  of  the  earth  thus 
banded  together  be  entrusted  with  the  fate  of  their 
coloured  fellow-beings?  What  security  would  the 
latter  have  that  they  would  not  be  kept  in  a  state 
of  political  serfdom,  called  by  those  who  impose  it 
"  good  government,"  in  order  that  the  natural  and 
human  resources  of  their  country  may  be  utilized 
for  the  good  of  a  world  to  which  they  are  out- 
siders? Indeed,  this  same  objection  may  be  raised 
on  behalf  of  civilized  peoples  which  either  are 
not  included  in  the  international  company  or 
which,  being  members,  may  yet  find  that  the  con- 
trol of  international  affairs  is  actually  wielded  by 
an  inner  circle  of  "  Great  Powers  "  imposing  its 
corporate  will  unjustly  and  oppressively  upon  the 
smaller  nations.  In  other  words,  it  is  difficult 
to  pre-figure  an  international  Government  that  can 
be  trusted  not  to  abuse  the  tutelage  over  "  lower  " 
or  "  backward  "  peoples,  and  not  to  preserve  in 
its  demeanour  and  operations  some  of  the  pride 
of  power  and  selfishness  which  the  official  repre- 
sentatives of  great  States  have  always  exhibited 
in  their  dealings  with  small  States.  The  problem 
in  the  two  cases  is  not,  indeed,  the  same  ;  but 
the  successful  solution,  so  far  as  it  is  attainable, 
involves  the  application  of  the  same  principle.  The 
tendency  of  powerful  States  to  domineer  over 
weaker  States  within  the  international  society  is 
in  substance  the  same  issue  as  is  raised  by  the 
class  struggle  within  a  State.  It  can  only  be 
remedied  by  a  more  intelligent  co-operation  of 

10 


146  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

the  weaker  members  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  an 
increasing  sense  of  human  solidarity  upon  the 
other.  A  disposition  of  a  Power,  or  group  of 
Powers,  to  attempt  to  use  the  international  policy 
for  the  furtherance  of  its  particular  interests  at 
the  expense  of  others  is  likely  enough  to  manifest 
itself  in  the  early  stages  of  the  evolution  of  a 
society  of  nations.  It  may  even  lead  to  a  tempo- 
rary break-up  or  collapse  of  the  experiment.  But 
the  necessities  of  the  situation  will  compel  attempts 
at  reconstruction,  perhaps  on  a  better  and  fuller 
basis  of  representation.  The  faults  and  failures 
of  international  conduct,  the  oppression  which 
international  society  may  seek  to  exercise  over  the 
outside  world  are  necessary  defects  of  its  quality, 
only  to  be  remedied,  as  defects  of  individual  and 
national  character  are  remedied,  by  the  expensive 
process  of  experience.  There  can  be  no  denial 
of  the  dangers  of  an  abuse  of  international  power. 
But  the  more  completely  international  it  becomes 
the  less  frequent  and  less  injurious  will  these 
abuses  be.  Every  extension  of  the  area  of  effec- 
tive internationalism,  every  growth  of  the  inter- 
national mind  by  co-operative  practice,  will 
diminish  the  danger  of  an  undue  preponder- 
ance of  power  remaining  in  the  hands  of  a  great 
State,  or  a  group  of  States,  inclined  to  exercise 
unjust  dominion  or  oppressive  exploitation  over 
weaker  members  of  the  social  union  or  over 
unrepresented  peoples. 

If,  then,  peaceable  relations  between  nations  are 
to  be  secured  by  conferring  upon  some  Council, 
Congress,  or  other  representative  body,  an 
adequate  power,  not  merely  to  settle  dangerous 


AN   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT       147 

disputes  but  to  prevent  them  from  arising,  this 
preventive  policy,  in  order  to  be  really  effective, 
requires  us  to  envisage  a  form  of  international 
control  or  government  endowed  with  considerable 
executive  and  legislative  functions.  It  must  be 
competent  to  frame  rules  or  laws  of  general  validity 
for  dealing  with  the  new  needs  and  new  situations 
which  will  arise  in  history  from  the  new  contacts, 
new  pressures,  and  new  conflicts  of  interest  between 
nations  or  their  Governments.  The  legislative  and 
executive  activities  of  such  an  international  Govern- 
ment cannot,  therefore,  be  narrowly  confined  to 
some  simple  methods  of  preventing  war  and  regu- 
lating armaments.  In  order  properly  to  accom- 
plish their  conservative  task  of  keeping  order  in 
a  changing  world  they  must  be  progressive.  In 
this  chapter  we  have  chiefly  dwelt  upon  what  is 
properly  regarded  as  the  legislative  aspect  of  this 
work.  The  executive  work  we  have  considered 
chiefly  from  the  standpoint  of  the  powers  that 
must  be  exercised  internationally,  if  the  arrange- 
ments for  settling  disputes  by  arbitral  and  legal 
methods  are  to  be  adequately  guaranteed.  This 
approach,  however,  has  given  a  very  partial  signi- 
ficance to  the  executive  powers  which  such  a 
Council  or  Congress  would  have  to  wield.  By 
stressing  the  question  of  guarantees  it  has  ignored 
the  international  Civil  Services  required  for  carry- 
ing on  the  ordinary  work  of  the  Council  and  the 
Courts  and  for  administering  their  rules  and 
judgments.  Yet  this  official  work  and  the  finance 
which  it  involves  will  be  of  great  and  continually 
increasing  importance,  establishing  habits  and  rules 
of  orderly  co-operation  and  adjustment  which  in 


148  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

themselves    will    furnish    a    valuable    educational 
support   to    internationalism. 

If,  further,  we  take  into  account  the  growth 
and  transfer  to  the  Council  of  those  numerous 
forms  of  positive  international  co-operation,  de- 
signed not  primarily  for  the  preservation  of  peace 
but  for  the  pursuance  of  the  common  welfare  of 
nations,  we  perceive  that  an  international  Govern- 
ment, once  fairly  established,  will  exhibit  natural 
powers  of  growth  for  legislative  and  administrative 
purposes  to  which  no  close  limits  can  be  set.  Just 
as  within  a  federal  State,  or  a  federation  of  States, 
the  central  power  continually  receives  new  acces- 
sions, by  virtue  of  the  widening  needs  and  interests 
of  the  members  of  this  national  society,  so  the 
actual  growth  of  international  contacts  and  com- 
munications will  have  a  similar  effect  in  feeding 
the  organs  of  international  government.  In  this 
process,  however,  there  is  nothing  really  inimical 
to  the  survival  and  strength  of  nationalism. 
Effective  growth  of  local  self-government  is  con- 
sistent with  a  continual  positive  enlargement  of 
the  powers  of  the  central  Government.  For  in 
a  progressive  community  there  is  a  constant 
enlargement  of  the  aggregate  of  government,  and 
the  functions  thrown  on  to  the  centre  are,  or  may 
be,  fully  compensated  by  the  orderly  devolution 
of  other  powers  from  the  centre,  as  well  as  by 
the  growth  of  fresh  functions  of  local  origin.  This 
same  economy  in  the  relations  between  local  and 
central  Governments  would  be  exhibited  upon  the 
larger  scale  if  the  federal  principle  were  once 
fruitfully  applied  to  a  society  of  nations. 


CHAPTER    X 
THE    SOCIAL    CONTRACT    OF    NATIONS 

IT  is  likely  that  some  readers  will  have  been  grow- 
ing impatient  during  the  process  of  developing 
an  international  design  so  far-reaching  as  that  indi- 
cated in  our  last  chapter.  "  It  will  be  difficult 
enough,"  they  will  say,  "  to  get  the  princes  and 
statesmen  of  Europe  to  look  with  favour  upon  any 
scheme  for  the  pacific  settlement  of  all  matters 
of  dispute.  But  to  invite  them  even  to  consider 
your  fuller  scheme  of  international  government,  not 
only  is  futile  in  itself  but  is  calculated  to  damage 
the  chance  of  the  more  modest  proposals."  To 
reply,  as  we  might,  that  the  more  ambitious  archi- 
tecture of  our  scheme  has  grown  by  the  natural 
and  logical  process  of  remedying  the  proved  and 
admitted  defects  of  the  simpler  proposals  will 
hardly  satisfy  our  critics.  It  will,  therefore,  be 
better  frankly  to  admit  that  to  ministers  and 
diplomatists,  steeped  in  the  traditions  of  the  arts 
hitherto  comprising  foreign  policy,  this  or  any  pro- 
posal of  an  international  Government  may  appear 
chimerical.  For  it  involves  a  complete  reversal 
of  ideas  and  practices.  The  very  term  "  inter- 
national "  is  no  more  than  a  century  old,  and 

though  since  then  it  has  enjoyed  an  ever -widening 

149 


150  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

vogue,  it  has  always  been  regarded  with  suspicion 
as  an  interloper  in  the  circles  of  diplomacy.  Its 
standpoint  and  its  fundamental  assumptions  alike 
would,  to  a  European  Foreign  Minister  or  Ambas- 
sador, seem  to  imply  a  betrayal  of  the  separate 
interests  of  his  country  which  are  by  right  his 
sole  consideration  in  dealing  with  other  States. 
If  this  type  of  man,  imbued  with  this  spirit  of 
the  past,  is  entrusted  by  the  nations  of  Europe 
with  the  settlement  of  the  terms  of  peace  and  the 
determination  of  the  future  relations  of  the  Powers, 
all  hope  of  ending  or  abating  militarism  and  its 
inevitable  sequel  disappears.  It  is  to  quite  other 
forces  of  persuasion  and  negotiation  that  we  must 
turn  for  any  prospect  of  success  for  our  policy 
of  internationalism.  Hitherto  the  peoples  have 
been  willing  to  leave  the  conduct  of  such 
momentous  matters  in  the  hands  of  their  de 
facto  rulers  to  do  as  they  think  best.  Will  they 
be  content  to  do  so  now  that  the  dire  consequences 
of  this  misplaced  confidence  are  so  evident?  Will 
they  give  a  perfectly  free  hand  for  the  making  of 
peace  to  the  statesmen  whose  most  recent  record 
is  that  they  have  made  this  war,  and  whose  plans 
for  the  future  will  consist  in  preparations  for 
another  war?  For  we  have  shown  that  the  sole 
alternative  to  internationalism  is  militarism.  Will 
the  peoples  allow  their  "  ministers  "  to  choose  this 
alternative?  Not,  I  think,  if  they  can  be  made 
to  realize  what  that  alternative  means.  And  they 
will  realize  it  by  most  convincing  demonstrations. 
Not  only  will  there  be  around  them  the  human 
and  material  wreckage  of  the  war  for  reminders, 
but  every  people  will  be  immediately  confronted 


THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF   NATIONS     151 

by  the  economic  consequences  of  war — poverty,  high 
prices,  enhanced  taxation,  insecurity  of  employ- 
ment, and  industrial  disturbances  of  every  kind. 
Take  the  case  of  Great  Britain,  probably  the 
country  which  will  have  suffered  relatively  least  of 
the  belligerents,  in  life  and  limb,  in  material  losses, 
and  even  in  financial  damages.  Unless  a  peace- 
ful future  can  be  secured  along  the  lines  of  inter- 
national government  and  public  law,  the  people 
of  this  country  will,  whatever  shape  the  peace  may 
take,  be  immediately  confronted  by  the  almost 
certain  prospects  of  conscription,  with  a  Protec- 
tive system  which  shall  secure  as  far  as  possible 
a  self-sufficing  British  Empire.  The  immense 
expenses  of  British  militarism  upon  the  continental 
scale  added  to  our  navalism,  with  the  even 
greater  costs  and  damages  involved  by  the 
abandonment  of  our  Free  Trade  policy,  will 
fall  upon  the  country  when  it  is  already 
burdened  by  the  payment  of  the  interest 
of  war  loans  of  colossal  size,  and  is  struggling 
to  recover  from  the  industrial,  commercial,  and 
financial  dislocations  of  the  war  economy.  Such 
a  solution  will  be  a  thought -compeller  of  no 
ordinary  power.  Whatever  Government  is  in  office 
will  be  at  its  wits'  end  for  the  necessary  revenue, 
the  well-to-do  classes  of  former  days  will  be  faced 
by  demands  for  a  continuation  of  the  full  war 
taxes  in  times  of  peace,  while  the  endeavours  to 
impose  a  tariff  on  foods  and  other  necessaries 
upon  the  workers  in  a  depressed  and  disorganized 
labour  market  will  bring  revolution  nearer  to  our 
doors  than  it  has  been  for  three  centuries.  If  this 
is  the  solution  for  England,  it  will  be  incomparably 


152     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

more  dangerous  for  France,  for  Germany,  and  for 
the  other  belligerent  countries,  while  the  neutrals 
will  be  all  confronted  with  the  same  financial  and 
economic  problems  upon  a  reduced  scale,  with  the 
same  bottomless  pit  of  the  new  competition  in 
armaments  yawning  before  them.  The  path  to 
peace,  disarmament,  and  internationalism  will  be 
the  only  escape  from  ruin  and  revolution  for  all 
peoples  and  all  classes.  This  simple  fact  will  be 
the  education  of  the  political  parties  and  their 
leaders.  The  full  force  of  the  self -preserving 
instincts  of  every  class  will  for  the  first  time  be 
enlisted  on  the  side  of  peace.  The  period  of 
exhaustion  which  follows  the  war  will  afford  suffi- 
cient time  for  the  necessary  propaganda  and  dis- 
cussion that  must  precede  those  conferences  of 
the  nations  from  which  the  international  arrange- 
ments will  emerge.  Is  it  possible  that  the  people 
of  this  or  any  other  civilized  State  will  permit  their 
Government  to  send  representatives  to  these  con- 
ferences free  to  reject  all  proposals  for  securing 
future  peace  and  for  the  establishment  of  an 
effective  concert  of  nations?  At  a  time  when  the 
thoughts  and  eyes  of  all  the  world  are  fastened 
upon  the  performance  of  this  one  necessary  task 
will  the  obsolescent  traditions  and  secret  intrigues 
of  a  handful  of  rulers  and  diplomatists  be  allowed 
to  wreck  it?  The  pressure  of  the  popular  needs 
and  the  plain  penalties  for  their  denial  will  act 
as  midwife  to  this  new  birth  in  history.  The  body 
of  internationalism  will  be  born  of  this  travail  of 
the  peoples  in  this  the  ripeness  of  time.  In  coun- 
tries with  representative  Constitutions  the  pressure 
will  be  urged  along  the  regular  provided  channels  ; 


THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF   NATIONS      153 

where  no  such  avenues  are  open  an  impassioned 
public  sentiment,  shared  everywhere  by  the  great 
majority  of  all  social  classes,  will  bring  the  neces- 
sary compelling  power  to  bear  upon  their  rulers. 
There  is  nothing  mysterious  or  mystical  in  this 
conception  of  the  operation  of  the  political  forces 
which  will  bring  international  government.  They 
will  be  in  effect  a  continuation  and  a  redirection 
of  the  patriotic  passions  evoked  in  a  war  which 
to  each  belligerent  people  has  appeared  to  be  a 
struggle  for  the  preservation  of  its  national  exist- 
ence. Each  people  has  been  told  that  the  war 
"  forced  upon  it  "  was  "  a  war  to  end  war,"  and 
they  will  insist  on  the  fulfilment  of  the  prophecy. 
This  is  the  answer  I  would  give  to  the  timid 
cavillers  at  our  project  of  international  govern- 
ment. The  immensity  of  the  need  will  evoke  the 
necessary  will  and  the  faith  and  courage  to  essay 
the  large  experiment. 

After  all,  does  it  involve  so  great  an  act  of 
faith? 

All  nations  will  be  confronted  with  the  same 
alternatives,  military  domination  and  the  reign  of 
war,  or  internationalism  and  the  reign  of  law. 
Can  there  be  any  doubt  which  they  will  choose? 
What  they  are  asked  to  do  is  to  insist  that  the  same 
methods  already  applied  to  the  settlement  of  all 
issues  between  individuals,  groups  of  individuals, 
and  the  smaller  societies  of  cities  or  provinces 
shall  be  extended  to  the  case  of  the  larger  social 
units  called  States.  Is  the  proposal  to  make  this 
extension  so  obviously  chimerical? 

The  new  forces,  however,  must  be  expected  to 
work  unequally.  Some  nations  will  be  readier 


iS4     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

than  others,  and  bolder  in  the  steps  they  are  pre- 
pared to  take.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  some 
internationalists  look  to  a  little  group  of  advanced 
liberal  nations  to  take  the  lead.  If  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  the  United  States,  perhaps  with  Italy, 
the  Scandinavian  countries,  and  Holland  and 
Switzerland,  formed  the  nucleus  of  the  International 
League,  the  strength  of  its  position  would  be  such 
as  gradually  to  bring  other  nations  to  seek 
membership.  But  though  it  would  doubtless  be 
easier  to  set  on  foot  such  a  league  of  liberal 
States,  the  project  would  be  attended  by  heavy 
risks  and  disadvantages.  The  most  obvious  of 
these  risks  would  be  that  so  limited  an  alliance, 
instead  of  bringing  in  the  other  nations  one  by 
one,  might  lead  them  to  combine  in  another  group, 
so  restoring  all  the  dangers  of  a  Balance  of 
Power.  In  any  case,  so  long  as  such  powerful 
States  as  Russia,  Germany,  Japan,  were  not  in- 
cluded, the  aggressive  policy  they  would  be  capable 
of  wielding,  singly  or  in  combination,  would  com- 
pel the  Western  Alliance  to  maintain  so  powerful 
a  defensive  force  that  the  benefits  of  a  League  of 
Peace  would  be  most  inadequately  realized.  More- 
over, most  of  the  gravest  problems  of  international 
politics  would  remain  outside  the  area  of  pacific 
settlement.  Closer  regard  to  "  real  "  politics 
makes  it  evident  that,  unless  the  great  military 
Empires  of  Germany  and  Russia  are  members  of 
the  Confederation  at  the  outset,  the  security  for 
peace  and  for  a  reduction  of  armaments  will  be 
but  slight.  The  case  of  Germany  is,  of  course, 
the  more  critical,  and  that  for  two  reasons.  For 
the  Russian  Government,  though  based  upon 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF   NATIONS      155 

autocracy  and  with  only  the  bare  foundations  of 
a  popular  Constitution,  has  shown  both  at  The 
Hague  and  elsewhere  strong  leanings  towards  the 
realization  of  advanced  internationalism.  Whether 
as  a  recurring  idealist  streak  in  Tsardom  or  as  a 
broader  policy,  this  Russian  liberality  in  inter- 
national relations  is  not  to  be  ignored.  More- 
over, though  the  recent  association  with  France 
and  Great  Britain  can  easily  be  overrated  as  a 
pledge  of  future  friendship,  the  war-alliance  would 
certainly  render  it  unlikely  that  Russia  would 
remain  outside  a  peace-alliance  formed  soon  after 
the  terms  of  the  peace-settlement  are  reached.  But 
the  presence  of  Russia  in  an  alliance  in  which  the 
other  two  principal  European  members  were  her 
recent  war-allies  would  give  a  sinister  meaning  to 
a  professing  peace-alliance  if  Germany  remained 
outside.  It  would  have  the  appearance  of  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  war-alliance  against  Germany  and 
Austria,  and  the  course  of  events  would  tend  to 
convert  that  appearance  into  the  substance  of  the 
arrangement,  blasting  all  the  higher  hopes  and 
aspirations,  as  was  the  case  with  the  confederation 
of  a  century  ago,  formed  to  secure  the  peace  of 
Europe  after  the  Napoleonic  war. 

The  admission  of  Germany  to  membership  of 
the  League  is  a  prime  condition  of  its  success. 
No  victory  of  the  Allies  in  this  war,  however  signal, 
can  "  crush  "  German  militarism.  Only  by 
enlisting  Germany  as  an  equal  member  of  the 
new  international  order  will  it  be  possible  to 
achieve  this  object,  either  for  Germany  or  for 
Europe  at  large.  For  Germany  outside  the 
League,  though  reduced  to  temporary  impotence, 


i56     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

would  still  retain  its  military  spirit,  and  the 
Prussian  military  caste  would  be  all  the  better 
enabled  to  hold  their  prestige  and  once  again  to 
muster  the  entire  resources  of  the  nation  for  the 
struggle  against  the  ring  of  enemies  around  it. 
If,  as  is  obviously  true,  the  Germans  alone  can 
crush  German  militarism,  they  can  only  do  so  on 
condition  that  Germany  becomes  a  member  of  the 
League.  The  objection  that  no  confidence  could 
be  placed  in  Germany's  fidelity  to  her  pledges, 
however  valid,  cannot  outweigh  the  danger  of 
leaving  her  outside  to  plot  and  intrigue  for  the 
weakening  of  the  League  or  the  creation  of  a 
counter-League.  Inside  the  League  the  German 
nation  would  have  a  stronger  stimulus  than  any 
other  to  "  crush  "  that  Prussianism  which  had 
proved  so  much  more  disastrous  to  them  than  to 
their  enemies.  Those  who  feel  so  confident  that 
Germany  would  refuse  to  enter  such  a  League, 
however  broken  in  immediate  power,  ignore  the 
overwhelming  evidences  that  even  in  Germany  the 
people  at  large  were  goaded  into  militarism  and 
war  by  their  fears,  and  that  the  offensive  motives 
which  may  have  actuated  their  rulers  and  generals 
were  not  the  dominant  motives  of  the  German 
people.  It  is  important  that  these  considerations 
shall  be  duly  weighed  in  the  formulation  of  the 
terms  of  peace.  For  it  is  incomparably  better  for 
the  future  of  Europe  to  make  such  terms  as  are 
likely  to  incline  the  people  of  Germany  to  force 
their  Government  to  enter  the  Confederation  than 
to  impose  conditions  which,  by  feeding  a  lasting 
passion  of  revenge,  will  strengthen  the  hold  of 
Prussian  militarism  upon  the  Germans,  and  keep 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT   OF  NATIONS     157 

the  great  mid-European  nation  a  permanent  barrier 
to  a  peaceful  future. 

It  is,  indeed,  obvious  that,  if  public  law  is  to 
be  established  on  a  basis  of  international  govern- 
ment, not  only  the  present  belligerents  but  all 
the  Great  Powers  if  possible  should  be  brought 
in.  But  here  we  enter  at  once  a  field  of  wide 
divergences  of  opinion  and  of  sentiment.  So  far, 
we  have  treated  internationalism  as  if  it  were  a 
European  problem.  But  among  the  belligerents 
is  Japan,  which  will  necessarily  be  represented 
at  the  Peace  Conference  from  which  the  larger 
international  proposals  would  naturally  emanate, 
and  which  could  hardly  be  excluded  from  the 
subsequent  arrangements.  Indeed,  two  non- 
European  Powers  must  now  be  added  to  the  six 
European  which  have  hitherto  conventionally 
figured  as  the  Great  Powers,  viz.  Japan  and  the 
United  States.  From  discretion,  if  for  no  higher 
reason,  it  would  seem  important  to  secure,  if 
possible,  the  inclusion  of  these  non-European 
Powers.  Indeed,  all  the  deeper  considerations  of 
world-policy  which  we  have  already  invoked 
confirm  the  view  that  an  attempt  to  treat  Europe 
as  a  separate  political  system  would  be  mis- 
chievous. There  are,  of  course,  reasons  which 
might  conceivably  deter  both  non-European  Powers 
from  desiring  to  enter  such  an  international 
Government  as  we  have  indicated.  For  both  the 
United  States  and  Japan  stand  in  a  special  relation 
of  political  and  economic  influence  towards  great 
neighbouring  countries  which  are  upon  a  lower 
level  of  strength  and  development.  The  ill-defined 
Monroe  doctrine  has  made  some  recent  extensions 


158     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

which  are  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  formal 
independence  and  integrity  of  South  American 
States.  Might  not  the  Government  and  citizens 
of  the  United  States  have  qualms  lest  their  special 
claims  and  interests  upon  their  continent  might 
be  disregarded  by  the  instruments  of  an  impartial 
international  Government?  This  difficulty  might 
seem  graver  still  if  the  South  American  States 
themselves  were  admitted  as  equal  members  of 
the  international  society.  But  there  are  many 
grounds  for  thinking  that  the  presence  of  the 
United  States  is  as  essential  to  the  ultimate  success 
of  a  League  as  that  of  Germany  or  of  Great 
Britain.  Some  of  these  grounds  are  narrowly 
prudential.  If  the  United  States  were  not  included, 
her  political  and  economic  interests  would  of  neces- 
sity be  concentrated  more  and  more  upon  the 
American  continent,  and  a  new  and  injurious  signi- 
ficance might  come  to  attach  to  Canning's  famous 
saying  that  he  had  called  a  new  world  into  being 
in  order  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  old.  If  the 
United  States  were  left  to  form  a  separate  con- 
federation of  American  States,  although  amiable 
relations  might  eventually  be  established  between 
this  and  the  European  organization,  an  interim 
period  of  misunderstandings  and  suspicions  might 
greatly  impede  the  progress  of  disarmament  and 
the  security  of  peace.  But  there  are  broader  con- 
siderations likely  to  weigh  with  the  Government 
and  people  of  the  United  States  in  favour  of  par- 
ticipation in  an  international  alliance.  Her  internal 
development,  as  regards  industry  and  population, 
has  already  removed  her  from  the  category  of  new 
countries  content  with  the  simple  economy  of 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF  NATIONS     159 

bartering  their  surplus  of  foods  and  raw  materials 
against  the  finished  manufactured  products  of  older 
countries.  The  economic  status  of  the  United 
States  is  less  and  less  that  of  Canada  and  Argen- 
tina, more  and  more  that  of  Great  Britain,  Holland, 
or  Germany.  Her  merchants,  manufacturers,  and 
financiers  must  look  henceforth  to  compete  with 
Europeans  in  all  parts  of  the  world  for  the  sale 
of  their  manufactured  goods  and  for  the  invest- 
ment of  their  capital.  "  The  open  door  "  and  the 
world-politics  involved  in  that  phrase  must  count 
more  every  year  in  the  calculations  of  American 
statesmen  and  business  men.  Indeed,  it  is  already 
obvious  that  the  intelligence  of  America  has  firmly 
grasped  these  truths  of  her  new  situation,  and  that 
she  is  preparing  rapidly  to  recast  her  political 
ideas  and  valuations  in  accordance  with  the  re- 
quirements of  the  new  era.  Her  far-sighted 
business  men  perceive  that  the  great  economic 
future  of  the  country  depends  upon  ability  to 
compete  successfully  and  upon  a  large  scale  of 
enterprise  in  the  general  business  of  world- 
commerce  and  world-development.  They  will 
clearly  recognize  the  advantage  of  entering  a 
system  of  political  internationalism  designed  to 
secure  equality  of  economic  opportunities  for  all 
nations  and  an  impartial  equitable  settlement  of 
all  differences  that  may  arise.  For  after  a  brief 
temptation  to  try  the  dangerous  and  costly  path  of 
protectionist  Imperialism,  the  country  has  definitely 
rejected  this  policy.  No  large  trend  of  American 
opinion  favours  the  acquisition  of  colonies  with 
subject  races  and  the  swollen  militarism  and 
navalism  which  such  a  policy  evokes.  The  temper 


160     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

and  traditions  of  the  American  people  are  pacific, 
and  if  they  see  a  way  of  living  upon  terms  of 
security  and  justice  with  other  nations  they  will 
take  it.  The  lesson  of  this  European  outbreak 
in  its  reactions  upon  their  trade  and  politics  will 
dispose  them  more  strongly  to  this  pacific  course. 
For  the  peril  of  the  alternative  is  already  brought 
vividly  before  them,  not  only  in  trade  damage 
and  the  risks  which  a  neutral  suffers  of  being 
drawn  into  the  fray,  but  in  the  bold  endeavours 
of  the  militarists  in  their  midst  to  impose  their 
naval  and  military  projects  on  the  nation.  The 
only  effective  answer  to  this  attempt  is  inter- 
nationalism. For  it  is  no  more  possible  for  the 
United  States  to  hope  to  preserve  a  splendid  isola- 
tion in  the  future  than  for  Great  Britain.  Either, 
therefore,  she  must  succumb  to  the  demand  for 
powerful  defensive  forces  and  a  strong  foreign 
policy  or  she  must  come  into  the  International 
Society.  Most  of  her  leading  statesmen,  lawyers, 
and  publicists  have  not  hesitated  to  declare  for 
justice,  sanity,  and  internationalism.  Nor  have 
they  waited  for  this  war  to  avow  their  sentiments. 
The  public  opinion  of  educated  America  is  already 
strongly  organized  for  the  acceptance  of  inter- 
national ideals,  and  the  part  taken  by  American 
public  men,  both  at  The  Hague  and  elsewhere, 
in  urging  the  realization  of  these  ideals  has  been 
one  of  higher  faith  and  courage  than  that  of  any 
other  nation.  Finally,  there  is  the  consideration 
that  the  United  States  is  in  a  position  of  peculiar 
influence  and  responsibility  for  the  furtherance  of 
this  great  end.  The  greatest  of  the  neutral  Powers 
in  this  war,  it  must  fall  to  her,  if  not  indeed  to 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF   NATIONS     161 

take  the  formal  step  of  bringing  the  belligerents 
together  for  a  discussion  of  peace  terms,  at  any 
rate  to  exercise  a  strong  and  helpful  influence  in 
the  subsequent  policy  of  reconstruction.  Indeed, 
the  presence  in  the  conferences  of  the  one  Great 
Power  which  enters  without  bloodstained  hands 
and  with  feelings  inflamed  neither  by  triumph  nor 
bitterness  will  be  so  evidently  helpful  that  any 
endeavour  to  confine  the  settlement  within  the 
European  system  will  rightly  be  regarded  as  a 
wrecking  policy.  America,  alike  in  the  make-up 
of  her  population,  the  liberality  of  her  ideas,  and 
the  conscious  declaration  of  her  sympathies,  pos- 
sesses at  present  a  larger  measure  of  the  inter- 
national mind  than  any  other  nation,  and  since  she 
is  destined  to  play  a  growing  part  in  the  affairs 
of  the  world,  her  faith  and  courage  should  be 
great  assets  in  the  initial  work  of  laying  a  true 
foundation  of  international  institutions. 

The  first  aim  of  the  internationalists  might  be 
to  obtain  the  adhesion  to  their  main  proposals  of 
as  many  as  possible  among  the  eight  Great  Powers 
and  the  minor  European  States,  leaving  open  the 
question  of  the  immediate  or  the  later  accession 
of  the  other  States  which  are  recognized  as  entitled 
to  representation  at  the  Hague  Conferences,  or 
which  may  have  a  reasonable  claim  to  be  repre- 
sented there.  The  number  of  nations  entering  the 
international  experiment  at  the  outset  is  not  the 
prime  condition  of  success.  For  if  all,  or  nearly 
all,  the  great  civilized  nations  can  be  brought  in, 
the  actual  strength  and  the  prestige  of  inter- 
nationalism will  exert  an  educative  pressure  of 
constantly  increasing  strength  upon  the  peoples 

ii 


1 62  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

and  Governments  which  remain  outside.  Apart 
from  the  preliminary  sacrifice  of  false  national 
pride  involved  in  any  measure  of  internationalism, 
the  real  crux  consists  in  discovering  some  accept- 
able basis  of  the  representation  of  nations  in  the 
International  Council  and  its  instruments  of 
government.  Where  nations  come  together  in  a 
League  or  an  Alliance,  for  the  purposes  of  some 
closely  defined  common  or  mutual  services,  their 
action  has  been  that  of  equal  independent  units. 
Though  in  the  Conferences  which  such  arrange- 
ments involve  certain  of  the  signatory  Powers  have 
usually  arrogated  to  themselves  a  directing 
influence,  resting  in  the  last  resort  upon  superior 
size  and  strength,  the  formal  structure  and  pro- 
ceedings of  their  Conferences  do  not  commonly 
carry  evidence  of  such  discrimination.1  Even 
where  closer  and  more  permanent  relations  were 
planned  there  would  be  a  strong  disposition,  at 
any  rate  among  the  smaller  Powers,  to  insist  upon 
retaining  this  status  of  equality  and  its  implication 
of  independence.  However  large  the  powers 
accorded  to  the  federal  control  in  a  federation  of 
States,  equality  of  representation  might  be  regarded 
as  a  prescriptive  right.  To  transgress  this  usage 
and  to  insist  upon  some  other  basis  of  representa- 
tion, resting,  not  on  independent  sovereignty  but 
upon  some  measure  of  the  relative  importance  or 
competency  of  the  co-operating  Powers,  would  be 
likely  to  arouse  suspicion  and  a  fear  lest  what  in 

1  In  the  Conferences  of  the  "  Grand  Alliance  "  the  tendency, 
however,  of  a  little  inner  group,  shifting  in  composition,  to 
take  over  the  initiative  or  direction  and  to  form  separate  inner 
compacts  was  an  important  and  a  most  disturbing  one. 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT   OF   NATIONS     163 

its  first  intent  claimed  to  be  a  federation  of  States 
(a  Staaten-Bund)  should  turn  out  to  be  the  very 
different  structure  of  a  federal  State  (a  Bundes- 
Staat).  Yet  this  suspicion  and  this  fear  must  be 
firmly  faced  if  our  scheme  of  internationalism, 
upon  any  scale  of  efficiency,  is  to  be  realized.  For 
whatever  theoretical  validity  may  be  claimed  for 
the  view  that  all  States,  irrespective  of  size  or 
territory,  strength,  population,  or  civilized  status, 
ought  to  be  equally  represented  upon  the  Council 
of  Nations  and  its  Courts  and  Committees,  no  such 
international  arrangements  as  we  contemplate 
could  be  operated  upon  such  a  basis.  Nor  is  it 
reasonable  that  they  should.  For  this  doctrine  of 
absolute  equality  evidently  rests  upon  an  over- 
stressing  of  that  very  factor  of  absolute  State  inde- 
pendence which  it  is  the  purpose  of  our  policy 
to  moderate  and  to  overrule.  Though  the  initial 
coming  together  for  the  establishment  of  our 
international  arrangements  is  an  act  of  separate 
sovereignty,  a  voluntary  contract  between  equals, 
a  certain  cession  of  that  very  equality  for  future 
purposes  of  co-operation  is  indispensable  to  the 
realization  of  these  purposes.  Now,  in  the  case 
of  a  number  of  nations  entering  an  enduring  com- 
pact to  undertake  in  common  the  important 
deliberative,  judicial,  and  executive  functions 
ascribed  to  them  in  the  schemes  we  have  dis- 
cussed, absolute  equality  of  representation  would 
be  an  unsound  and  unreasonable  basis.  That 
Denmark  or  Servia,  not  to  mention  Monaco  and 
San  Marino,  should  have  precisely  the  same  number 
of  voices  in  the  Council  as  Great  Britain,  Russia, 
or  the  United  States  could  hardly  be  advocated, 


1 64     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

even  by  the  stoutest  champions  of  small 
nationalities.  It  may  perhaps  be  said  that 
international  justice  and  wisdom  is  as  important 
for  a  small  as  for  a  great  people,  and  that  if 
small  nations  are  liable  to  be  outvoted  by  big 
nations  with  more  representatives,  the  tyranny  of 
arms  which  they  have  often  suffered  in  the  past 
will  only  be  replaced  by  a  constitutional  tyranny 
equally  objectionable.  But  there  is  no  substance 
in  this  plea.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  not  true  that 
equal  representation  tends  to  secure  for  any  little 
nation  juster  or  wiser  international  treatment. 
Quite  the  contrary.  Equal  representation  will  con- 
tinually keep  alive  and  emphasize  the  national 
as  distinguished  from  the  international  point  of 
view,  and  tend  to  introduce  a  group-nationalism 
into  the  deliberations  and  the  policy  of  the 
Council.  The  big  nations,  with  their  own  axes 
to  grind,  would  be  continually  angling  and 
intriguing  for  the  support  of  a  sufficient  number 
of  small  States  to  carry  through  their  particular 
projects,  as  was  the  case  with  Prussia  and  Austria 
in  the  German  Confederation  as  established  by 
the  Congress  of  Vienna.  Genuinely  international 
policy  requires  that  the  interests,  capacities,  and 
needs,  not  of  sovereign  States,  but  of  peoples, 
shall  prevail.  Now,  it  is  idle  to  pretend  that 
number  of  population  is  not  a  relevant  considera- 
tion where  the  interests  of  peoples  are  at  stake,  or 
that  the  welfare  of  Montenegro  is  as  important, 
in  the  human  sense,  as  that  of  Russia.  Even  if 
our  international  policy  were  destined  to  have  no 
more  unity  of  purpose  than  was  attainable  by  the 
respective  pulls  of  its  constituent  national  units, 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF  NATIONS      165 

it  would  be  better  that  the  representation  of  these 
units  should  be  weighted  by  some  populational 
allowance.  For,  putting  the  matter  at  its  worst, 
it  would  be  better  for  the  interests  of  the  great 
nations  to  prevail  than  for  those  of  the  small 
nations,  not  because  a  great  nation  is  more  likely 
to  be  in  the  right,  but  because  it  is  better  for  a 
larger  number  of  human  beings  to  have  their  way 
than  for  a  smaller.  But  the  case  for  population 
representation  is,  of  course,  far  stronger,  if  we 
are  entitled  to  assume  some  genuine  sense  of  justice 
and  some  real  regard  for  the  good  of  the  society 
of  nations  in  the  deliberations  and  the  policy  of 
our  International  Council.  For  if,  as  I  should 
insist,  the  success  of  this  arrangement  depends 
upon  getting  together  in  the  Council  the  ablest, 
most  experienced,  and  most  public-spirited  men 
which  the  nations  can  furnish,  it  would  be  the 
extremity  of  folly  to  take  precisely  the  same 
number  from  each  nation.  It  may,  indeed,  well 
be  the  case  that  some  smaller  nation,  such  as 
Holland  or  Switzerland  by  reason  of  its  high 
standard  of  education  or  other  advantages  of 
position,  contains  a  much  larger  quota  of  men  fitted 
for  such  international  service  than  some  countries 
with  a  far  larger  population.  That  may  be  a 
valid  ground  for  qualifying  any  populational  basis 
by  some  other  tests  of  fitness.  But  it  is  not  a 
reason  for  ignoring  population  as  a  determinant 
factor  in  the  problem.  Other  things  equal  (i.e. 
education,  industrial  status,  geographical  position, 
etc.),  a  country  with  a  larger  population  will  be 
in  a  position  to  make  a  larger  contribution  of 
suitable  men  to  our  International  Council  the 


1 66  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

a  country  with  a  smaller  population.  Indeed,  the 
qualitative  economy  of  personnel  is  so  obvious  that 
I  should  not  have  laboured  it  thus  far  were  it  not 
desirable  to  show  that  in  this  instance  reason  and 
justice  are  on  the  side  of  the  great  battalions. 
For  this  purpose  I  retain  to  the  last  what  the 
practical  man  will  regard  as  an  all-sufficient  argu- 
ment, viz.  the  evident  impossibility  of  getting  the 
Great  Powers  into  any  sort  of  international 
arrangement  in  which  their  "  greatness  "  was  not 
recognized.  Though  pride  and  selfishness  may 
enter  into  this  claim  for  larger  representation,  that 
claim  is  not  intrinsically  unjust  or  unreasonable. 
The  aggregate  of  welfare  contained  in  the  great 
nations  is  a  greater  human  value  than  that  con- 
tained in  the  small  nations,  and  its  capacity  for 
international  service  is  also  greater. 

Though  it  is  possible  that  small  nations,  partly 
from  pride  of  nationality,  partly  from  genuine 
fears,  may  at  first  look  askance  at  proposals  for 
a  Council  in  which  a  handful  of  Great  Powers 
may  appear  to  be  supreme,  and  may  even  decline 
to  enter  into  what  they  may  consider  as  a  spider's 
web,  I  think  that  reflection  will  wear  down  this 
early  attitude  of  suspicion  and  show  them  that 
there  is  more  safety  inside  than  outside  this  society 
of  nations.  For  if  there  were  a  general  disposition 
on  the  part  of  Great  Powers  to  "  domineer  "  in 
the  International  Council  and  to  override  the  equal 
rights  of  small  nations,  would  not  the  latter  be 
in  a  far  stronger  position  if  they  organized  a 
constitutional  resistance  as  members  of  the  League 
or  Federation  than  if  they  permitted  the  justice  of 
their  case  to  go  by  default  and  trusted  to  an  armed 


THE  SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF   NATIONS      167 

defence  foredoomed  to  failure.  But  the  supposition 
of  such  a  general  policy  of  oppression  on  the  part 
of  Great  Powers,  operative  so  as  to  unite  them 
against  a  small  nation  or  a  group  of  small  nations, 
in  any  given  issue,  is  itself  unwarranted.  On  the 
contrary,  history  shows  that  the  mere  "  sympathy  " 
of  greatness  does  not  keep  Great  Powers  in  accord, 
or  lead  them  to  support  the  encroachments  of 
one  among  their  number.  Fear,  jealousy,  and 
suspicion  have  ever  been  more  rife  among  great 
than  among  little  Powers,  and  the  notion  that  the 
party  politics  of  internationalism  would  run  on 
mere  lines  of  size  has  no  ground  in  the  realities 
of  the  modern  situation.  A  Holland,  Switzerland, 
or  Poland  would  be  far  securer  of  its  rights  if  it 
had  representatives  within  the  Council  and  a  right 
of  appeal  to  the  International  Court  than  if  it 
hugged  a  self-centred  and  necessarily  precarious 
policy  of  isolation.  Such  considerations  would, 
I  think,  certainly  prevail  to  bring  in  the  smaller 
European  nations. 

Having  once  accepted  the  general  principle  of 
a  representation  roughly  proportionate  to  the  size 
and  population  of  the  constituent  nations,  no 
present  purpose  is  served  by  endeavouring  to  work 
out  any  close  basis  for  such  representation.1  At 
the  outset  of  the  experiment  such  a  question  would 
evidently  be  one  for  compromise  and  special 
arrangement  rather  than  for  a  rigorous  logic  of 
proportion.  A  good  deal  would  depend  upon  the 
contemplated  size  of  the  International  Council,  and 

1  The  representation  adopted  for  the  International  Prize  Court 
at  The  Hague,  though  hardly  acceptable  as  it  stands,  would  form 
a  serviceable  starting-point  for  such  an  inquiry. 


1 68  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

this  in  its  turn  would  hinge  partly  upon  the  number 
of  the  constituent  nations,  partly  upon  the  scope 
of  the  international  Government.  If  the  more 
modest,  but  to  my  mind  less  effective,  experiment 
of  a  simple  League  of  Peace  were  adopted, 
a  small,  compact  Council  of  nominees  of  the 
respective  Governments  would  probably  be  formed. 
For  any  special  labours  of  inquiry  such  a  Council 
might  co-opt  the  services  of  experts,  so  keeping 
the  dimensions  of  the  international  body  such  as 
to  facilitate  close  personal  intercourse  and  under- 
standing. In  such  a  case  it  would  probably  suffice 
if  each  of  the  Great  Powers  appointed,  say,  three 
representatives  and  the  smaller  Powers  one  or  two. 
If,  however,  the  international  experiment 
were  made  upon  the  wider  basis,  provision 
should  be  made  for  a  more  generous  repre- 
sentation, so  that  each  nation  might  have  upon 
the  International  Council  some  fairly  adequate 
reflection  of  its  various  capabilities  and  interests. 
Although  it  would  be  impossible  for  such  a  body, 
in  effect  an  International  Parliament,  to  prescribe 
the  method  of  election  or  appointment  to  be 
adopted  by  the  several  nations,  those  committed 
in  their  national  affairs  to  the  principle  of  popular 
election  would  probably  desire  to  find  some  method 
by  which  this  democratic  principle  might  be  ex- 
tended to  the  wider  area  of  government.  If  direct 
popular  election  of  the  national  representatives  for 
the  International  Council  were  deemed  impractic- 
able or  inconvenient,  some  mode  of  selection 
through  an  electoral  college,  partly  elected  by 
localities,  partly  by  professions,  trades,  and  labour 
unions,  might  be  substituted.  In  the  more  liberal 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT   OF   NATIONS     169 

Western  nations,  at  any  rate,  it  would  seem  most 
desirable  that  the  type  of  man  chosen  for  a  repre- 
sentative should  be  drawn,  not  from  the  diplomatic 
or  distinctively  official  class,  but  from  those  who 
have  risen  to  public  influence  and  eminence  by 
practical  sagacity  and  experience  in  the  handling 
of  affairs.  The  able  parliamentarian  rather  than 
the  expert  administrator  is  the  fit  representative 
of  a  people  that  desires  to  have  the  breath  of 
popular  self-government  play  through  the  new 
international  institutions.  For  the  chief  peril  con- 
fronting such  an  experiment  at  the  outset  will  be 
the  endeavour  of  the  diplomatic  caste  of  each 
nation  to  capture  the  national  representation,  and 
to  introduce  the  poison  of  the  old  statecraft  into 
the  new  international  system.  This  peril  can  best 
be  met  by  the  resolute  determination  of  the  demo- 
cratic peoples  to  appoint  as  their  representatives 
men  untainted  by  the  theories  and  the  practices 
which  have  fostered  ill-will  and  dissensions  among 
nations  in  the  past.  The  presence  of  such  men 
upon  the  Council,  imbued  with  the  true  spirit  of 
internationalism,  will  be  required  to  counteract  the 
machinations  of  the  representatives  of  less  en- 
lightened Powers,  who  may  be  disposed  in  the 
initial  stage  of  the  experiment  to  assume  the 
position  of  a  "  State's  right  "  party,  suspicious  and 
perhaps  obstructive  of  the  wider  functions,  upon 
the  successful  performance  of  which  the  progress 
of  internationalism  depends. 

The  considerations  here  adduced  have  a  bearing 
upon  a  practical  issue  of  great  importance,  viz. 
the  part  to  be  taken  by  the  existing  structure  of 
the  Hague  Tribunals  and  Conventions  in  our  larger 


170    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

schemes  of  international  government.  Would  it 
not  be  best  to  build  upon  the  actual  foundations 
of  arbitral  and  judicial  procedure  and  the  delibera- 
tive and  quasi-legislative  bodies  represented  by 
the  Hague  Congresses,  Conventions,  and  Courts? 
If  more  continuity,  larger  powers,  and  stronger 
sanctions  could  be  secured  for  this  international 
instrument,  it  would  appear  a  truly  sound  economy 
to  use  it  for  the  larger  work  of  international 
government.  It  is  but  the  shallowest  and  most 
ignorant  criticism  which  regards  the  present  war 
and  the  breakdown  of  international  laws  and  con- 
ventions it  has  exhibited  as  a  testimony  to  the 
failure  and  futility  of  Hague  pacifism.  For  no 
body  of  men  recognized  so  clearly  the  insufficiency 
of  existing  rules  and  sanctions  of  international 
law  to  secure  peace  as  those  who  have  been  closely 
associated  with  the  conferences  and  constructive 
proposals  of  The  Hague.  Though  the  external 
and  the  psychological  conditions  will  be  greatly 
changed  when  Europe  is  once  again  upon  a  peace 
basis,  it  would  be  a  grave  error  to  ignore  the 
important  contribution  which  the  experience  of  The 
Hague  can  make  towards  the  solution  of  the 
problems  of  international  relations  that  will  burst 
with  novel  force  upon  the  mind  of  the  politicians 
and  citizens  of  every  civilized  country.  At  The 
Hague  there  exists  something  more  than  the  rudi- 
ments of  an  international  judicial  and  legislative 
system,  and  on  the  face  of  things  it  would  seem 
more  reasonable  to  develop  this  system  and  to 
endow  it  with  the  larger  executive  powers  that 
will  be  needed  than  either  to  erect  a  brand-new 
edifice,  or  merely  to  utilize  the  Hague  Courts  for 


THE   SOCIAL  CONTRACT  OF   NATIONS     171 

the  arbitral  and  judicial  work  delegated  to  them 
by  a  Council  which,  neither  in  its  constitution 
nor  in  its  place  of  meeting,  preserves  a  continuity 
with  the  earlier  experiment  in  internationalism. 

There  are,  however,  as  our  discussion  has 
already  indicated,  grave  difficulties  to  be  en- 
countered in  moulding  the  existing  constitution  of 
the  Hague  Congresses  and  Courts  into  the  form 
which  seems  essential  to  the  success  of  our  larger 
scheme.  The  forty-four  States  represented  at  The 
Hague  meet  on  a  basis  of  absolute  equality  and 
complete  independence  :  no  decision  of  a  majority, 
however  large,  is  binding  on  a  minority,  however 
small,  and  there  is  no  cession  to  the  international 
assembly  of  any  power  by  the  several  States.  To 
convert  this  voluntary  gathering  of  equal  Powers, 
each  retaining  its  unfettered  liberty  in  dealing  with 
every  practical  proposal  for  co-operative  action, 
into  the  International  Council  we  have  sketched, 
might  prove  impracticable.  Indeed,  a  complete 
conversion,  in  the  sense  of  an  incorporation  of  the 
forty-four  States  in  our  new  plan  of  international 
government,  would  be  virtually  impossible.  For 
it  might  be  taken  as  axiomatic  that  the  Great 
Powers  would  not  enter  the  close  organic  union 
here  proposed  if  their  influence  and  will  were  liable 
to  be  overborne  by  the  numerical  strength  and 
voting  power  of  a  large  number  of  relatively  small 
and  backward  States,  including  those  of  Asia  and 
South  America.  On  the  other  hand,  amour  propre 
and  possibly  a  sense  of  danger  would  certainly 
deter  some  of  the  smaller  States  from  accepting 
a  deposition  from  their  existing  equal  status  at  The 
Hague.  If,  therefore,  the  Hague  Congress  were 


172  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

taken  as  a  starting-point,  a  satisfactory  Council 
could  only  be  formed  by  the  voluntary  agreement 
of  a  number  of  States  transforming  themselves  into 
an  inner  league,  with  a  separate  proportional  repre- 
sentation and  a  constitution  of  their  own.  The  con- 
tinuity of  a  Council  thus  formed  with  the  machinery 
of  The  Hague  would  be  very  slight,  and  its  ability 
or  willingness  to  utilize  or  expand  even  the  existing 
Courts  (upon  which  nations  not  included  in  this 
league  would  have  representatives)  would  be  very 
doubtful.  It  is  thus  evident  that  a  great  and 
difficult  transformation  would  be  necessary  to 
accommodate  the  machinery  of  The  Hague  to  the 
larger  work  of  international  government.  If,  how- 
ever, these  difficulties  can  be  surmounted,  it  would 
be  highly  desirable  to  secure  the  formal  and  the 
real  advantages  which  continuity  with  these  early 
experiments  in  internationalism  would  afford. 

In  conclusion,  one  important  counsel  of  dis- 
cretion deserves  mention.  In  order  to  abate  as 
much  as  possible  the  suspicions  or  fears  which 
may  be  entertained  by  certain  States  whose  early 
presence  on  the  Council  is  urgently  desirable,  the 
right  of  withdrawal  or  secession  after  reasonable 
notice  should  be  specifically  recognized  in  the  terms 
of  any  treaty  or  convention  by  which  the  inter- 
national arrangements  are  brought  into  being. 
Nations  should  be  entirely  free  to  withdraw,  pro- 
vided that  the  terms  of  notice  are  such  as  to  pre- 
clude any  nation  from  withdrawing  in  order  to  avoid 
the  fulfilment  of  her  treaty  obligations  in  respect 
of  any  particular  matter  regarding  which  her 
conduct  might  be  in  question. 


CHAPTER    XI 
THE    INTERNATIONAL    MIND 

STARTING  from  the  assumption  that  it  was  urgently 
desirable  for  nations  to  try  to  establish  such 
relations  with  one  another  as  may  avert  the  likeli- 
hood of  war,  secure  a  sensible  relief  in  the  burden 
of  armaments,  and  provide  some  better  way  of 
settling  differences  and  enabling  nations  to  co- 
operate for  common  purposes,  I  have  set  forth 
a  series  of  proposals  in  an  order  of  increasing 
dimensions  and  complexity.  None  of  these  pro- 
posals strictly  belongs  to  the  terms  of  peace  which 
will  conclude  this  war,  though  the  meeting  of 
Powers  to  settle  and  to  sign  the  Peace  Treaty 
may  take  the  initial  steps  towards  the  establish- 
ment of  some  more  permanent  arrangements  for 
securing  future  peace. 

But  since  the  feasibility  of  all  the  proposals 
we  discuss  involves,  as  we  have  seen,  the  voluntary 
co-operation  of  leading  members  of  the  European 
groups  which  have  just  issued  from  a  deadly  con- 
flict, the  terms  and  spirit  of  the  settlement  are 
of  vital  importance.  The  vanquished  party  must, 
of  course,  suffer  heavily  in  terms  of  blood  and 
money,  in  the  restitution  of  ravished  territory,  and 

in    the    temporary    loss    of    military    and    naval 

173 


174    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

strength.  Such  are  the  normal  fortunes  of  an 
unsuccessful  war.  A  nation  thus  beaten  does  not 
naturally  harbour  lasting  resentment  against  the 
conquerors,  or  cherish  projects  of  revenge.  Some 
measure  of  humiliation  is  necessarily  inflicted  upon 
its  military  and  its  ruling  classes  actively  respon- 
sible for  the  terrible  sufferings  of  their  people, 
but  the  spirit  of  the  people  suffers  no  such 
embitterment.  Very  different,  however,  would  be 
the  result  of  a  policy  of  dismemberment,  or  of 
any  attempt  permanently  to  cripple  the  economic 
or  even  the  military  recovery  of  the  nation.  History 
teaches  no.  clearer  lesson  than  the  folly  and 
futility  of  such  a  vindictive  policy.  But  I  am  here 
only  concerned  with  its  most  deplorable  result. 
The  dismemberment  or  national  degradation  of 
Germany  would  blast  all  hopes  of  a  pacific  future 
for  the  world  by  planting  a  permanent  danger 
zone  in  the  centre  of  Europe,  which  would  keep 
that  quarter  of  the  globe  an  armed  camp  and  a 
perpetual  area  of  intrigue.  Complete  victory  might 
enable  the  Allies  for  a  time  to  impose  rigorous 
limits  upon  German  militarism.  But  history  shows 
the  ultimate  futility  and  mischief  of  such  a  policy. 
It  fosters  rancour  and  revenge  in  the  subject  nation, 
obliges  the  dominant  nations  to  maintain  strong 
forces  and  incessant  vigilance,  and  ensures  an  out- 
break on  a  favourable  opportunity.  Herein  lies 
the  all -importance  of  a  settlement  based,  not  upon 
short-range  military  expediency  but  upon  a  far- 
sighted  and  comprehensive  statesmanship,  having 
due  regard  to  the  reactions  of  the  settlement  upon 
the  larger  constructive  policy  of  internationalism. 
But  given  these  preliminary  conditions  for  our 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  175 

experiments  towards  international  government,  how 
far  is  it  feasible  and  desirable  to  seek  to  go? 
The  questions  of  feasibility  and  desirability  are 
not  identical.  Many  who  would  desire  to  take 
the  most  advanced  of  our  proposals,  could  they 
persuade  themselves  of  its  feasibility,  are  deterred 
even  from  discussing  it,  for  fear  that  such  discus- 
sion may  discredit  their  advocacy  of  some  smaller 
proposal  which  they  consider  to  be  really  prac- 
ticable. But  I  submit  that  at  the  present  stage 
of  consideration  we  should  be  wise  to  claim  a 
larger  liberty  than  may  be  possible  later  on  when 
the  issue  becomes  one  of  immediate  politics. 

The  various  proposals  we  have  examined  are  not 
clearly  distinct  from  one  another.  They  sometimes 
overlap  and  sometimes  receive  special  enlargements 
in  the  hands  of  particular  advocates.  But  in  general 
they  fall  under  three  categories.  First  come  those 
based  upon  the  narrow  "  practical  "  suggestion  that 
States  shall  band  together  to  give  mutual 
guarantees  against  all  wars.  Provisions  for 
settling  disputes  by  arbitral  or  other  means 
are  sometimes  added.  But  they  remain  subsidiary 
to  the  "  stop-war  "  motive.  Next  come  the  pro- 
posals primarily  concerned  with  methods  and 
instruments  of  conciliation  and  of  arbitration, 
based  primarily  upon  appeals  to  reason,  the  sense 
of  justice,  and  public  opinion.  Some  of  these 
proposals  contain  material  guarantees  for  the  per- 
formance of  certain  undertakings,  but  they  do  not 
rest  upon  a  binding  prohibition  of  all  war.  The 
third  class  of  proposals  aims  at  an  agreement  of 
Powers  to  establish  an  international  government 
by  means  of  a  permanent  representative  Inter- 


1 76     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

national  Council  exercising  powers  of  arbitration 
and  conciliation,  with  executive  authority  to  enforce 
arbitral  or  judicial  awards  and  decisions  of  the 
Council,  and  to  repress  attacks  made  by  any  of 
the  treaty-Powers  upon  any  other  treaty-Power, 
or  by  any  outside  Power  upon  any  of  the  treaty - 
Powers.  Though  the  first  object  of  this  inter- 
national Government  would  be  the  security  of  peace 
and  the  maintenance  of  existing  public  law,  the 
evolution  of  events  in  international  relations  would 
require  that  certain  prescribed  legislative  powers 
should  be  conferred  upon  the  Government  for  the 
improved  co-operation  of  nations  in  all  activities 
in  which  their  common  interests  are  involved.  If 
the  public  law  of  nations  is  ever  to  be  set  upon 
the  same  secure  basis  as  the  municipal  law  of 
every  civilized  State,  some  such  formal  inter- 
national Legislature  as  is  here  contemplated  must 
be  brought  into  being. 

Now,  my  argument  has  evidently  been  addressed 
to  persuade  readers  to  direct  their  hopes  and  efforts 
to  the  attainment  of  the  most  advanced  of  these 
positions,  chiefly  because  the  less  advanced  posi- 
tions, though  perhaps  more  easily  attainable,  do 
not  contain  effective  guarantees  of  peace  or  furnish 
sufficient  motives  to  secure  an  early  or  a  lasting 
reduction  of  armaments.  Indeed,  in  view  of  the 
evident  ineffectiveness  of  these  positions,  I  even 
doubt  whether  they  can  rightly  be  considered  more 
attainable.  For  when  the  political  mind  of  the 
nation  is  fairly  at  grips  with  the  situation  I  am 
disposed  to  think  that  it  will  brush  aside  all  more 
timid  and  tentative  devices  as  flimsy  barriers 
against  a  sudden  onrush  of  the  war  spirit,  and, 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  177 

taking  for  its  indispensable  test  the  effectiveness 
of  guarantees,  will  make  for  the  bolder  policy  of 
international  government. 

But  it  is  well  to  face  the  immense  difficulties 
which  beset  the  path  of  those  who  work  towards 
the  attainment  even  of  the  least  advanced  posi- 
tion. The  present  intellectual  atmosphere  is  one 
of  profound  scepticism.  All  the  forces  of  reason, 
justice,  goodwill,  and  common  interest,  upon 
which  most  men  had  relied  as  efficient  brakes 
upon  the  war-chariot,  have  ignominiously  failed. 
The  complex  informal  web  of  international  rela- 
tions through  commerce  and  finance  has  proved 
as  feeble  a  defence  of  peace  as  the  more  formal 
bonds  of  treaty  and  of  international  law.  How, 
in  the  face  of  this  collapse  of  all  pacific  forces 
and  arrangements,  can  we  honestly  expect  to  attain 
security  by  any  international  agreement  or  any 
system  of  "  paper  "  guarantees?  Each  nation  in 
the  future,  more  evidently  even  than  in  the  past, 
must  trust  to  its  own  strong  right  hand  and  to 
such  comrades  in  arms  as  are  bound  to  it  by 
common  fears  and  common  enmities  1 

This  very  natural  scepticism  of  all  peace 
arrangements  on  the  part  of  "  the  practical  man  " 
is  the  immediate  barrier.  Its  "  nothing-can-be- 
done  "  attitude  serves  to  paralyse  thought.  Nor 
is  it  possible  by  mere  argument  to  break  through 
this  incredulity.  One  can  only  trust  that  when 
the  "  practical  man  "  realizes  the  full  material1  and 
moral  costs  of  his  counsel  of  despair  he  will  bestir 
himself  to  find  some  way  of  avoiding  payment. 
He  will  then  discover  the  necessity  of  moving 
along  some  such  paths  of  business  arrangements 

12 


178    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

as  we  have  sketched,  and  will  insist  upon  applying 
with  rigour  the  test  of  effective  guarantees. 

But  the  naive  scepticism  of  the  man  in  the 
street  is  fortified  among  the  educated  classes  by 
two  types  of  objection  to  all  large  schemes  of 
international  arrangements  which  demand  fuller 
consideration. 

The  first  consists  in  the  conscious  or  unconscious 
acceptance  of  a  half -legal,  half -philosophical  theory 
of  the  National  State  as  the  final  stage  in  the 
process  of  social  evolution.  The  juridical  concep- 
tion of  absolute  independence  and  sovereignty  for 
the  State  is  supported  on  the  side  of  social 
philosophy  by  the  doctrine  that  "  consciousness  of 
kind,"  and  the  community  of  experience  necessary 
for  effective  realization  of  common  purposes,  are 
confined  within  the  limits  of  the  nation.1  Thus 
no  reliable  basis  for  effective  inter-State  or  inter- 
national co-operation  is  furnished  by  the  actual 
experience  of  life.  The  national  State,  being  thus 
the  largest  type  of  social  grouping,  cannot  rightly 
enter  into  any  permanently  valid  engagements,  with 
other  States  that  impair  its  complete  sovereignty. 
The  State  in  effect  is  a  moral  absolute.  Applied 
with  logical  rigour,  this  conception  of  the  State 
carries  with  it  that  domination  over  individual  lives, 
and  that  dispensation  from  all  external  duties  or 
obligations,  which  we  are  discovering  to  be  the 
inspiring  genius  of  the  German  "  Real-Politik." 
In  this  discovery  we  are  mistaken.  Germany, 
indeed,  among  modern  States  has  carried  farthest 
in  theory  and  in  practice  the  doctrine  of  the  supre- 

1  See  Bosanquet's  "  Theory  of  the  State,"  and  Giddings'  "  The 
Principles  of  Sociology." 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  179 

macy  of  the  State  over  the  person  of  its  citizens. 
But,  as  regards  the  relation  of  the  State  to  other 
States,  though  German  historians,  philosophers,  and 
statesmen  have  formulated  the  absolutist  doctrine 
with  more  rigour,  they  have  not  invented  it.  Its 
practical  implication  that  any  action  may  be  justi- 
fied by  "  necessity  "  or  "  reason  of  state  "  was 
formulated  by  Macchiavelli,  by  Hobbes,  and  by 
a  whole  series  of  British,  French,  and  Italian 
political  thinkers.  Everything  we  are  condemning 
in  Treitschke  as  a  specifically  German  vice  of 
thought  is  old  as  the  hills  alike  for  theory  and 
for  practice.  A  single  illustration  may  serve  to 
make  this  clear.  Nothing  more  shocked  "  the 
conscience  of  the  civilized  world  "  in  the  conduct 
of  this  war  than  the  German  contention  that  the 
"  necessity  "  of  her  situation  warranted  her 
brutal  assault  upon  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Yet 
our  sudden,  unprovoked  attack  upon  Copenhagen 
in  1806  without  declaring  war  was  justified  by 
our  Government  of  that  day  in  language  almost 
identical  with  that  employed  last  year  by  the 
German  Chancellor.  It  ran  as  follows  : — 

Royal  Proclamation.  While  he  [the  King]  laments  the  cruel 
necessity  which  has  obliged  him  to  have  recourse  to  acts  of 
hostility  against  a  nation  with  which  it  was  His  Majesty's  most 
earnest  desire  to  have  established  the  relations  of  common 
interest  and  alliance,  His  Majesty  feels  confident  that  in  the 
eyes  of  Europe  and  the  world  the  justification  of  his  conduct 
will  be  found  in  the  commanding  and  indispensable  duty, 
paramount  to  all  others  among  the  obligations  of  a  sovereign, 
of  providing  while  there  was  yet  time,  for  the  immediate  security 
of  his  people. 

In    a    word,    Salus    reipnblicce    suprema    lex,    a 
doctrine  which   is   the   negation  of  all   law. 


i8o    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

It  is  this  false,  immoral  doctrine,  inimical  to 
humanity,  that  a  State  is  an  absolute  morally  self- 
contained  being,  living  in  the  world  with  other 
similar  beings,  but  owing  no  duties  to  them  and 
bound  by  no  obligations  that  it  may  not  break 
on  the  plea  of  necessity,  which  is  the  fundamental 
vice  embedded  in  that  foreign  policy  the  fruits 
of  which  we  are  now  reaping.  If  nations  were 
in  point  of  fact  self-contained,  materially  and 
morally,  living  in  splendid  or  even  in  brutish 
isolation,  this  doctrine  of  States  or  Governments 
might  be  tenable.  But  they  are  not.  On  the 
contrary,  their  intercourse  and  interdependence  for 
every  kind  of  purpose,  economic,  social,  scientific, 
recreative,  spiritual,  grows  continually  closer. 
Hence  the  doctrine  of  State  sovereignty  and  in- 
dependence grows  continually  falser.  The  facts 
of  modern  life  force  nations  to  come  into  close  and 
frequent  relations.  But  statecraft  provides  no 
intellectual  or  moral  basis  for  these  relations. 
International  law  and  usage  are  indeed  experi- 
ments towards  such  a  basis,  but,  possessing  neither 
authoritative  origin  nor  effective  guarantee,  they 
are  liable  at  any  time  to  be  thrown  aside  by  the 
dominance  of  "  State  necessity."  But  the  in- 
humanity of  foreign  policy  is  not  confined  to 
this  obsolete  conception  of  the  moral  sovereignty 
and  independence  of  the  State.  It  is  expressed 
with  equal  significance  in  the  mode  of  envisaging 
the  State  which  prevails  in  foreign  policy  and  in 
diplomatic  intercourse.  States  are  represented  in 
their  capacity  of  "  Powers."  This  reduces  the 
absolutism  of  the  State  to  terms  of  military  force. 
It  is  the  literal  rendering  of  that  doctrine  of  "  the 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  181 

will  to  power  "  which  we  affect  to  believe  that 
the  teaching  of  Nietzsche  has  imposed  on  Germany. 
So  long  as  diplomatic  intercourse  is  conducted 
between  "  Powers  "  it  is  difficult  to  get  on  to 
any  plane  of  human  friendliness  or  common 
purpose.  How  can  it  be  expected  that  Foreign 
Ministers  and  Ambassadors,  drawn  almost  exclu- 
sively by  close  selection  from  the  fighting,  ruling 
caste  of  their  respective  nations,  and  inured  to 
traditions  of  military  prowess  and  personal 
dominion,  should  be  able  or  willing  to  release 
themselves  from  the  clutches  of  the  "  Power  "  con- 
cept which  is  enshrined  in  every  official  act  they 
perform  or  document  they  sign? 

The  significance  of  words,  especially  in  the  art 
of  diplomacy,  is  indeed  proverbial.  When  nations 
enter  a  formal  agreement  with  one  another,  they 
are  "  the  Signatory  Powers."  When  they  deign, 
for  the  nonce,  to  quit  their  splendid  isolation,  they 
form  "  a  Concert  of  the  Powers."  Some  of  them 
at  any  given  epoch  are  "  Great  Powers  " — and 
their  greatness  is  the  measure  of  the  fighting  forces 
they  can  command.  But  the  most  sinister  employ- 
ment of  the  term  is  contained  in  the  phrase  which, 
ever  since  it  was  invented  by  the  most  unscrupu- 
lous of  English  statesmen,1  has  been  the  supreme 
engine  of  international  mischief,  the  Balance  of 
Power.  So  long  as  nations  are  conceived  as 
Powers,  and  foreign  policy  as  the  manipulation 
of  Power  by  statesmen  to  whom  the  exercise  and 
increase  of  the  power  of  the  nation  is  the  supreme 
criterion  of  success,  no  stable  international  arrange- 
ments are  possible.  For  though  the  term  Balance 
1  Sir  Robert  Walpole. 


i82     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

of  Power  suggests  a  stable  equilibrium,  it  only 
does  so  by  a  complete  falsification  of  the  situation. 
In  a  purely  statical  world  such  a  mechanical 
balance  might  be  attainable.  In  the  changing 
world  we  know  such  a  balance  can  only  endure 
for  a  passing  moment.  But  it  is  not  necessary 
to  labour  the  folly  of  pretending  to  solve  the 
greatest  of  human  problems  in  terms  of  statical 
mechanics.  For  history  shows  that  this  expression 
Balance  of  Power  is  nothing  else  than  the 
core  of  diplomatic  falsehood.  The  statesmen  who 
employ  it  do  not  want  to  preserve  a  just  balance, 
but  always  to  tip  the  scale  in  favour  of  the  Power 
or  group  of  Powers  they  represent. 

To  diplomatists  the  relations  between  nations 
are  thus  grounded  in  assumptions  of  antagonism 
of  interests,  deeply  embedded  in  the  art  and 
language  they  employ.  Alike  the  theory,  the  prac- 
tice, and  the  personnel  of  diplomacy  and  foreign 
policy  are  vitiated  by  this  falsehood  and  in- 
humanity. 

But  associated  with  it  is  another  vice  which  helps 
to  poison  foreign  policy.  It  consists  in  the  control 
of  that  policy  by  special  business  groups  and 
interests  within  each  nation  for  purposes  of  private 
gains.  Tariffs  and  other  protective  measures, 
directed  to  benefit  a  section  of  a  nation  and  to 
damage  a  section  of  another  nation  ;  preferential 
or  exclusive  trade  with  colonies  and  protectorates, 
the  struggle  for  treaty  ports,  mining  and  railway 
concessions  in  backward  countries,  for  banks  and 
loans  to  foreign  Governments,  and  in  general  for 
all  lucrative  propositions  of  "  development,"  have 
in  recent  times  more  and  more  occupied  the 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  183 

energies  of  Foreign  Offices  and  of  diplomatists,  and 
have  continually  inflamed  jealousies,  suspicions,  and 
antagonisms  among  the  Governments  of  the  com- 
peting interests.  Some  of  this  business  direction 
of  foreign  policy  is  definitely  bad.  The  whole 
protective  policy  is,  of  course,  doubly  injurious  to 
the  nation  that  employs  it,  for,  while  it  diminishes 
the  total  real  income  of  the  nation,  it  damages  its 
political  relations  with  other  nations.  But  still 
more  disastrous  to  pacific  relations  has  been  the 
policy  of  intrigue  and  diplomatic  pressure  pur- 
sued on  behalf  of  groups  of  concession-mongers 
and  financiers  by  the  Foreign  Offices  of  commercial 
and  investing  nations.  For  though  some  of  this 
business  may  be  beneficial  to  the  general  trade 
and  industry  of  the  nation,  there  is  not  the  slightest 
guarantee  that  this  will  be  the  case.  The  pressure 
exercised  by  financial  groups  through  their  respec- 
tive Governments  on  foreign  States  or  Protectorates 
to  effect  profitable  loans,  to  obtain  land,  railway, 
or  mining  concessions,  or  to  secure  spheres  of 
business  enterprise,  is  the  key  to  the  understand- 
ing of  the  dealings  of  European  States  in  recent 
years  in  Egypt,  South  Africa,  China,  Persia, 
Morocco,  and  most  other  undeveloped  countries. 
In  some  instances  the  net  results  of  the  political 
and  economic  intervention  thus  brought  about  may 
have  been  advantageous  to  the  intervening  nation 
and  to  the  nation  subject  to  this  intervention,  in 
other  cases  not.  But  the  point  is  that  the  foreign 
policy  has  in  every  case  been  motived  and  directed, 
not  by  any  national  interest  at  all  but  by  the  par- 
ticular interests  of  small  groups  of  financiers, 
investors,  and  merchants  out  for  private  gain,  and 


184  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

seeking  to  use  the  diplomatic  and  armed  resources 
of  their  country  to  further  their  business  purposes. 
Their  prostitution  of  the  State  to  private  interests, 
with  the  international  jealousies  and  hostilities  in- 
volved, is  directly  traceable  to  the  secret  autocratic 
methods  of  the  Foreign  Offices,  and  of  the  close 
personal  sympathy  which  exists  between  the 
political  conception  of  the  State,  as  an  instrument 
of  power,  and  the  commercial  conception  of  it 
as  an  instrument  for  pushing  private  profitable 
enterprises. 

The  two  complementary  parts  of  this  vicious 
theory  and  practice  find  their  most  appropriate 
union  in  the  place  occupied  in  foreign  policy  by 
the  armament  trade.  Here  the  entire  political 
philosophy  of  power  is  reduced  to  an  impudent 
simplicity.  We  have  seen  that,  for  purposes  of 
foreign  policy,  a  State  regards  itself  as  a  Power. 
But  it  is  not  the  self-sufficing  being  that  it  repre- 
sents itself  to  be.  It  is  not  a  Power  in  itself  :  it 
buys  its  power  in  expensive  bits  from  private 
business  firms,  whose  interest  it  is  to  stimulate  it 
continually  to  buy  more  power  in  the  shape  of 
ships,  guns,  ammunition,  etc.,  and  to  pay  whatever 
prices  each  of  these  firms,  in  agreement  with  its 
few  sham  competitors,  arranges  to  demand  from 
its  Government.  Here  we  have  powerful,  highly 
organized  industries  directly  interested  in  feeding 
the  fears,  suspicions,  and  enmities  of  nations,  and 
enabled  by  the  powerful  personal  influence  of  their 
carefully  chosen  directors  and  their  shareholders 
to  bring  pressure  upon  their  Governments  to  put 
larger  and  larger  quantities  of  public  money  into 
their  private  pockets. 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  185 

The  crowning  feature  of  this  audacious  con- 
spiracy against  the  peace  of  Europe  is  found  in 
the  "  internationalism  "  of  the  armament  trade. 
The  great  armament  firms  of  one  nation  are  so 
linked  up  by  interlocking  directorates,  trade  agree- 
ments, common  ownership  of  secret  processes,  and 
by  their  common  interest  in  fanning  and  feeding 
international  animosities,  as  to  present  an  economic 
phenomenon  unique  in  history,  an  international 
trade  which  lives  and  thrives  by  manufacturing 
hate  and  the  instruments  of  hate  between  nations. 
For  these  vendors  of  power  are  as  cosmopolitan  in 
their  markets  as  in  their  directorates.  Germans 
and  Austrians  have  been  sitting  side  by  side  with 
Britons,  French,  and  Italians  in  the  control  of 
businesses  which  have  been  supplying  our  present 
enemies  as  well  as  our  Allies  with  the  implements 
of  war.  Inside  each  nation  these  little  business 
groups  of  war-traders  have  been  incessantly  at 
work,  advising  and  stimulating  the  military  and 
naval  departments  by  true  or  false  reports  of  the 
preparations  which  other  nations  (also  by  their 
advice  and  aid)  were  making  against  them. 
Enjoying  access  to  the  military  and  naval  secrets 
of  each  country,  they  were  in  an  excellent  position 
to  supply  both  goods  and  information  to  other 
War  Offices  and  Admiralties,  and  so  keep  business 
humming.  That  the  "  Great  Powers  "  should  have 
allowed  these  private  profiteering  cosmopolitan 
monsters  thus  to  prey  upon  their  very  vitals  is  the 
culminating  modern  instance  of  capitalist  control 
of  politics.1 

1  See  Mr.  H.  N.  Brailsford's  " The  War  of  Steel  and  Gold" 
Chap.  IX,  and  for  a  more  detailed  exposition,  Mr.  G.  H.  Perris's, 
"  The  War  Traders"  and  pamphlets  by  Mr.  Walton  Newbold. 


186  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

We  now  see  what  the  theory  and  the  practice 
of  foreign  policy  signify.  The  foreign  relations 
which  concern  these  ministers  and  diplomats  are 
relations  between  Powers,  which  are  in  theory 
directed  to  secure  balances  by  means  of  groupings 
based  upon  the  supposed  strength  of  military  and 
naval  force.  This  inhuman  theory  is  disturbed 
and  distorted  in  practice  by  the  pulls  and  drives 
of  business  and  caste  interests  and  sentiments, 
commercial  and  financial  power,  armament  firms, 
and  the  constant  pressure  of  the  "  services  "  and 
would-be  Empire-builders  towards  a  spirited 
foreign  and  colonial  policy.  Such  are  the  in- 
eradicable vices  of  a  foreign  policy  of  Power, 
administered  by  a  virtually  self-appointed  and 
uncontrolled  bureaucracy. 

Now  it  may  be  at  once  admitted  that  no  inter- 
nationalism of  the  order  here  contemplated  can 
be  achieved  if  this  policy  and  this  personnel 
remain  intact.  Unless  foreign  policy  can  be 
made  to  express  the  relation  between  Peoples, 
not  between  Powers,  nothing  is  achieved.  No 
attempt  to  work  a  Concert  of  Europe,  a  League 
of  Peace,  an  International  Council,  by  entrusting 
the  constructive  policy  to  members  of  the  diplo- 
matic castes  of  the  several  nations  can  prove  other 
than  disastrous. 

This  is  the  real  lesson  to  be  learned  from  the 
example  of  a  century  ago,  which  is  pressed  upon  us 
by  academic  historians  as  proof  of  the  Utopianism 
of  all  efforts  after  international  government. 
Those  who  to-day  are  planning  Leagues  of  Peace 
and  other  schemes  of  international  confederation 
are  confronted  with  a  series  of  former  projects 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  187 

and  experiments  directed  to  the  same  general  ends, 
employing  the  same  means  and  formulated  in 
almost  the  same  terms  as  those  of  to-day,  and 
destined  to  complete  and  ignominious  failure. 
When  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  concluded  the  conti- 
nental wars  of  the  early  eighteenth  century,  the 
moral  and  material  havoc  in  Europe  set  men 
thinking  upon  the  possibility  of  getting  nations 
on  to  a  stable  footing  of  pacific  relations.  The 
ripest  fruit  of  this  thinking  was  the  Projet  de 
Traite  pour  rendre  la  Paix  Perpetuelle  of  the  Abbe" 
de  St.  Pierre,  published  in  1713.  A  League  of 
Peace  for  the  maintenance  of  public  law  was  to 
be  formed  with  the  following  provisions  : 

1.  The  Sovereigns  are  to  contract  a  perpetual  and  irrevocable 
alliance,  and  to  name  plenipotentiaries  to  hold,  in  a  determined 
spirit,  a  permanent  diet  or  congress,  in  which  all  differences 
between  the  contracting  parties  are  to  be  settled  by  arbitration 
or  judicial  decision. 

2.  The  number  of  the  Sovereigns  sending  plenipotentiaries  to 
the  congress  is  to  be  specified,  together  with  those  who  are  to 
be  invited  to  accede  to  the  treaty.     The  presidency  of  the 
congress  is  to  be  exercised  by  the  Sovereigns  in  turn  at  stated 
intervals,  the  order  of  rotation  and  term  of  office  being  carefully 
defined.     In  like  manner  the  quota  to  be  contributed  by  each  to 
the  common  fund,  and  its  method  of  collection,  are  to  be  care- 
fully defined. 

3.  The  Confederation   thus  formed  is  to  guarantee  to  each 
of  its  members  the  sovereignty  of  the  territories  it  actually 
possesses,  as  well  as  the  succession,    whether    hereditary  or 
elective,  according  to  the  fundamental  laws  of  each  country. 
To  avoid  disputes,  actual  possession  and  the  latest  treaties  are 
to  be  taken  as  the  basis  of  the  mutual  rights  of  the  contracting 
Powers,  while  all  future  disputes  are  to  be  settled  by  arbitration 
of  the  Diet. 

4.  The  Congress  is  to  define  the  cases  which  would  involve 
offending  States  being  put  under  the  ban  of  Europe. 


1 88     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

5.  The  Powers  are  to  agree  to  arm  and  take  the  offensive 
in  common  and  at  the  common  expense,  against  any  State  thus 
banned,  until  it  shall  have  submitted  to  the  common  will. 

6.  The  plenipotentiaries  in  congress,  on  instructions  from  their 
Sovereigns,  shall  have  power  to  make  such  rules  as  they  shall 
judge   important   with  a   view   to   securing  for   the  European 
Republic  and  each  of  its  members  all  possible  advantages. 

Though  this  proposal  found  no  acceptance 
among  the  statesmen  of  the  age,  and  was  rejected 
as  chimerical  even  by  so  free  a  thinker  as 
Rousseau,  it  was  destined  to  reappear  under  what 
seemed  far  more  favourable  circumstances  a  century 
later,  when  the  fall  of  Napoleon  broke  once  more 
the  spell  of  militarism  upon  the  Continent  and 
stirred  fresh  hopes  of  the  possibilities  of  a  pacific 
future.  Mr.  Allison  Phillips,  in  his  valuable  book, 
"  The  Confederation  of  Europe,"  l  shows  how  the 
allied  Powers  of  Europe  in  their  larger  or  smaller 
groupings  endeavoured  to  incorporate  the  various 
provisions  of  St.  Pierre  in  some  practical  scheme 
of  co-operative  union  to  keep  the  peace,  and  to 
guarantee  public  order  in  Europe. 

The  active  will  in  these  political  experiments 
was  that  of  the  Tsar  Alexander  I,  who  from  1804 
onwards  kept  this  general  idea  of  a  European  Con- 
federation in  the  forefront  of  his  political  schemes. 
Though  historical  analogies  can  never  safely  be 
pressed  far,  there  is  much  in  the  European  situa- 
tion of  a  century  ago  to  remind  us  of  the  situation 
which  will  presently  emerge  when  the  military 
power  of  Germany  is  broken.  Substituting 
Germany  for  France,  the  following  response 
of  Pitt  in  1805  to  Alexander's  proposal  of  a 

1  Longmans,  1914. 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  189 

European  alliance  is  sufficiently  suggestive  of  the 
general  lines  of  settlement  which  are  forming  them- 
selves to-day  in  many  minds.  After  discussing 
the  general  desirability  of  a  Concert,  Pitt  recites 
its  objects,  dividing  them  into  the  following  three 
groups  : 

1.  To  release  from  the  domination  of  France  the  territories 
conquered  since  the  Revolution. 

2.  To  form  out  of  the  countries  thus  released,  with  due  regard 
to  their  peace  and  happiness,  a  barrier  against  future  French 
aggression. 

3.  To  establish,  after  the  restoration  of  peace,  a  convention 
and  guarantee  for  the  mutual  protection  and  security  of  the 
different  Powers,  and  to  establish  in  Europe  a  general  system 
of  public  law.1 

Pitt's  remarks  upon  the  most  fundamental  of 
these  proposals,  the  third,  deserve  citation  : — 

"  In  order  to  make  this  security  as  perfect  as 
possible,  it  seems  necessary  that  at  the  time  of  the 
general  pacification  a  treaty  should  be  concluded, 
in  which  all  the  principal  European  Powers  should 
take  part,  by  which  their  possessions  and  their 
respective  rights,  as  there  established,  should  be 
fixed  and  recognized  ;  and  these  Powers  should 
all  engage  reciprocally  to  protect  and  support  each 
other  against  all  attempts  to  violate  it.  This  treaty 
would  give  to  Europe  a  general  system  of  public 
law  and  would  aim  at  repressing,  as  far  as  possible, 
future  attempts  to  trouble  the  general  tranquillity, 
and,  above  all,  to  defeat  every  project  of  aggran- 
dizement and  ambition,  such  as  those  which  have 
produced  all  the  disasters  by  which  Europe  has 

1  Phillips,  p.  36. 


igo     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

been  afflicted  since  the  unhappy  era  of  the  French 
Revolution."  ' 

These  views,  first  embodied  in  a  Treaty  of  1805 
between  Russia  and  Great  Britain,  became  opera- 
tive motives  in  European  policy  ten  years  later, 
and,  with  various  restrictions  and  extensions  as 
regards  purposes  and  signatory  nations,  found  ex- 
pression in  the  entanglement  of  treaties  and 
alliances  which  spread  from  1814  through  the 
succeeding  decade,  ending  in  the  break-up  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  by  the  policy  of  Canning  and  the 
collapse  of  the  tortuous  endeavours  to  realize  a 
Confederation  of  Europe. 

This  failure  of  effective  and  peaceable  co- 
operation between  European  nations  Mr.  Phillips 
considers  to  be  as  inevitable  to-day  as  it  'was  a 
hundred  years  ago.  The  assumption  that  the 
changed  conditions  of  to-day  render  possible  a 
project  for  which  Europe  was  not  then  ripe  he 
dismisses  as  unwarranted. 

He  appears  to  hold  that  a  general  alliance  of 
nations  to  impose  and  in  the  last  resort  enforce 
the  public  law  of  Europe,  which  all  may  have 
formally  adopted,  would  be  as  impracticable  as 
ever.  For  while  it  is  possible  that  an  ad  hoc 
coalition  of  Great  Powers  might  be  able  and  pre- 
pared "  to  enforce  the  principles  which  now  stand 
unanimously  acknowledged  by  the  Second  Peace 
Conference  of  The  Hague,"  it  would  be  impossible 
to  extend  this  coalition  into  "  a  universal  union," 
based  on  "  the  general  right  of  the  world -organi- 
zation to  coerce  its  refractory  members."  For 
what,  he  asks,  would  then  become  of  "  the 
1  Phillips,  p.  38. 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  191 

sovereign  independence  of  nations  "?  "  Especially 
it  would  be  the  small  States  whose  independence 
would  be  prejudiced  ;  for  though  international  law 
recognizes  in  them  the  equality  of  all  sovereign 
States,  no  international  system  which  should 
attempt  to  translate  this  theory  into  practice  would 
survive.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  voting  power 
of  the  central  '  directory  '  were  to  be  proportioned 
to  the  size  and  importance  of  its  constituent  States, 
the  result  would  be  precisely  such  a  hegemony 
of  the  Great  Powers  as  was  exercised  by  the  Holy 
Alliance  after  1815."  The  new  Alliance,  like  the 
old,  would  be.  driven  to  interfere  with  "  internal 
affairs."  As  Sir  F.  Pollock  insists,  "  the  effective 
working  of  an  international  federal  system  demands 
a  far  greater  uniformity  of  political  institutions 
and  ideas  among  the  nations  of  the  world  than 
at  present  exists." 

Now,  this  is  a  really  formidable  indictment,  the 
full  force  of  which  is  contained  in  its  final  count. 
For  it  comes  to  this  that,  although  modern  civi- 
lization may  have  brought  certain  more  liberal 
nations  up  to  a  level  of  justice  and  humanity  which 
would  express  itself  in  the  fair  and  equal  treatment 
of  Western  nations  in  a  Union,  the  consciousness  of 
"  power  "  would  continue  to  impel  certain  other 
great  nations  to  violate  their  treaty  obligations, 
to  exercise  their  will  by  voting  power  or  force 
to  the  detriment  of  smaller  nations,  and  to  break 
through  any  limitations  set  upon  the  right  of  the 
Union  to  interfere  in  internal  politics.  In  a 
word,  it  has  been  impossible  to  secure  an  equitable 
spirit  of  internationalism  in  a  large  heterogeneous 
alliance  such  as  is  proposed,  in  the  past,  and 


192     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

it  must  continue  to  be  impossible  in  the 
future. 

History,  it  is  contended,  thus  supports  political 
theory  in  insisting  that  the  national  State  is  a 
final  product  of  social  evolution,  and  that  the 
political  instinct  of  men  has  exhausted  itself  in 
attaining  this  goal.  But  before  turning  to  the 
test  of  history,  one  is  entitled  to  question  the 
theoretical  assumption.  What  is  the  worth  of  this 
assumption  that  the  associative  instincts  and 
interests  of  men,  which  have  gradually  built  up 
the  fabric  of  the  national  State  from  smaller  social 
units  by  fusion  and  co-operation,  are  precluded 
from  carrying  the  process  any  farther  by  some 
absolute  barriers  of  sovereignty  and  independence? 
Were  not  the  smaller  social  units,  which  have  in 
the  past  grown  together  into  the  present  national 
States,  once  themselves  little  States,  often  as 
sovereign  and  as  independent  as  the  great 
States  of  to-day?  If  once  separate  tribes, 
cantons,  and  provinces,  widely  divergent  from  one 
another  in  economic  structure,  in  civilized  develop- 
ment, in  language,  and  in  political  government, 
have  been  able  to  coalesce  or  to  co-operate  in  a 
larger  political  union,  why  should  not  nations  be 
able  to  do  the  same?  It  may,  indeed,  well  be 
admitted  that  wide  differences  of  political  insti- 
tutions render  federation  difficult.  But  they  do 
not  render  it  impossible. 

Moreover,  the  changes  of  the  last  century,  which 
to  Mr.  Phillips  seem  almost  negligible,  are  in 
reality  exceedingly  important  contributions  towards 
the  feasibility  of  such  a  federation.  Not  only 
have  the  rights  of  nationality  and  of  local  autonomy 


THE   INTERNATIONAL  MIND  193 

made  great  advances  towards  realization  in  the 
map  of  Europe,  but  the  ideas  and  the  sentiments 
which  they  embody  are  the  common  accepted 
doctrines  of  liberal  thinkers  in  all  countries,  and 
their  definite  acknowledgment  in  the  settlement  of 
this  war  would  be  a  powerful  incentive  towards 
that  standardization  of  government  which  is  so 
great  a  desideratum  for  the  co-operation  of  free 
States.  Every  extension  of  effective  self-govern- 
ment makes  for  the  further  assimilation  of  internal 
polities  among  the  different  nations.  The  institu- 
tions, central  and  local,  in  which  such  self- 
government  expresses  itself,  exhibit  among  the  free 
peoples  of  most  countries  striking  resemblances, 
which  are  the  natural  products  of  community  of 
human  wants  and  efforts  seeking  expression  in 
forms  of  self-government  which  in  modern  times 
become  more  and  more  consciously  imitative. 
Nations  and  even  their  Governments  are  far  nearer 
to  one  another  in  actual  structure  and  in  conscious 
tendencies  than  was  the  case  a  century  ago,  while 
their  intercommunication  of  ideas  and  influences 
is  immensely  greater.  Do  these  facts  not  count 
in  considering  the  feasibility  of  carrying  one  stage 
farther  the  process  of  social  evolution  and  in 
planning  a  Society  of  Nations? 

But  granting  that  nations  are  somewhat  nearer 
to  one  another  in  their  political  arts  and  institu- 
tions than  they  were  when  Alexander  projected 
his  Grand  Alliance,  have  they  reached  a  degree 
of  uniformity  that  will  enable  them  to  co-operate 
successfully  in  maintaining  peace  and  public  law? 
I  agree  that  it  is  impossible  to  give  with  any  con- 
fidence an  affirmative  reply,  although  the  whole 

13 


194    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

issue  of  the  maintenance  and  progress  of  our 
civilization  is  here  at  stake.  But  equally  I  deny 
the  right  of  historians  and  political  philosophers 
to  affirm  the  contrary.  A  State,  or  national  society, 
may  and  often  does  contain  within  itself  communi- 
ties or  localities  widely  discrepant  in  their  culture, 
status,  outlook,  and  local  government.  But  though 
this  diversity  may  sometimes  weaken  the  State, 
it  does  not  destroy  it,  and  is  quite  consistent  with 
an  effective  spirit  of  nationality  permeating  the 
whole  structure  and  maintaining;  the  requisite 
unity  of  national  will.  Indeed,  so  far  as  their 
political  diversity  is  rooted  in  differences  of  local 
needs  and  conditions,  it  may  be  a  source  of 
strength,  not  of  weakness.  Why  should  not  the 
same  hold  good  of  a  society  of  nations,  provided 
it  is  inspired  by  a  sufficiently  vigorous  spirit  of 
internationalism?  We  have  already  seen  that  the 
most  powerful,  varied,  and  distinctive  growth  of 
recent  times  has  been  that  web  of  international 
relations,  economic,  social,  scientific,  philanthropic, 
which  everywhere  testifies  to  a  liberal-mindedness 
and  'a  community  of  interests  and  purposes  trans- 
cending the  limits  of  country  and  nation.  These 
relations,  though  as  yet  thinly  represented  in  the 
sphere  of  politics,  have  been  educating  an  inter- 
national mind.  The  elaborate  and  secure  arrange- 
ments by  which  men,  goods,  letters,  money,  news 
are  carried  by  a  single  continuous  process,  by  land 
and  sea,  from  any  town  or  village  in  the  world 
to  any  other,  across  many  different  countries  occu- 
pied by  people  of  diverse  races,  colours,  tongues, 
and  grades  of  civilization,  are  a  unique  achieve- 
ment in  the  history  of  our  age.  The  railroad, 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  195 

shipping,  postal,  telegraphic,  financial,  journalistic 
apparatus,  by  which  these  communications  are 
carried  on,  constitutes  an  immense  structure  of 
social -economic  government.  The  thought,  intel- 
ligence, and  concordant  will  required  to  sustain 
these  communications  are  already  far  more  than 
the  nucleus  of  the  international  mind  which  it  is 
our  object  to  express  in  the  new  forms  of  political 
government.  The  firmly  woven  bonds  of  com- 
merce and  investment  and  the  tidal  flows  of  labour 
which,  in  spite  of  some  obstructions,  pulse  con- 
tinually with  more  power  through  the  world,  are 
constantly  engaged  in  bringing  into  closer  union 
the  arts  of  industry,  the  standards  of  living,  the 
habits,  desires,  and  thoughts  of  men.  The  noxious 
fallacies  of  an  antiquated  political  economy,  which 
represented  nations  as  hostile  beings  in  commerce 
as  in  politics,  are  rapidly  dissolving  in  the  fuller 
light  of  international  experience.  The  recent 
revivals  of  Protectionism  may  be  regarded  as  the 
last  death  struggle  of  obscurantist  economics 
enlisted  in  the  ranks  of  militarism.  The  formal 
establishment  of  international  government  would 
be  able  to  appeal  to  the  immense  resources  of 
this  community  of  interests  and  activities  which 
constitutes  the  economic  unity  of  the  modern  world. 
While  international  finance  is  the  most  consciously 
powerful  expression  of  this  unity,  organized  labour 
has  been  long  reaching  out  towards  international 
co-operation,  based  upon  a  clearly  felt  identity 
of  interests  and  a  class  sympathy  transcending 
nationalism.  Though  this  internationalism  of  com- 
merce, finance,  and  labour  proved  unable  to  stem 
the  tide  of  militarism  last  year,  that  is  no  sufficient 


196  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

reason  for  disparaging  it  as  a  material  and  spiritual 
support  of  the  new  pacific  order.  For  it  has  been 
the  absence  of  any  legitimate  political  organism 
through  which  the  economic  internationalism  might 
operate  that  has  been  the  cause  of  its  compara- 
tive impotence.  For,  until  this  political  structure 
has  been  formed  upon  a  firm  basis  of  international 
law  and  representation,  the  economic  spirit  of  inter- 
nationalism can  exercise  no  regular  or  authorita- 
tive voice  even  in  those  questions  of  peace  and 
war  which  are  so  vital  to  it.  Capital  and  labour 
alike  are  coming  to  recognize  that  few  of  their 
deeper  problems  are  any  longer  susceptible  of 
merely  national  solutions.  Markets,  rates  of 
interest,  wages,  and  standards  of  living  are  more 
and  more  regulated  by  world -forces.  The  per- 
ception of  the  futility  of  all  attempts  either  to 
deny  or  to  reverse  these  wo  rid -forces  will  more 
and  more  lead  those  who  do  the  thinking  for 
capital  and  labour  to  think,  not  nationally,  nor 
imperially,  but  in  terms  of  mankind.  I  have  dwelt 
upon  these  two  modern  factors  in  the  world  because 
for  a  long  time  they  have  been  straining  at  the 
barriers  of  international  politics,  endeavouring  to 
get  national  Governments  to  patch  up  little  bits 
of  international  arrangement  by  means  of  par- 
ticular treaties,  conferences,  congresses,  and  Berne 
bureaux.  The  era  of  international  congresses, 
through  which  we  have  been  passing,  has  largely 
concerned  itself  with  trying  to  create  partial  and 
informal  substitutes  for  what  should  be  the  work 
of  a  co-operative  international  Government.  In 
view  of  all  these  facts,  and  of  the  immense  ex- 
tension of  world  intercourse  and  sympathy  which 


THE   INTERNATIONAL   MIND  197 

they  attest,  how  can  it  be  possible  dogmatically 
to  deny  the  feasibility  of  international  government 
upon  the  ground  that  it  failed  a  century  ago,  and 
that  nothing  new  of  any  consequence  has  happened 
since  to  justify  a  different  expectation?  What  has 
happened  since  is  the  creation  and  emergence  into 
clear  consciousness  of  an  international  mind. 


CHAPTER   XII 
DEMOCRACY   AND    INTERNATIONALISM 

THOSE  who  have  regard  to  what  they  consider 
the  cold  realities  of  the  political  situation  will 
probably  object  that  this  international  mind,  if  it 
can  be  said  to  exist  at  all,  will  not  show  itseJf  in 
any  Congress  of  the  Powers  or  in  the  working  of 
any  Council,  Concert,  or  other  formally  inter- 
national arrangements  which  may  be  the  subject 
of  experiment.  History  teaches  us,  it  will  be 
urged,  that  every  nation  always  plays  for  its  own 
hand,  is  motived  by  its  own  essential  interests, 
and  will  not  admit  the  rightful  dominion  of  any 
common  interest  or  of  any  general  sense  of  right 
as  represented  in  the  international  mind.  This  has 
been  so  in  the  past.  Alliances,  Concerts,  and 
Federations  have  failed  because  they  were  mere 
balances  of  short-range  interests,  the  centripetal 
force  being  too  feeble  for  any  permanent  agree- 
ment. Must  this,  however,  necessarily  hold  of  the 
future?  I  have  pressed  the  argument  as  to  the 
conscious  community  of  interests  which  binds 
together  citizens  of  the  world.  But  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  rely  upon  the  utilitarian  motive  only.  Are 
Justice,  Peace,  Humanity  mere  futile  abstractions? 

Will   not    the    palpable    Injustice,    Unreason,    In- 

198 


DEMOCRACY  AND   INTERNATIONALISM    199 

humanity  of  existing  international  relations,  as 
dramatized  by  war,  prove  powerful  pleaders  for 
international  thinking?  To  argue  that  the  inter- 
national mind,  required  for  the  successful  working 
of  an  international  Government,  is  non-existent  and 
impossible,  is  to  deny  that  the  spirit  of  education 
has  done  anything  to  broaden  the  views  and  to 
expand  the  sympathies  of  men.  Now,  this  is  a 
false  account  of  the  moral  world  of  our  time. 
Notwithstanding  the  hampering  traditions  of 
diplomacy,  it  would  be  impossible  to  bring 
together  groups  of  representatives  of  the  ordinary 
life  of  the  several  nations  without  discovering  in 
them  a  capacity  for  the  discussion  and  settlement 
of  issues  by  reference  to  the  inherent  justice  and 
reason  of  the  case,  and  apart  from  any  merely 
national  reference.  As  the  immense  significance 
of  the  work  they  were  called  upon  to  do  gripped 
their  minds,  it  would  impress  its  intrinsic  meaning 
on  them  and  would  release  them  from  the  bondage 
of  the  national  standpoint.  It  would  do  this  by  an 
appeal  to  the  principles  of  reason  and  justice  within 
them,  which  would  thus  become  the  moulding  influ- 
ence of  an  international  mind.  It  is  this  inter- 
national mind  that  has  replaced  the  vague  and 
somewhat  sentimental  cosmopolitanism  which  was 
partly  felt,  partly  affected,  by  small  cultured  circles 
a  century  ago.  It  is  this  new  factor  in  the  situa- 
tion which  may  serve  to  falsify  the  gloomy  vaticina- 
tions of  those  who  insist  that  the  Utopia  of  a 
century  ago  must  be  the  Utopia  of  to-morrow.  We 
cannot,  of  course,  assume  that  this  new  spirit,  and 
the  non-political  institutions  it  has  informed,  will 
at  once  supply  the  strength  and  unity  of  purpose 


200    TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

for  a  stable  international  Government  or  even  for 
a  simpler  League  of  Peace.  But  they  form  a 
ground  of  hope. 

The  measure  in  which  this  hope  may  be  realized 
depends,  however,  first  and  chiefly  upon  the  oppor- 
tunities afforded  for  this  international  mind  and 
will  to  animate  and  control  the  political  experi- 
ments. The  type  of  statesman  and  diplomatist 
hitherto  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  international 
affairs,  and  the  methods  of  diplomacy  employed 
by  them,  have  been  impervious  to  the  healthy 
penetration  of  this  international  mind.  Different 
men,  different  methods,  different  motives  and  ideals 
are  required. 

It  should  be  definitely  understood  that  the  type 
of  man  who  has  filled  our  Foreign  Office  and  our 
Embassies,  however  "  expert  "  he  may  have  been 
in  the  diplomacy  of  the  past,  is  the  reverse  of 
"  expert  "  for  the  new  needs  of  peace  and  inter- 
national government.  He  must  be  replaced  by 
men  of  wider  outlook,  sympathies,  and  understand- 
ing, who  regard  themselves  as  the  servants,  not 
the  masters,  of  the  nation  that  employs  them,  and 
who  will  be  prepared  to  conduct  the  large  public 
business  entrusted  to  them  in  the  open  light  of 
day  and  subject  to  the  same  wholesome  advice 
and  criticism  as  is  available  for  the  conduct  of 
domestic  government.  What  the  open  door  is  for 
trade  the  open  window  is  for  politics,  and  a  people 
is  wise  if  it  distrusts  men  who  tell  them  that  they 
can  only  conduct  the  public  business  in  the  dark. 
The  first  requisite  of  popular  control  of  foreign 
policy,  therefore,  is  a  reasonable  publicity.  The 
people  must  have  full  opportunity  of  knowing  what 


DEMOCRACY  AND   INTERNATIONALISM    201 

is  being  done,  who  is  doing  it,  and  why  it  is  being 
done,  before  it  has  actually  been  done.  Without 
this  provision  there  is  no  safety.  For  a  people 
to  grant  an  unlimited  control  of  their  lives  and 
their  money  to  little  knots  of  unrepresentative 
supermen,  who  tell  them  that  the  arts  they  practise 
are  too  important  and  too  delicate  for  disclosure, 
is  a  monumental  act  of  folly.  But  while  an  in- 
formed public  opinion  is  the  first  requisite  of 
popular  control,  it  must  be  furnished  with  the 
proper  instruments  and  opportunities  for  acting 
upon  foreign  policy.  This  power  it  must  exercise 
through  its  representatives  in  Parliament.  The 
Foreign  Minister  must  no  longer  be  at  liberty 
to  make  engagements  to  foreign  nations  binding 
us  to  future  performances  involving  the  vital  in- 
terests of  the  country  behind  the  backs  and  without 
the  assent  of  Parliament.  Ample  opportunities 
must  be  afforded  to  Parliament  for  the  dis- 
cussion of  foreign  affairs  and  for  receiving  informa- 
tion from  the  Foreign  Secretary,  and  a  Standing 
Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs  should  be  appointed 
to  follow  the  course  of  policy  more  closely  than 
is  possible  for  the  House  of  Commons  as  a 
whole. 

One  other  reform  is  needed  to  give  reality  to 
the  popular  control,  viz.  the  periodic  revision  and 
rearfirmation  of  treaties  and  other  formal  engage- 
ments between  this  and  other  countries.  In  this 
way  alone  can  a  full  measure  of  vitality  be  secured 
for  our  engagements  and  ample  opportunity  be 
afforded  for  effecting  such  changes  as  are 
demanded  by  the  new  conditions  of  the  times. 

This   brief   recital  of   the  chief  reforms   needed 


202     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

to  give  validity  to  popular  control  l  assumes,  as 
must  be  the  case,  that  however  large  the  functions 
to  be  exercised  by  any  international  Government 
that  may  be  formed,  much  would  remain  with  the 
Foreign  Offices  and  the  diplomatic  machinery  of 
the  several  Governments.  All  matters  affecting 
the  relations  between  two  nations,  or  a  small  group 
of  nations,  would,  at  any  rate  in  their  early  stages, 
continue  to  be  negotiated  by  the  respective  national 
Governments,  and  only  if  they  reached  some  sort 
of  strain,  or  otherwise  assumed  a  position  of  inter- 
national interest,  would  come  before  the  Council 
of  Nations.  Moreover,  however  large  the  powers 
of  an  international  Government  may  eventually 
become,  it  is  exceedingly  unlikely  that  for  some 
time  to  come  it  will  be  entrusted  with  any  large 
measure  of  legislative  power.  Where  legislation 
is  needed  to  give  validity  to  a  decision  of  the 
Council,  action  is  likely  to  be  taken  by  an  agree- 
ment to  promote  concurrent  legislation  in  the 
several  national  Legislatures.  Though  the  in- 
effectiveness of  such  a  method  will  be  pretty  certain 
to  bring  about  the  requisite  enlargement  of  the 
international  power  in  course  of  time,  during  the 
experimental  period  much  will  depend  upon  the 
improved  conduct  of  business  by  the  Foreign 
Offices  and  the  Diplomatic  Services. 

But  the  principles  of  publicity  and  popular 
control,  essential  for  the  reform  of  the  national 
conduct  of  foreign  policy,  are  not  less  essential  to 
the  success  of  the  new  international  arrangements. 

1  A  fully  informed  discussion  of  these  reforms  will  be  found 
in  an  important  little  book  shortly  to  be  published  by  Mr.  Arthur 
Ponsonby  entitled  "  Democracy  and  Diplomacy  "  (Methuen). 


DEMOCRACY  AND   INTERNATIONALISM    203 

In  the  selection  and  appointment  of  national  repre- 
sentatives to  the  Council,  in  the  discussions  of  the 
Council,  the  sittings  of  the  Arbitration  and  Con- 
ciliation Courts,  the  decisions  and  the  executive  steps 
to  be  taken,  the  fullest  measure  of  publicity  is 
desirable.  The  notion  that  privacy  and  secrecy 
are  conducive  to  the  success  of  diplomacy  is  in 
itself  the  crowning  condemnation  of  diplomacy. 
For  it  is  chiefly  in  so  far  as  diplomacy  has  been 
directed  to  securing  private  national  ends  by  out- 
witting or  deceiving  other  States,  or  to  forming 
special  friendships  and  pursuing  the  arts  of  under- 
ground intrigue,  that  the  utility  or  necessity  of 
secrecy  is  apparent.  The  defence  of  secrecy  rests 
on  the  assumption  of  the  rivalry  and  antagonism 
of  nations,  and  the  use  of  cunning  to  get  the  better 
of  another  nation  or  to  counterwork  its  plans. 
The  policy  of  the  commonwealth  of  nations  neither 
requires  nor  permits  such  secret  arts.  The  injury 
they  have  inflicted  in  the  past  is  terribly  drama- 
tized in  the  world-war  that  is  waged  to-day.  For 
granting  everything  that  may  be  imputed  to  the 
consciously  aggressive  designs  of  military  and 
political  castes,  war  could  not  have  been  brought 
about  save  by  playing  upon  the  mutual  fears  and 
suspicions  of  the  peoples.  No  nation  could  have 
been  made  willing  to  fight  but  for  the  conviction 
that  some  other  nation  was  plotting  to  destroy  it. 
This  general  atmosphere  of  mistrust  and  apprehen- 
sion was  the  direct  product  of  a  diplomacy  in  which 
secret  treaties,  underhand  engagements,  private 
conversations,  and  suspected  intrigues  were 
believed  to  sway  the  destiny  of  nations.  Every 
belligerent  nation  believes  that  it  is  fighting  a 


204  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

defensive  war  for  its  national  existence.  This  false 
belief  is  the  characteristic  and  inevitable  reaction 
of  secret  diplomacy  upon  the  popular  mind.  The 
only  remedy  is  to  let  the  peoples  know  that  the 
business  which  so  vitally  concerns  them  is  done 
openly.  The  light  of  day  is  healing  as  well  as 
illuminating. 

Publicity  is  the  answer  to  all  the  trite  objec- 
tions that  are  brought  against  the  possibility 
or  desirability  of  democratic  control  of  foreign 
policy.  The  people,  we  are  told,  are  too 
ignorant  to  be  allowed  to  take  a  hand  in  framing 
foreign  policy.  Their  aid  is  only  invited  for  one 
supreme  act  of  foreign  policy — war.  When 
diplomacy  has  failed,  the  peoples  are  called  upon 
to  make  good  the  failure  with  their  lives.  But 
if  the  people  are  ignorant,  to  what  else  is  their 
ignorance  due  than  to  the  fact  that  little  informa- 
tion and  no  power  of  decision  were  vouchsafed  to 
them?  For  those  who  have  kept  people  in 
ignorance  to  urge  this  ignorance  as  a  reason  for 
giving  them  no  power  is  the  most  impudent  of 
fallacies.  The  same  answer  applies  to  the  frequent 
taunt  that  the  people  are  the  natural  prey  of  scare- 
mongers and  a  Jingo  press.  The  agitator  and  the 
yellow  journalist  who  work  by  spreading  fears, 
suspicions,  and  jealousies,  and  by  imputing  false 
motives  to  foreigners,  owe  all  their  power  to  this 
atmosphere  of  ignorance  in  which  they  work. 

Again,  it  is  often  said  that  peoples  are  .not 
more  but  less  peaceable  than  their  Governments, 
and  as  testimony  we  are  referred  to  the  wild  out- 
bursts of  popular  fury  which  some  Kruger  telegram 
or  some  Fashoda  incident  evokes,  and  to  the  enthu- 


DEMOCRACY  AND  INTERNATIONALISM  205 

siastic  rally  made  by  every  people  to  the  flag 
when  war  has  been  declared.  But  neither  of  these 
evidences  proves  the  case.  There  undoubtedly 
exists  a  sub -current  of  pugnacity  in  every  people 
which,  when  it  is  duly  stimulated,  makes  for  war. 
The  survival  of  this  instinct  will  always  be  a  source 
of  danger  to  the  public  peace.  But  it  is  not 
self-acting.  It  responds  to  the  strong  stimulus 
of  an  irresponsible  provocative  Press,  a  Jingo 
statesman,  or  the  overwhelming  appeal  of  an  actual 
state  of  war.  It  responds  the  more  readily  and 
whole-heartedly  because  it  recognizes  for  itself  no 
real  responsibility.  A  check  upon  this  play  of 
popular  war-passion  can  only  come  with  know- 
ledge and  the  feeling  of  responsibility  which  power 
brings.  This  is,  of  course,  the  general  argument 
for  democracy,  as  applicable  here  as  in  any  other 
department  of  politics.  For  the  notion  that  foreign 
policy  is  essentially  esoteric,  and  stands  apart  from 
all  domestic  policy,  is  precisely  the  falsehood  that 
must  be  extirpated.  It  is  true  that  hitherto  not 
only  the  ordinary  citizen  but  the  ordinary  Member 
of  Parliament  has  seldom  seriously  concerned  him- 
self with  foreign  policy.  This  was  partly,  no  doubt, 
because  he  was  conscious  of  possessing  little  or 
no  power  to  determine  it,  but  largely  because  he 
acquiesced  in  the  view  that  foreign  policy  was 
a  thing  apart  which  might  safely  be  left  to  those 
who  knew,  while  he  confined  himself  to  matters 
nearer  at  hand  and  more  obviously  important.  No 
Member  of  Parliament  and  no  citizen  can  any 
longer  indulge  this  dangerous  illusion.  Every  one 
will  see  the  direct  and  vital  dependence  of  the 
internal  upon  the  foreign  policy  of  his  country, 


206  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

and  will  recognize  that  the  only  way  to  retain  any 
real  voice  in  the  former  is  to  insist  upon  a  con- 
trolling voice  in  the  latter.  He  will  base  his 
demand  upon  the  conviction,  not  that  the  public 
are  wiser  than  their  rulers,  or  as  well  informed 
as  their  expert  administrators,  but  that  the  policy 
they  will  approve  will  be  more  consistently  pacific. 
The  peoples  may  not  be  actively  friendly  in  their 
relations,  so  far  as  they  regard  one  another  col- 
lectively, but  they  are  not  actively  hostile.  Even 
the  prolonged  efforts  of  a  Protectionist  compaign, 
directed  to  poison  the  minds  of  a  people  against 
rivals  who  seek  to  "  steal  their  markets  "  and 
"  destroy  their  trade,"  does  not  bring  the  popular 
passions  near  the  fighting -point.  The  active 
hostilities  that  endanger  peace  are  mainly  attri- 
butable, as  we  have  shown,  to  the  pressure  of 
private  antagonistic  business  interests  within  the 
State  upon  the  sympathetic  personnel  of  diplo- 
macy. In  this  pressure  we  have  a  rational  explana- 
tion for  what  figures  on  the  stage  of  politics  as 
international  rivalry,  being,  in  fact,  the  rivalry  of 
little  groups  and  interests  within  each  nation 
"  usurping  the  name  and  pretext  of  the  common- 
wealth." The  peoples,  if  the  conduct  of  foreign 
policy  can  be  put  more  in  their  hands,  will  be 
more  pacific,  because  in  point  of  fact  their  interests 
are  not  opposed  but  identical,  whereas  the  opposi- 
tion of  the  class  interests,  liable  to  control  policy 
under  our  present  secret  autocratic  rule,  is  a 
genuine  antagonism  certain  to  breed  dissensions 
between  Governments,  and  always  playing  into  the 
hands  of  militarism.  The  peoples  may  sometimes 
be  deceived  into  thinking  that  their  real  interests 


DEMOCRACY   AND   INTERNATIONALISM    207 

are  opposed,  but  it  is  more  difficult  to  deceive 
them  (given  publicity  in  the  acts  of  foreign  policy) 
than  if  the  moulding  of  that  policy  remains  in 
the  power  of  strongly  organized  financial  or  com- 
mercial cliques,  operating  in  darkness  through  their 
Foreign  Offices. 

In  conclusion,  there  are  two  dilatory  pleas  which 
deserve  attention.  The  first  comes  from  some  who, 
while  professing  to  be  favourable  to  the  general 
case  for  popular  control,  insist  that,  before  any 
steps  are  taken  to  make  the  control  effective,  a 
period  of  education  must  intervene.  The  people 
must  be  trained  to  understand  foreign  policy  before 
they  practise  it.  They  must  study  the  history 
of  foreign  countries  in  their  relations  to  one  another 
and  learn  something  of  international  commerce  and 
law,  and  of  the  racial  and  other  problems  which 
are  such  disturbing  factors  in  history  ;  they  must 
be  acquainted  with  the  procedure  of  treaties  and 
of  arbitration  courts,  and  with  other  modes  of 
adjusting  differences.  Now,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  a  popular  instruction  upon  these  lines  is  essen- 
tial to  intelligent  democratic  control.  But  since 
politics  is  not  only  a  branch  of  knowledge  but  of 
conduct,  it  is  not  possible  to  postpone  the  duty 
of  securing  to  the  people  self-government  in 
foreign  affairs  until  this  serviceable  education  is 
complete.  For  in  all  conduct,  individual  or  col- 
lective, the  possession  of  power  and  of  the  respon- 
sibility attaching  to  it  is  of  the  essence  of  the 
educative  process.  Paradoxical  as  it  seems,  you 
must  do  a  thing  before  you  can  know  it.  Only 
by  the  exercise  of  self-control  can  a  person  or 
a  people  learn  the  art  of  government.  Only  in 


2o8     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL   GOVERNMENT 

that  way  can  it  gain  a  full  incentive  to  acquire 
the  special  information  and  capacity  of  judgment 
which  the  educationists  are  anxious  to  impart. 
The  process  of  exercising  power  before  the  mind 
is  properly  informed  is  indeed  a  risky  one,  but 
these  risks  and  the  mistakes  which  they  involve 
are  not  peculiar  to  foreign  policy.  They  belong 
to  every  art  whatsoever,  and  condition  the  experi- 
ment of  life  itself.  Moreover,  there  are  two 
considerations  which  mitigate  the  danger  lest  an 
ignorant  mob -mind  should  drag  a  nation  into  ruin. 
If  it  is  not  true  that  knowledge  is  power,  it  is 
true  that  knowledge  is  indispensable  to  the  direc- 
tion of  power.  An  ignorant  mob -mind  will  be 
distracted,  and  will  seldom  possess  the  unity  of  self- 
confidence  requisite  for  the  strong  pursuance  of 
desperate  causes.  No  ignorant  people  could 
commit  the  criminal  conduct  imputed  to  Germany. 
Again,  some  self -preservative  instinct  may  not 
unreasonably  be  ascribed  to  a  people.  If  it  be 
premised  that  no  real  clash  of  interests  exists 
between  the  nations,  and  that  one  nation  does  not 
stand  to  gain  by  another's  damage,  but  that,  on 
the  contrary,  peace  and  co-operation  are  obviously 
profitable  to  both  nations  alike,  this  fundamental 
mutuality  will,  quite  apart  from  an  intellectual 
comprehension  of  its  workings,  insensibly  operate 
upon  the  general  mind  and  will  to  keep  nations 
in  the  path  of  sanity.  No  such  instinct  is  avail- 
able to  keep  in  peaceful  courses  a  diplomacy 
whose  secrecy  is  so  well  adapted  to  the  conflicting 
pressures  of  rival  business  groups  and  military 
castes  within  the  several  nations.  An  opponent 
of  popular  control  would  need  considerable  hardi- 


DEMOCRACY  AND   INTERNATIONALISM    209 

hood  to  maintain  that  self-government  in  foreign 
policy  could  lead  to  worse  disasters  than  the 
method  hitherto  in  vogue. 

The  second  dilatory  plea  urges  the  impossibility 
or  the  undesirability  of  one  nation  practising  pub- 
licity and  popular  control  until  all  others  attain 
the  same  level  of  enlightened  policy.  This  view 
rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  nation  which  shows 
its  hand  will  be  at  a  disadvantage,  which  assump- 
tion in  its  turn  harks  back  to  the  notion  that 
nations  in  their  dealings  with  one  another  are 
competitors,  not  co-operators.  But  granting  that 
there  will  always  continue  to  be  a  place  for 
bargaining,  in  order  that  one  nation  may  get  its 
proper  share  in  some  common  good,  such  publicity 
as  we  desiderate  need  not  and  would  not  impair 
this  process.  Publicity  and  popular  control  do 
not  imply  that  every  tentative  step  taken,  every 
communication  made,  should  be  an  immediate  sub- 
ject of  debate  in  Parliament  or  in  the  country. 
What  is  demanded  is  something  very  different — viz. 
that  sort  of  real  control  exercised  by  the  direc- 
torate of  a  business  company  over  their  managers 
and  agents,  to  whom  they  entrust  the  detailed 
conduct  of  negotiations  along  lines  which  they  have 
sanctioned,  though  all  binding  agreements  and 
contracts  must  be  submitted  to  them  for  their 
assent.  It  is  the  main  course  of  policy  that  must 
be  kept  continuously  before  the  public  eye,  and  it 
is  the  determinant  acts  of  that  policy  which  must 
receive  the  direct  sanction,  beforehand,  of  the 
representatives  of  the  people.  There  is  no  reason 
whatever  to  assume  that  a  State  which  so  con- 
ducts its  foreign  affairs  will  be  placed  at  any 

14 


2io  TOWARDS  INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

disadvantage  in  dealing  with  other  States  whose 
ways  may  be  less  liberal,  or  that  negotiations 
cannot  pass  between  two  States  behaving  so 
differently  towards  their  peoples.  The  power  of 
the  American  Senate  and  its  Foreign  Affairs  Com- 
mittee, and  the  publicity  attending  its  procedure, 
are  nowise  shown  to  be  detrimental  to  the  con- 
duct of  foreign  affairs  in  that  country.  The  fact 
that  a  Foreign  Minister  cannot  bind  his  country 
to  an  important  undertaking,  without  obtaining  the 
open  and  express  assent  of  its  representatives,  does 
not,  as  is  sometimes  suggested,  involve  a  weaken- 
ing of  foreign  policy.  It  is  not  a  really  strong 
foreign  policy  where  a  Minister,  acting  entirely 
on  his  own  initiative,  is  able  to  make  engagements 
involving  his  countrymen  in  obligations  which  he 
does  not  know  they  will  be  willing  to  accept  when 
the  time  comes  for  meeting  them.  Publicity  is 
a  source  of  strength,  not  of  weakness,  for  sound 
foreign  policy,  and  its  adoption  and  practice  by 
a  few  genuinely  liberal  nations  would  do  more  than 
anything  else  to  liberalize  the  methods  in  the  more 
backward  States.  More  than  any  other  course 
of  conduct  it  would  make  for  that  education  of 
the  mutual  confidence  of  nations  which  is  the 
indispensable  condition  of  secure  international 
arrangements. 

It  is  to  publicity,  the  regular  reliable  forma- 
tion and  co-operation  of  public  opinion  among  the 
different  peoples,  that  we  must  look  for  the  prime 
support  of  peaceful  international  relations.  No 
mere  structure  of  treaties,  Councils,  Courts,  or 
other  instruments  of  international  Government  will 
be  of  real  avail  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and 


DEMOCRACY  AND   INTERNATIONALISM    211 

the  promotion  of  active  co-operation  among 
nations,  unless  in  all  or  most  countries  this  in- 
formed and  active  public  opinion  exists.  It  may 
not  always  find  full  and  formal  expression  through 
parliamentary  or  other  representative  institutions. 
If  we  were  to  insist  that  no  safe  or  sane  .rela- 
tions could  be  formed  between  any  nations  whose 
Governments  were  not  developed  along  lines  of 
formal  democracy,  the  outlook  would  indeed  be 
dark.  But  important  as  is  popular  control  through 
Parliament,  publicity  and  informed  national  opinion 
are  more  important.  For  in  the  critical  events 
of  history  no  Government,  however  autocratic,  can 
effectively  ignore,  defy,  or  antagonize  the  general 
sentiment  of  the  people.  Once  secure  that  the 
course  of  international  relations  is  conducted 
openly,  and  that  organs  of  public  opinion  are  no 
longer  able  to  poison  public  opinion  at  the  source, 
by  spreading  false  suspicions  and  sowing  fears 
and  animosities,  the  first  moral  condition  of  sound 
internationalism  will  have  been  attained.  Publicity 
is  more  than  half  democracy  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  policy.  Upon  this  "  open  door  "  for  news, 
ideas,  and  feelings,  the  education  of  the  national 
mind,  we  shall  rely  for  the  building  up  of  that 
larger  moral  organism  which  is  to  function  in 
politics,  the  international  mind. 

At  the  end  of  this  war,  although  the  different 
peoples  may  still  dispute  the  rights  and  wrongs 
of  its  immediate  causes,  they  will  seek  its  deeper 
origins  in  the  belated  survival  of  the  evil  arts  of 
militarism  and  diplomacy,  with  their  false  out- 
looks and  their  group  pressures.  They  will  refuse 


212     TOWARDS   INTERNATIONAL  GOVERNMENT 

to  allow  the  practitioners  of  these  arts  to  resume 
their  sway  over  their  lives  and  to  force  them 
once  again  like  dumb,  driven  cattle  towards  the 
slaughter-house.  They  will  insist  that  the  obsolete 
rhetoric  of  Power  and  Sovereignty,  with  the  ideas 
of  exclusiveness  and  antagonism  which  it  sustains, 
shall  be  swept  away,  and  that  the  affairs  which 
concern  nations  shall  be  set  upon  the  same  footing 
of  decent,  reasonable  settlement  that  prevails  in 
every  other  human  relation.  They  will  require 
their  statesmen  and  their  representatives  to  think 
out  and  establish  the  necessary  arrangements  for 
doing  this.  When  they  perceive  that  these 
arrangements,  to  be  effective,  involve  an  Inter- 
national Government,  with  council,  courts,  and  an 
executive  strong  enough  to  carry  into  effect  the 
common  will  of  nations,  they  will  not  be  de- 
terred from  pressing  to  this  goal  by  theories  about 
the  absolutism  of  States  or  the  biological  necessity 
of  war,  or  by  false  analogies  from  history,  but 
will  definitely  declare  for  a  Commonwealth  of 
Nations  as  the  only  security  for  peaceful  civilization 
in  the  future. 


INDEX 


Africa,  partition  of,  141 

Alabama,  35 

Alexander  I,  188 

Algegiras  Act,  74  (n.) 

Alliance,  Western,  154 
,,       the  Holy,  26 

Alliances,  disappearance  of,  84 

Alsace-Lorraine,  122 

America,  Senate  of,  210 

Angel  1,  Norman,  95 

Antivari,  97  (n.) 

Arbitrable,  definition  of,  30-33 

Arbitral  Court,  60 

,,       Justice,  Court  of,  29 

Arbitration     Court,     Appointment, 
etc.,  Ch.  V 

Arbitration,  general  Treaty  of,  29 
,,          sphere  of,  30 
„          international,  Ch.  Ill 
,,          reservations  from,  36-7 
,,          standardization   of,  40 

Argentina,  Arbitration  Treaty,  29 

Armaments  and  policy,  184-5 
,,          for  defence,  81 
,,          reduction  of,  20 

Armenia,  122 

Asia,  labour  supply  of,  143 

Asquith,  Dublin  speech  of,  5 

Austria,  129 

Autonomy,  124-5 

"Balance  of  Power,"  15,  23,  25, 
154.  182 


Balkans,  44,  49 
Belgium,  violation  of,  179 
Berlin,  Treaty,  74  (n.) 
Berne,  Postal  Bureau,  117 
Bieberstein,  Baron  Marschall  von, 

38,42 

Bohemia,  134 
Bosanquet,  Dr.,  "The  Philosophical 

Theory  of  the  State,"  j  78 
Bosnia- Herzegovina,  74  (n.) 
Boycott,  the  economic,  Ch.  VII 

,,       difficulties  of,  92,  93 
Brailsford,   H.  N.,    "The   War  of 

Steel  and  Gold,"  138,  185 
Bryce,  Lord,  8 
Bundes-Staat,  163 

Canada,  North- West,  120 

Canning,  158 

Capital,  export  of,  139 

China,  49 

Choate,  Hon.  J.,  41 

Cobden,  137 

Colonization,  policy  of,  132 

Concert  of  Europe,  82,  189 

Concession-mongers,  183 

Conciliation,     Council    o.,     54-6 ; 

reports  of,  62 

,,  settlement  by,  Ch.  IV 

,,  issues  for,  45,  etc. 

Confederation,  a  basis  of,  Ch.  II 

Conference,  International  Peace,  28 

Convention,  Anglo-French,  68  (n.) 


213 


214 


INDEX 


Convention,  Anglo- Russian,  74  (n.) 

„  Hague,  30 

Copenhagen,  attack  on,  179 
Corea,  120 

Council,  composition  of,  64-70 
Crete,  blockade  of,  97  (n.) 
Cross,  E.  R.,  8 

"Democracy  and  Internationalism," 

Ch.  XII 
Democratic  control,  limits  of,  207, 

209 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowes,  8 
Diplomacy,  sphere  of,  32 

,,          arts  of,  67-71,  200 
Diplomatic  caste,  169 
„         service,  68 

Disarmament,  feasibility  of,  15-17 
,,  basis  of,  17-19 

,,  motives  for,  21 

Disputes,  classified,  34,  35 
Dogger  Bank,  36 
Dulcigno,  97  (n.) 

Egypt,  49 

„      status  of,  69  (n. ) 
Embassies,  personnel  of,  67-9 
England,  economic  needs  of,  129 
Executive,     International,    86-89  5 

constitution     and      powers     of, 

Ch.  VIII 

Fashoda,  204 
Fear,  cause  of  war,  84 
Finance,  international,  195 
Financiers,  influence  of,  138 

„         in  politics,  183 
Finland,  claims  of,  122 
Force,  international,  Ch.  VI 
Foreign  Ministers,  conferences  of, 
104-8  ;  difficulties  of,  105,  106 


Free  Trade,  137 
,,       ,,       dangers  to,  151 

German  militarism,  12,  13 
Germany  and  confederation,  154 
,,       crushing  of,  12,  155-6,174 
,,       economic  needs  of,  129 
„  .,         policy,  133  (n.) 

Giddings,    Professor,    "The  Prin- 
ciples of  Sociology,"  178 
"  Grand  Alliance,"  162,  193 
"Great     Powers,"     145;     danger 
from,  1 66 

Hague,  1899  Conference,  28 

,,      Second   Conference,    33-6, 

41-5 

Hague,  Powers  represented  at,  171-2 
Hobbes,  179 

"  Holy  Alliance,"  190-91 
"  Honour  and  vital  interests,"  177 
Hornblower,  Mr.,  quoted,  34 
Hull,    "The     Two     Hague    Con- 
ferences," 39,  47 
Hungary,  134 

Immigration,  Asiatic,  1 16  ^ 
Imperialism,  14,  132 
"  International,"  149 

,,  Council,  109,  1 68 

„  Executive,  Ch.  VIII 

Mind,  64,  Ch.  XI 
,,  Postal  Bureau,  117 

,,  Prize  Court,  167 

Inquiry,  Commissions  of,  46,  47,  49 
Internationalism,  growth  of,  194 
Investigation,  Committees  of,  56 
Italy,  Arbitration  Treaty,  29 

Japan,  157 

,,      economic  needs  of,  130 


INDEX 


215 


Japan,  treaty  with,  74  (n.) 
Judicature,  international,  33 
"Justiciable, "31,  33 

Keen,     F.    N.,    "The    World    in 

Alliance,"  94 
Knox,  definition  of  arbitration,  30 

Laissez-faire,  143 

Lambert,  M.  Henri,  quoted,  133-4 

League  of  Peace,  Ch.  I 

Maartens,  Prof,  de,  47 

Macchiavelli,  179 

Marburg,  Dr.,  quoted,  32 

Mongolia,  120 

Monroe  doctrine,  36,  46  ;  extensions 

of,  157 

Montenegro,  164 

Morocco,  status  of,  69  (n.) ;  trade 
in,  133 

"  National  Service,"  22 
Nationality,      meaning     of,      119; 

problems  of,  Ch.  IX,  Part  I 
Navalism,  British,  151 
Newbold,  Walton,  185 

"Open  door,"  policy  of,  131,   142, 

159 
Oppenheim,  Professor,  quoted,  29 

Panama  Canal,  113 

Peace  Commission,  50 ;  constitution 
and  powers  of,  50-52 ;  limita- 
tions of,  53 

Peace,  League  of,  Ch.  I 
,,      terms  of,  27 

Pekin,  expedition  to,  97 

Persia,  49 ;  Anglo- Russian  Conven- 
tion with,  74  (n.) 


Perns, G.  H.,  "The  War  Traders," 
'85 

Phillips,  Allison,  "  The  Confedera- 
tion of  Europe,"  188,  189,  190, 
192 

Pitt,  concerning  the  Concert,  189 

Poland,  claims  of,  122 

Pollock,  Sir  F.,  quoted,  191 

Ponsonby,  Arthur,  "  Democracy 
and  Diplomacy,  "202 

Power,  theory  of,  181 

Powers,  "Great,"  107 

Press,  provocative,  205 

Protectionism,  132,  133  ;  revivals  of, 
195,  206 

Protectorates,  131 

Prussianism,  13 

Real-Politik,  178 

Reform  Club  of  New  York,  memo- 
randum of,  119,  138 
Russia,  economic  needs  of,  129 

St.  Pierre,  Abbe  de,  187 

Scutari,  97  (n.) 

Servia,  129,  134 

"Social     Contract"     of     nations, 

Ch.  X 

South  America,  158 
"Sovereign  Powers,"  127 
"  Sphere  of  Influence,"  45,  131 
Staal,  M.,  28 

Staaten-Bund,  163 
State,  reasons  of,  66 
Super-States,  86 

Taft,  ex-President,  30,  31,  33,  75, 

77 

Tariff  wars,  137 
Tariffs,  136,  182 
'  Territorial  integrity,"  36 


2l6 


INDEX 


Treaties,  general,  39 

,,        by  Great  Britain,  36 

,,         Russia  and  Great  Britain, 

190  ;  revision  of  ,  201 
by  U.S.A.,  50 
Treaty  Powers,  21 
Treitzschke,  179 
Tribunal  of  Arbitral   Justice,    33, 

43 

Tsarism,  155 


United  States  and  Internationalism, 

157-61 
,,  ,,     "open  door,"  159 

„     peace,  31,  75 
Utrecht,  treaty  of,  187 
Utopias,  199 

Vienna,  Congress  o«,  115  (n.),  164 
Walpole,  Sir  R.,  181  (n.) 
Williams,  Aneurin,  proposals  for  a 
League  of  Peace,  28 


CNWTN  BROTHERS,  LIMITED,  THE  GRESHAM  PRESS,  WOKING  A\D  LONDON 


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